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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is an appeal from a final Decree of Divorce
dated May 19, 1993.

The Court of Appeals has

jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1986).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err or abuse its

discretion by ordering Devon Smuin to pay $313.00 per
month in child support for Dee Jay Smuin in spite of
Bonnie Jo Smuin1s earning capacity?

The lower court's

decision need not be upheld if it is so manifestly
unjust or inequitable that it indicates a clear abuse
of discretion.

Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056

(Utah App. 1987).

Supporting authorities cited by

Defendant/Appellee on this issue are as follows: Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1989); Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d
489 (Utah 1991).
2.

Did the lower court err or abuse its

discretion by awarding Bonnie Jo Smuin $1,000 per month
as alimony in spite of Bonnie Jo Smuin's earning
capacity, available liquid assets, and the distribution
of marital debt?

In reviewing such issue, the lower
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court's decision should not be upheld if it constitutes
abuse of discretion.

Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d

841, 843 (Utah App. 1992).

Supporting authorities

cited by Defendant/Appellee on this issue are as
follows:

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985);

Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991);
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988);
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991);
Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992);
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989).
3.

Did the lower court err or abuse its

discretion by ordering DeVon K. Smuin to pay all
marital debts of the parties except the "Tole House"
debt?

The standard of review for assignment of marital

debts is abuse of discretion.

Rasband v. Rasband, 752

P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah App. 1988).

Supporting

authorities cited by Defendant/Appellee are as follows:
Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 1987).
4.

Did the lower court err or abuse its

discretion by considering the part-time employment of
DeVon K. Smuin in its award of $1,000 per month alimony
to Bonnie Jo Smuin?

The standard of review for awards

of alimony is stated in paragraph 2.

2

Supporting

authorities cited by Defendant/Appellee are as follows:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1989), Rasband v. Rasband,
752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988).
5.

Did the lower court err or abuse its

discretion by ordering DeVon K. Smuin to pay one-half
of his retirement to Bonnie Jo Smuin, while not
considering said funds as monies available to Bonnie Jo
Smuin in determining Bonnie Jo Smuinfs financial need
for alimony?

The lower court's decision should not be

upheld if "there was a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated
against the findings, or such serious inequity has
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion."
Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App.
1988).

The standard of review for awards of alimony is

stated in paragraph 2.

Supporting authorities cited by

Defendant/Appellee are as follows: Rasband v. Rasband,
752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988); Jones v. Jones, 700
P.2d 1072 (Utah App. 1985).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1986) and

3

Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.5 (1989).

Copies of the

statutes are attached to the Addendum as Exhibits L and
M.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The parties were married on April 19, 1968.
During the next twenty years, they had three children
together. Plaintiff/Appellee ("Bonnie Jo") worked at
numerous jobs, became a licensed beautician, and
operated her own business.

Defendant/Appellant

("Devon") often worked more than one job at a time to
support the family.

Both parties purchased The Tole

House, a craft and paint store which Bonnie Jo managed
and operated.
Bonnie Jo is currently working only 12 to 15 hours
a week as a beautician.
Utah State University.

She is studying nursing at
She lives, rent-free, in a home

provided for her by her mother, receives a Pell grant
which covers nearly all educational expenses, and has
no utility expenses or car payments.
DeVon works more than 40 hours a week at two
different jobs.

He provides health insurance coverage

for the only minor child of the parties, Dee Jay Smuin.
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His other monthly expenses include rent, utilities,
child support, automobile expenses, medical costs not
covered by insurance, and more than $500 a month for
installment payments on outstanding debts.
The lower court awarded Bonnie Jo $312.00 a month
child support, $1,000.00 a month alimony, one vehicle,
half the proceeds of the sale of the marital home, and
one-half of Devon's retirement fund.

The court ordered

DeVon to pay all of the marital debts except for the
balance remaining on the Tole House, which appears to
have been written off by the obligor.

The debts, added

to the child support and alimony DeVon must pay, exceed
DeVonfs monthly net income.

DeVon appeals the child

support, alimony, allocation of debt, and division of
property ordered by the lower court as an abuse of
discretion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The parties were married on April 19, 1968

(R. 5).
2.

Three children born have been born of the

marriage, one of whom is still a minor.

The minor

child is Dee Jay Smuin, ("Dee Jay") born October 10,

5

1976 (R. 5 ) ,
3.

During the course of the marriage, the

parties have resided in Vernal, Utah (R. 18).
4.

During the course of the marriage, Bonnie Jo

has been periodically employed at numerous jobs.
(Smuin Dep. pp. 5-13, R. 69-77).
5.

During the course of the marriage, Bonnie Jo

has worked at the following establishments in the
following positions:
(a) Avon, salesperson (R. 69);
(b) Sara Coventry, salesperson (R. 69);
(c) Joyces House of Beauty, shampoo girl (R.
69-70);
(d) Jean's Beauty Boutique,
apprentice/licensed beautician (R. 71);
(e) The Hair Affair, licensed beautician (R.
72);
(f) The Tole House, owner, manager, teacher
(R. 75-76).
6.

During the period of time that Bonnie Jo

owned the Tole House (1988) she also worked at the Hair
Affair (R. 75).
7.

During the aforementioned period, Bonnie Jo
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worked at the Tole House six days per week and at The
Hair Affair approximately two to three days per week.
At this time, Bonnie Jo worked from eight to fifteen
hours per day.
8.

(R. 75-76).

Bonnie Jo and DeVon purchased The Tole House

in 1988 and the original purchase price was $15,000.00
(R. 75-77).
9.

The Tole House was a craft and paint store

where things were made of wood with tole paintings on
them.

The Tole House was also a retail store which

sold the paint supplies.
10.

(R. 14).

DeVon made the original down payment of

$2,200.00 on the Tole House (R. 14).
11.

Even without deducting alimony, Devon's

monthly expenses exceed his monthly income by
approximately $72.00 a month. (R. 10).
12.

DeVon has borrowed money to meet his monthly

financial obligations.
13.

(R. 10-11).

DeVon now holds more than one job, working

more than 40 hours a week.
14.

Bonnie Jo is taking one class at Utah State

University.
15.

(R. 82).

Bonnie Jo works 3 days a weeks, from 2 to 8

7

hours a day.
16.

(R. 73).

Bonnie Jo's classes are taught in the evening

and do not prevent her from working at a minimum wage
job during the day.
17.

(R. 120).

DeVon has paid more than $10,000 in house

payments on the marital property since the separation,
although he has not had access to the home during this
time. (R. 19-20).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT 1:

The lower court erred in ordering DeVon

to pay $312.00 per month in child support for Dee Jay
Smuin.

In making this award of child support, the

court considered Bonnie Jo's income of only $250.00 per
month although Bonnie Jo is capable of earning at least
$760 a month if she works full time like she did during
the marriage and as DeVon continues to do.
POINT II: The lower court erred in awarding
Bonnie Jo Jo $1,000.00 per month as alimony.

Failure

to consider the Jones factors is abuse of discretion.
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1988).
The lower court failed to consider any of the Jones
factors.
POINT III: The lower court erred in ordering
8

Devon to pay all marital debts except the "Tole House"
debt without considering his ability to pay the debts.
The assignment of all debts to DeVon, after ordering
him to pay amounts of child support and alimony
exceeding his financial ability to pay, was unjust,
unequitable, and an abuse of discretion.
POINT IV:

The lower court erred in considering

Devon's part-time employment in awarding $1,000.00 per
month alimony to Bonnie Jo.

The income attributed to

DeVon in considering his ability to pay alimony should
have been limited to his earnings during one full-time
job because no one should be required to work more than
one full-time job so that another person can work only
part-time.
POINT V:

The lower court erred by ordering DeVon

to pay one-half of his retirement to Bonnie Jo while
not considering said funds in determining Bonnie Jo's
financial need for alimony.

This property settlement

was unjust, unequitable, and an abuse of discretion
because it deprives DeVon of an asset needed to pay
debts assigned to him.

Moreover, the retirement funds

awarded to Bonnie Jo should have been counted as a
resource decreasing her financial need for alimony.

9

ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEVON TO PAY
$312.00 PER MONTH IN CHILD SUPPORT FOR DEE JAY
WITHOUT CONSIDERING BONNIE JO'S EARNING CAPACITY.
In awarding $312.00 a month child support, the
court considered Bonnie Jo's income of only $250.00 per
month although Bonnie Jo is capable of earning at least
$760 a month if she works full time like she did during
her marriage and as DeVon continues to do.

Bonnie Jo

is a healthy, fit adult with business management skills
and experience which enable her to earn at least
minimum wage.

She has voluntarily reduced her work

hours to less than 20 hours a week.

The Utah

legislature recognized the gross unfairness in such a
situation by authorizing the court to impute income to
any parent who is voluntarily underemployed or
unemployed.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (1989).

The lower court should have imputed income to
Bonnie Jo in an amount based upon her "employment
potential and probable earnings as derived from work
history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the
community."

Id.

None of the exceptions to the rule
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that income should be imputed apply to Bonnie Jo; she
has no minor children at home with unusual emotional or
physical needs, she is not disabled in any way, and she
is not engaged in training to establish basic job
skills.

Id.

Bonnie Jo does not need additional education or
training to prepare her to enter the job market.
already has more than ample job skills.

She

She has

experience in sales, teaching, and retail management.
She has owned and operated her own business.

She has

taken classes in word perfect, lotus, English, and
business math.

She has not sacrificed a career for

marriage, but has pursued her career and outside
interests freely during the duration of the marriage.
Bonnie Jo's continued education is not
rehabilitative in nature.

Unlike the wife in Bell v.

Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991), Bonnie Jo did not
help her husband to acquire an education while
postponing her own educational plans.

Bell at 492.

Instead, Bonnie Jo is attending college only because
she has decided to change careers. Although the
decision to better oneself is always commendable, it is
unjust and unfair to require DeVon to bear nearly all

11

of the financial responsibility for Dee Jay merely
because Bonnie Jo chooses to make a career change.
Even if Bonnie Jo's educational pursuits are
considered necessary, she is taking only one evening
class.

This class does not prevent her from working

during the daytime.

Bonnie Jo worked full-time during

the marriage and should not be permitted to
substantially reduce her efforts after the termination
of the marriage to Devon's detriment.
By counting only $250 a month in earnings for
Bonnie Jo, the lower court lifted much of the financial
responsibility for Dee Jay from Bonnie Jo's shoulders
and placed it upon DeVon.

This decision was not based

upon a difference in earning capacity, but only upon a
difference in the willingness of each parent to work to
support their child.

DeVon was, in effect, penalized

because he chose to work full-time instead of going
back to school to learn a new trade.

He remains bound

to a full-time job as a laborer, while Bonnie Jo works
very little.

This is so manifestly unjust and

inequitable that it constitutes abuse of discretion.

12

II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING BONNIE JO
$1,000.00 PER MONTH AS ALIMONY WITHOUT CONSIDERING
ANY OF THE JONES FACTORS.
Three factors must be considered in determining a
reasonable alimony award: (1) the financial conditions
and needs of the reguesting spouse, (2) the ability of
the reguesting spouse to produce a sufficient income
for himself or herself, and (3) the ability of the
other spouse to provide support. Jones v. Jones, 700
P.2d 1072, 1975 (Utah 1985).

See also, Schindler v.

Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App. 1989).

Failure to

consider the Jones factors "constitutes an abuse of
discretion."

Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333

(Utah App. 1988).

The lower court failed to consider

any of the Jones factors.
A.

THE COURT DID NOT CONSIDER BONNIE JO'S FINANCIAL
NEEDS
Since the purpose of alimony is to maintain the

standard of living enjoyed during marriage, "trial
courts should first determine the financial needs and
resources for both parties." Howell v. Howell, 806
P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 1991)(emphasis added).

The

lower court's consideration of Bonnie Jo's needs was
limited to finding that she "does not possess work
13

skills which will allow her to receive much more than
minimum wage" and may receive an inheritance.

Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 4.
An individual's financial need depends upon more
than the individual's income. As demonstrated in
Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah App.
1991), financial need is determined by comparing income
to expenses.

In Thronson, the court compared Ms.

Thronson's imputed monthly income to her monthly living
expenses to determine that she had a financial need for
$800 a month alimony.

Id.

The lower court in the case

at hand made no similar comparison and utterly failed
to consider Bonnie Jo's expenses. The court gave no
weight to the fact that Bonnie Jo, unlike DeVon, had no
housing expenses. The court properly stated that the
rental value of Bonnie Jo's home was not very
important, but did not explain why the rental value of
Bonnie Jo's home is of any consequence, since she does
not receive rental income from the home and pays no
rent to live in it. The court overlooked the
significance of the market rental value of the home.
Clearly, the value of the home to Bonnie Jo is a type
of income in-kind, equal to what she would otherwise

14

have to pay for shelter.
The lower court erred in not considering the home
and free utilities as factors in determining Bonnie
Jofs need for alimony.

The court never compared Bonnie

Jo's expenses to the amount of money available to her
through her own earnings and educational assistance.
Such a comparison is a crucial part of any
determination of Bonnie Jo's financial need.
B.

THE COURT DID NOT FULLY CONSIDER DEVONfS ABILITY
TO PAY ALIMONY
Ability to pay any debt, including alimony,

depends upon an individual's expenses as well as
income.

The court erred by not considering Devon's

expenses in comparison to his income. The court merely
stated that the gross income from all of Devon's jobs
would be counted to determine the amount of alimony he
must pay to Bonnie Jo.

Findings of Fact, 3.

Although

the court never articulated the relationship between
Devon's gross income and the alimony award, the
implication is that DeVon should be able to pay $1,000
because of his gross income.

"The court must do more

than simply state that the defendant has the ability to
pay."

Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah

App. 1992).
15

Devon's net income is the real indicator of his
ability to pay alimony.

Without knowing the monthly

liabilities imposed upon DeVon by the order that he pay
child support and all of the marital debts, and without
considering Devon's other living expenses, it is
impossible to know if DeVon is financially able to pay
$1,000.00 per month alimony.

The court abused its

discretion by failing to note that DeVon had no net
income with which to pay alimony.

Lacking a comparison

of Devon's income and expenses, the lower court failed
to make an "adequate factual finding'1 as required by
Chambers.
C.

Id.

THE COURT DID NOT FULLY CONSIDER BONNIE JO'S
ABILITY TO PROVIDE FOR HERSELF
The lower court found that "the defendant does not

possess work skills which will allow her to receive
much more than minimum wage" and that she currently
earns about $250.00 a month.

Thus it appears that the

alimony award was based upon Bonnie Jo's current
earnings, but the court did not explain why it relied
upon this reflection of Bonnie Jo's willingness to
support herself instead of her ability to provide for
herself.

At a minimum, the court should have

considered the amount that Bonnie Jo could earn if she
16

accepted a full-time minimum wage job. The lower
court's statement that Bonnie Jo is currently a fulltime student may indicate that the alimony award was
meant to be rehabilitative, but the lower court neither
characterized the alimony as rehabilitative nor
explained why rehabilitative alimony is appropriate.
Bonnie Jo is a healthy adult with an educational
background at least equal to Devon's.
work history and work skills.

She has a good

She is clearly able to

earn at least $760 a month, the equivalent of the
federal minimum wage for 40 hours a week.

The same

equitable considerations which led the Utah State
legislature to impute earnings when awarding child
support to a spouse who voluntarily reduces employment
also apply to determinations of alimony.

Bonnie Jo

worked full-time during the marriage and should not be
permitted to voluntarily reduce her employment in order
to increase her alimony award.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEVON TO PAY ALL
MARITAL DEBTS EXCEPT THE "TOLE HOUSE" DEBT.
Without explanation or rationale, the lower court
ordered DeVon to pay all marital debts except the "Tole
House" debt.

In Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1057
17

(Utah App. 1987), the appellate court upheld the trial
court's allocation of debt because the trial court had
considered the nature of the debts and the parties1
relative abilities to repay them.

No such

consideration was made before DeVon was ordered to pay
all the debts. DeVon has zero net income after payment
of child support, alimony, and living expenses.

Bonnie

Jo is relatively more financially capable of paying
these debts, because her monthly expenses are much less
than the amount that she could earn if she worked 40
hours a week like DeVon. Assigning all debts to DeVon
without comparing his ability to pay those debts to
Bonnie Jo's ability to pay is so arbitrary and unjust
as to constitute abuse of discretion.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING DEVON'S PARTTIME EMPLOYMENT IN AWARDING $1,000.00 PER MONTH
ALIMONY TO BONNIE JO.
The lower court based the alimony award upon
Devon's total earnings, counting his part-time
employment as well as his full-time employment.

This

is unfair, unreasonable, and contrary to the overall
goal of alimony to "equalize the parties' respective
post-divorce living standards" because the income
18

results from Devon working more than 40 hours a week.
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App.
1980).

The Utah state legislature has recognized the

unfairness and unreasonableness of basing child support
awards upon a parent's income from working more than 40
hours a week.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2) (1989).

It is just as unfair and unreasonable to base alimony
awards upon a spouse's income from working more than 40
hours a week.

Our modern society has accepted 40 hours

a week as the norm and the maximum that a reasonable
employer may expect from laborers.

Forty hours a week

is called "full-time" because 40 hours of work occupies
the full amount of work time reasonably allocated to an
individual.

Since DeVon should not be expected to keep

working more than 40 hours a week, the alimony award
should not be based upon the income from more than 40
hours a week.
A standard of living is more than income; it is
the way of life followed by an individual.

If DeVon

must work more than full-time, while Bonnie Jo works
much less than full-time, their standards of living are
grossly unequal.

19

V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY ORDERING DEVON TO PAY
ONE-HALF OF HIS RETIREMENT TO BONNIE JO WHILE NOT
CONSIDERING SAID FUNDS AS MONIES AVAILABLE TO
BONNIE JO IN DETERMINING BONNIE JO'S FINANCIAL
NEED FOR ALIMONY.
The court erred in two respects concerning the
order requiring Devon to pay one-half of his retirement
to Bonnie Jo.

First, the division of Devon's

retirement is a substantial and prejudicial error and a
serious inequity because it deprived DeVon of assets he
needs to enable him to pay the debts allocated to him
by the court.

Second, the court failed to consider the

retirement funds as a resource affecting Bonnie Jo's
financial need for alimony.
A.

DIVISION OF DEVON'S RETIREMENT IS A SERIOUS
INEQUITY BECAUSE DEVON WAS ORDERED TO PAY ALL OF
THE MARITAL DEBTS EXCEPT THE TOLL HOUSE DEBT.
DeVon was ordered to pay Bonnie Jo one-half of his

retirement, even though he was assigned all of the
debts.

Debt, however, is merely the inverse of an

asset.

As a type of property, the negative value of

the debts should have been added the value of the
Devon's retirement and all other assets, such as the
equity in the marital home, so that the total value of
all marital property could be equitably divided.

20

Before adding in the equity of the marital home, DeVon
should have been reimbursed for the $10,000 he paid in
mortgage payments on this home after the separation.
The lower court, however, never calculated the total
value of all of the assets or considered using the
marital assets to offset the marital debts.

In giving

half of Devon's retirement to Bonnie Jo, the court
deprived DeVon of assets which should be available for
him to pay the debts which the court ordered him to
pay.
B.

IF DEVON MUST GIVE ONE-HALF OF HIS RETIREMENT TO
BONNIE JO, THE RETIREMENT MONIES SHOULD BE COUNTED
AS A RESOURCE DECREASING BONNIE JO'S FINANCIAL
NEED FOR ALIMONY.
In determining the amount of an alimony award, a

court must consider the financial need of the party
requesting alimony.

Jones at 1075. Failure to

consider this Jones factor is an abuse of discretion.
Rasband at 1333. As demonstrated in Jones, the assets
available to the party requesting alimony should be
considered in determining financial need for alimony.
Jones at 1075. The Jones court considered the cash,
securities, and equity in the home awarded to Ms. Jones
compared to her monthly expenses as part of the
determination that she needed $1,000 a month alimony.
21

Such a comparison has never been made upon which to
base the alimony awarded to Bonnie Jo.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the facts and circumstances of this
case, and the authorities cited herein, the orders and
judgments entered by the lower court should be
reversed.
DATED this^7^

day of December, 1993.
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a
true and accurate copy of the foregoing Brief this
^L\

' day of December, 1993 to the following:
Alan M. Williams
365 W. 50 N., #W10
Vernal, Utah
84078
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

!

DEVON K. SMUIN,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 9108000247

BONNIE JO SMUIN,
Defendant,

!

This matter came before the Court on the 29th day of January,
1993.

The Honorable A. Lynn Payne presided.

The plaintiff

appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Suzanne
Bensen. The defendant was present and represented by her attorney,
Alan M. Williams.

The Court heard evidence from the parties.

Having done so and now being fully advised in the premises, and
having previously entered its findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and for good cause appearing, the Court makes the following:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The parties are hereby granted a Decree of Divorce from

each other dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing
between the parties.

Said decree shall become final upon entry

2
thereof.
2.

It is ordered that the parties property should be divided

as follows:
a. The parties are ordered to sell the marital residence
with the proceeds to be divided equally between the parties.

In

the event that there is a deficiency upon sell, it is ordered that
it shall be divided equally between the parties;
b. The parties are ordered to sell the Kit camp trailer.
The proceeds are to divided equally between the parties;
c.

It is ordered that the inventory from the business

known as the Toll House be sold with the proceeds being retained
for the purposes of paying off the $8,000.00 debt owed on the
business.

In the event that the creditor cannot be located, it is

ordered that the parties retain the proceeds until such time as the
statute of limitations has expired for collection of the debt.

In

the event that there is a residual debt on the business, it is
ordered that the parties divide equally and be equally responsible
for that debt.

In the event that the proceeds become available,

it is ordered that those proceeds shall divided equally between the
parties.
d.

It is ordered that the plaintiff be awarded all

property on Exhibit Four received by the Court and referred to in
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with the exception of
the dishes, glasses, and kitchen appliances;
e.

The defendant is awarded the dishes, glasses, and

kitchen appliances and the items listed on Exhibit Five with the

3
exception of the inventory of the Toll House;
f. The defendant is awarded the 1988 Pontiac automobile;
g.

The plaintiff is hereby awarded the 1985 Bronco;

h.

The parties are hereby awarded all other personal

property which is currently in the possession of each of them.
3.

It is ordered that the plaintiff shall assume and pay all

remaining marital debts.
4.

It is ordered that the plaintiff pay to the defendant one

half of the value of his retirement plan currently held with his
employer, P.J.E.
5.

The defendant is hereby awarded custody oi the parties

minor child, D.J.
6.

The plaintiff is ordered to pay child support in the

amount of $312.00 per month until the month of May following

D.J.'s

eighteenth birthday.
7.
Thousand

The plaintiff is ordered to pay alimony in the sum of One
Dollars

jurisdiction

($1,000.00)

to alter

per

or amend

month.

The

Court

retains

this award in the event that

defendants income substantially increases.
8. The plaintiff is ordered to maintain medical insurance on
behalf of D.J. through his employment through the month of May
following his eighteenth birthday.

9.

Each party is ordered to execute and complete all necessary
**" :

documents in order to effectuate the above transfer of property.

Dated this

(f

day of

/^L

A. Lynn Pa
Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Suzanne Bensen

1993.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and DECREE OF DIVORCE were
sent postage prepaid to Suzanne Benson, Attorney at Law at 455 East
500 South, Suite #200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 5th day
of March, 1993.
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Alan M. Williams (3478)
Attorney for Defendant
365 W. 50 N., #W10
Vernal, Utah 84078
801-789-2713

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

|

DEVON K. SMUIN,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No.

BONNIE J. SMUIN,
Defendant,

9108000247

j

This matter came before the Court on the 29th day of January,
1993.

The Honorable A. Lynn Payne presided.

The plaintiff

appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, Suzanne
Bensen. The defendant was present and represented by her attorney,
Alan M. Williams.

The Court heard evidence from the parties.

Having done so and based on the evidence, the Court makes the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1.

The parties were married on April 19, 1968.

2.

That during the course of the marriage, irreconcilable

differences have developed in making a continuation of the marriage
impossible.
3.

The parties have resided in Uintah County, State of Utah

for a period of at least several years prior to the filing of the

2
action in this matter.
4. The parties have two children.
is under the age of eighteen.
record,

it

is

reasonable

One of the children, D.J.

Based on the parties stipulation of

and

appropriate

that

child

support

continue until through the month of May following D.J.'s eighteenth
birthday in order that he may finish high school.
5. The plaintiff works at P.J.E. Resources as a pumper.

For

the purposes of accessing child support, his income is $2,885.92
per month.
6. The defendant is currently enrolled as a full-time student
and works part-time a week as a beautician.

Her income from

employment is $250.00 per month.
7.
custody

The parties have stipulated that the defendant be given
of D.J.

arrangement.

The Court

finds that

this is a reasonable

It is reasonable and appropriate that the plaintiff

have the right to reasonable and liberal visitation.
8. It is reasonable and appropriate that based on the parties
income, child support should be assessed at $312.00 per month
payable by the plaintiff to the defendant.
9.

It reasonable and appropriate that plaintiff be ordered

to provide insurance for D.J. through his employment.

He may

deduct the costs of D.J.'s portion of such medical insurance from
the child support payments.

It is reasonable that each party pay

one-half of the medical expenses not covered by insurance.
10.

It is reasonable and appropriate that the plaintiff may

claim DeeJay as his dependant for income tax purposes.

3
11. It is reasonable and appropriate that the plaintiff assume
all debts incurred during the marriage except as specifically
excepted in these findings.
12.

The plaintiff has other employment besides his work as a

pumper.

For the purposes of considering alimony, the Court will

consider all of his income.

His total income for the purposes of

considerating alimony is $3,176.66 per month.
13.

During the course of this marriage the parties purchased

a business known as the Tole House.

It is reasonable and proper

that the inventory of this business be sold with the proceeds being
used to pay off an existing debt in connection with this business
in the amount of approximately $8,000.00. In the event the parties
cannot locate the creditor, the funds should be retained by the
parties until a statute of limitations has expired with respect to
the collection of the debt.

In the event that there is residual

debt after the payment of any creditors in this matter, it is
reasonable and appropriate that the debt be divided equally between
the parties.
14. The parties are owners of real property with a home on it.
It is reasonable and appropriate that the home should be sold and
the proceeds should be equally divided between the parties after
expenses are paid.
15.

The parties are the owner of a Kit camp trailer.

It is

reasonable and appropriate that it should be sold and the proceeds
divided equally between the parties.
16. It is reasonable and appropriate that the parties personal

4
property be divided as follows:
a.

Plaintiff should awarded the dishes, silverware and

utensils in the trailer.
b.

Defendant should be awarded the items listed on

Exhibit Five with the exception of the inventory.
c.

Plaintiff should be awarded the property on Exhibit

Four with the exception

of the dishes, glasses, and kitchen

appliances which are awarded to the defendant.
d.

Except as otherwise specified, each party should be

awarded the personal property of his or her own possession.
17.

The plaintiff has available to him retirement funds.

It

is reasonable and appropriate that the retirement funds should be
divided equally between the parties.
18.

It is reasonable and appropriate that the plaintiff should

be awarded the 1985 Bronco and that the defendant should be awarded
the 1988 Pontiac automobile.
19.

The Court finds that the defendant does not possess work

skills which will allow her to receive much more than minimum wage.
It is therefore reasonable and appropriate that the plaintiff be
ordered to pay alimony.

In consideration of the amount of alimony,

the Court finds that it is inappropriate at this time to consider
any expectation of inheritance.

The court also finds that it is

unable to give the fact that the defendant will live in a new home
at a rental rate at less than market value a great deal of weight
in determining the amount of that alimony.

Based on the parties

present financial condition, it is reasonable and appropriate that

5
the defendant be awarded the sum of $1,000.00 per month as alimony.
20.

The defendant currently is in school to up-grade her job

skills, and it is anticipated that her ability to provide for
herself willincrease in the future.

It is appropriate that the

Court retain jurisdiction to alter alimony if defendants income
substantially increases.
21.

It is reasonable and appropriate that each party be

required to bear his or her own attorney's fees in this matter.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes
the following conclusions of law:
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the parties hereto.

2. The parties are entitled to a decree of divorce from each
other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to
become final upon entry.
3. The parties debt should be divided in accordance with the
above findings of fact.
4.

The parties

personal

property

should

be divided in

accordance with the above findings of fact.
5.

The defendant is awarded custody of the parties minor

child.
6.

The plaintiff should be required to pay child support in

the amount of with the amount of $312.00 per month until the month
of May following Deejay's eighteenth birthday.
7.

The plaintiff should be required to pay alimony to the

Defendant in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) per
month.

6
8.

The Court should retain jurisdiction to alter alimony if

the defendants income substantially increases.
9. The plaintiff should be required to pay and assume medical
insurance for the parties minor child in accordance with the terms
set forth above.
10.

The plaintiff should be required to assume and pay all

marital debts in accordance with the terms set forth above.
Dated this

ff

day of

/^*H

1993.

A. Lynj/TPayne, Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Suzanne Bensen
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Cite as 810 PJJd 489 (Utah App. 1991)

dmmistrative search, which, as applied, made on appeal that the bailiff deviated
not violate the fourth amendment. from the routine that is followed in all
thout exceeding the scope of the admin- situations where the x-ray reveals "a dark,
indistinct mass."
n v e search, an officer discovered a bin£»e containing cocaine in plain view at the
Thus, I infer that the protocol routinely
' 0f the purse's contents. A more ex- followed when a container enclosing such a
haustive search of Cornwall's baggage en- mass also contains other closed containers
ued as an incident to her arrest and reis that the other containers—or, more acculed marijuana. Since the controlled rately, those large enough to contain the
substances seized were either in plain view mass which has aroused curiousity—are
discovered in a lawful search incident to immediately opened and individually inarrest, the district court erred in suppress- spected rather than to first individually xmg the controlled substances as evidence ray the smaller containers.
against Cornwall.
As the main opinion observes, the bailiff
The order of suppression is therefore "discovered that [the large bag] contained
reversed and this case is remanded for two purses, and she could not see from
examining the outside of the purses whethtrial.
er either purse contained a weapon or danJACKSON, J., concurs.
gerous object." Of course, further insight
might have been gained with less intrusion
ORME, Judge (concurring):
had each purse been individually x-rayed as
I concur in the court's opinion but write
the next step. But on the record before us,
separately to highlight an aspect of our
that is not what the search protocol redecision that is only implicit in the main
quires. Neither does the Fourth Amendopinion.
ment. Use of an x-ray is essentially gratuiJust as in the context of automobile in- tous, an accommodation to the privacy conventory searches, routinized adherence to cerns of the public and/or a convenience to
an articulated search protocol is critical to those conducting the searches. So long as
sustaining an administrative search as rea- proper notice is posted, the Fourth Amendsonable. As this court recently stated in ment is not violated at other court locations
the inventory search context,
where the practice is to simply physically
[s]uch a procedure precludes the possibil- inspect the briefcases, bags, and purses of
ity that officers conducting inventory all persons seeking to enter the courthouse.
searches will act arbitrarily and only selectively open containers. Further, such
( O | « Y NUMBtR SYSTEM^
a procedure insulates police from the
claim that, in a particular case, their
opening closed containers was nothing
more than a "fishing expedition." It also
Michele Mclver BELL, Plaintiff
promotes a certain equality of treatment.
and Appellant,
With a standardized, mandatory procev.
dure, the minister's picnic basket and
grandma's knitting bag are opened and
Harold Freeman BELL, Defendant
inventoried right along with the biker's
and Appellee.
tool box and the gypsy's satchel.
No. 900183-CA.
State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 428 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).
Court of Appeals of Utah.
In the instant case, uncontroverted testiApril 23, 1991.
mony establishes that the bailiff conducted
the magnetometer and x-ray screening and
the ensuing search strictly in accordance
Divorce judgment was entered by the
with the established protocol. No claim is First District Court, Cache County, F.L.
1
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C l l e u S I O P2d 4S9 (Utah App 1991)

Gunnell, J , and wife appealed The Court
of Appeals, Billings, J , held that: (1) the
trial court's findings on the issue of alimony were inadequate, and (2) trial court was
required to explain its reduction of attorney fees incurred by wife
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part
1. Divorce «=>286(3)
Court of Appeals will not disturb trial
court's ruling on alimony as long as court
exercises its discretion within bounds and
under standards Court of Appeals has set
and has supported its decision with adequate findings and conclusions.
2. Divorce <S=»239. 240(2), 285
Failure to consider Jones factors in
fashioning alimony award constitutes
abuse of discretion; thus, trial court must
make sufficiently detailed findings of fact
on each factor to enable reviewing court to
ensure that trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon
those three factors, and if sufficient findings are not made, Court of Appeals must
reverse unless record is clear and uncontroverted such as to allow court to apply
Jones factors as matter of law on appeal.
3. Divorce e=>239
Alimony award was not supported by
adequate findings; court failed to make
adequate findings on needs of either husband or wife, as both parties claimed that
other's expenses were unreasonable, but
court made no findings as to reasonableness of those expenses, and findings were
inadequate as to wife's ability to support
herself, as wife's claimed expenses far exceeded her monthly income even at level
imputed by trial court
4. Divorce *»252.1, 252.2
Wife failed to show that property distribution was inequitable, as wife did not
explain what property she believed should
have been awarded to her or how court
abused its discretion
5. Divorce «=»22l. 227(1)
Award of attorney fees in divorce proceeding must be based on evidence of fi-

nancial need of receiving spouse, ability of
other spouse to pay, and reasonableness of
requested fees; court may consider, among
other factors, difficulty of litigation, efficiency of attorneys, reasonableness of
number of hours spent on case, fee customarily charged in locality, amount involved
in case and result attained, and expertise
and experience of attorneys involved. U.C
A. 1953, 30-3-3.
6. Divorce «=»287
Where court gave no explanation for
its reduction of attorney fees incurred by
wife in divorce proceeding and reasonable*
ness of fees was uncontroverted, and court
failed to address wife's need or husband's
ability to pay her attorney fees, remand
was required for redetermination of award*
able attorney fees. U C.A.1953, 30-3-3.

tamed a master's degree which assisted
aim in the advancement of his military
career. Wife claims the degree was a remit of joint efforts of Husband ami Wife.
Wife claims the parties agreed she would
twist Husband in pursuing his degree, and
•hen she decided to return for her graduate degree, Husband would support her.
Husband admits Wife assisted him in obttihing his degree and does not explicitly
deny that he agreed to support Wife when
•be returned to school to obtain her graduate degree.
At the time of trial, Wife was pursuing a
•uter's degree in education at Utah Stite
University and was making $863 per month
as a teaching assistant. Prior to attending
Utah State, Wife taught school in North
Carolina making about $1,500 per month,
«T approximately $18,000 a year.

7. Divorce «=>226, 227(1)
It is abuse of discretion for trial court
without any reasonable justification to
award less than claimed amount of attorney fees in divorce proceeding; court must
explain its sua sponte reduction in order to
permit meaningful review on appeal. U.CL
A. 1953, 30-3-3.

The parties purchased a home in North
Carolina and resided there between 1983
and 1987. Both parties incurred substantial debt in their individual names during
the marriage.

Lyle W. Hillyard (argued), Hillyiri
Anderson & Olsen, Logan, for plaintiff and
appellant.
Craig S. Cook (argued), Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellee.

Wife began working on her master's define at Utah State in 1988. Although Husband had sent Wife between $1,600 and
•1,800 per month while he was stationed in
Korea, once Wife began attending Utah
Slate, he refused to provide Wife with financial support other than $450 per month
to support their child, apparently because
be disapproved of her relocation and educational advancement.

Before BILLINGS, GARFF, and
ORME, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Appellant Michele Mclver Bell (WifeX
and Appellee Harold Freeman Bell (Hua»
band), were married in 1979 at Logan,
Utah. One child, age six at the time of the
divorce, was born during the marriage. *
Husband serves as a Major in the Air
Force and is stationed in New Mexico. Hit
monthly salary at the time of the divoroi
was $3,660, or approximately $40,000 per
year.
During the marriage, Husband

In April 1987, Husband was ordered to
Korea for a one year tour of duty. Wife
dtd not accompany him, but remained in
North Carolina.1

Wife filed for divorce in March 1989, and
k March 1990, the parties were granted a
divorce based on irreconcilable differences.
Under the divorce decree, Wife was awarded custody of the parties' child subject to
reasonable visitation by Husband. Husband was ordered to pay $450 per month
i

Huvband claims thai during this one ycai pen
ad. Wife dissipated their maiilnl assets Wife,
•A the other hand, claims there were two
•lonths of unpaid bills that she paid soon after
Muihand left for Korea, and that the remainder
•( the money was spent on joint family expenses
HOP 2d-13

child support, Wife was awarded an interest in Husband's military retirement, subject to a reduction of $3,800, one-half of
Wife's retirement, which she cashed in February 1989. Each party was ordered to
pay the debts incurred in his or her own
name. Neither party challenges these rulings on appeal.
The court awarded Wife alimony of $250
a month for two years and then satisfied
the award by giving Wife the personal
property in her possession which the court
valued at $6,000. The court found no equity in the family's North Carolina home and
awarded it to Husband. The court also
awarded Husband the personal property in
his possession. Finally the court ordered
Husband to pay a portion of Wife's attorney fees
Wife appeals from the divorce decree,
claiming- (1) her award of alimony was
insufficient; (2) the trial court failed to
adequately value and divide the marital
property; (3) her award of attorney fees
was inadequate; and (4) she is entitled to
attorney fees on appeal We affirm in part
and reverse and remand in part.
ALIMONY
111 We will not disturb a trial court's
ruling on alimony as long as the court
"exercises its discretion within the bounds
and under the standards we have set and
has supported its decision with adequate
findings and conclusions." Naranjo v.
Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 749
P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988)).
The well-settled standard for setting traditional alimony has been articulated by the
Utah Supreme Court as follows:
"The most important function of alimony
is to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of
living she enjoyed during the marriage,
and to prevent the wife from becoming a
and that she and hci daughter weie living at the
same standaid ol living as they had lived before
Husband went to Korea The only exception
appears to have been a loan Wile made to her
sister, which rcptesents only a small part of the
total amount of assets.
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public charge." English v. English, 565
P.2d [409] at 411 (Utah 1977)....
[TJhree factors must 1 1 be considered in
fixing a reasonable alimony award:
11] the financial conditions and needs
of the wife;
[21 the ability of the wife to produce
a sufficient income for herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to provide support.
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah
1985).
12 J Failure to consider the
Jones
factors in fashioning an alimony award
constitutes an abuse of discretion. See
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah
Ct.App.1988) (citing Paffel v. Paffel, 732
P.2d 96. 101 (Utah 1986)). Accordingly, the
trial court must make sufficiently detailed
findings of fact on each factor to enable a
reviewing court to ensure that the trial
court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon these three factors.
See Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah
1988); Stevens, 754 P.2d at 958-59; see
also Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999
(Utah 1987). If sufficient findings are not
made, we must reverse unless the record is
clear and uncontroverted such as to allow
us to apply the Jones factors as a matter of
law on appeal. See Asper v. Asper, 753
P.2d 978, 981 (Utah CtApp.1988).

That regarding alimony, because the
standard of living is based on debt and
wasted assets and not established by the
lifestyle and in lieu of any alimony, Plaintiff is awarded all the personal property
now in her possession which the Court
places a value of $6,000.00 based on the
husband's Exhibit No. 14.
In discussing the alimony award, the trial judge stated from the bench, "I don't
give it as much weight as to what the
needs and abilities of the parties might be
because they dissipated and lived on credit." Nevertheless, the court specifically indicated that the level of its alimony award
was not based on the fact that Wife dissipated assets.

The court did find Husband's income was
$3,660 per month and Wife's was $1,500.'
The only other arguable reference to the
Jones factors is included in another statement by the court from the bench:
So what I will do is, as far as alimony, is
in lieu of alimony, and I set down and
computed what the defendant could pay,
which is essentially nothing, what the
plaintiff needed, which is a great deal
and asked how it could be paid.
The trial court seems to justify ignoring
the three-prong Jones test because "each
[of the parties] have had and pursued separate careers and there has been a history
of marital problems." At least the latter
part of this statement can be made about a
131 The trial court awarded alimony to majority of divorces and certainly is not
Wife in the amount of $250 a month for grounds to deviate from the Jones analysis.
Furthermore, nothing in the record inditwo years. The court satisfied this award
by awarding Wife the personal property in cates the trial judge approached the alimoher possession which the court valued at ny issue from the standpoint of a rehabili$6,000. This, in effect, eliminated the per- tative or reimbursement approach rather
sonal property award to Wife and resulted than a traditional alimony award. If this
in no monetary award of alimony. The was the intent, then different findings and
analysis would be appropriate.' See Petertrial court found:
2.

3.

It was undisputed that, at the time of trial,
Wife's income was J863 per month. Nonetheless, the court imputed to hci income at a
level she previously had earned in North Carolina as a school teacher No explanation was
offcted for this unusual adjustment.
A rehabilitative award could well be appropriate in this case as Wife is college educated, in
good health, and worked throughout the marriage. She is independently minded, as evidenced b) hci decision to stay in North Car-

olina when Husband went to Korea and to stay
in Utah when he was assigned to New Mexico.
She is comparatively young and the marriage
was comparatively short. On the other hand,
Wife helped Husband get his master's degree,
but the marriage ended before she had the
chance to get hers, as had been contemplated.
There is no question that receiving an advanced
degree would better equip her to compete in the
job market for a position at a better salary. An
award of alimony geared towards reimbursing

HELL v. HELL
ClleaaHIO P.2d 4S9 (Utah App 1*91)

sen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 242 n. 4
(Utah Ct.App.1987).
The trial court's findings on the issue of
alimony are so inadequate that we cannot
determine the legal basis of the award or
whether the trial court abused its discretion in the amount of the award. First, the
court failed to make adequate findings on
the needs of either Husband or Wife. Wife
claimed expenses of $2,493 per month.
Husband claimed expenses of $5,090.74 per
month. No findings were made as to the
reasonableness of these expenses, yet both
parties argued below and on appeal the
other's expenses are unreasonable. The
only finding by the court on this point is
that each party had "roughly equivalent"
debts in their own names, which the court
required them to pay. Without a finding
on reasonable expenses, we are unable to
determine the true needs of Wife, or to
determine Husband's actual ability to pay
and, therefore, to balance Wife's needs
against Husband's ability to pay as required in Jones.
The mere conclusory
statement of the trial court that Husband
can "afford nothing" when he is making
$40,000 per year is simply not supported by
the record, absent some finding as to the
reasonableness of his claimed expenses.
Furthermore, there is no explanation why,
if Wife needed "a great deal," the court
awarded no monetary award of alimony.
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those findings. In the alternative, if the
relevant Jones findings or other analysis
lead to a conclusion that an award of rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony is the
more appropriate vehicle to equitably treat
the parties in this case, then findings supporting such an award should be entered.
PROPERTY DIVISION
14 J Wife also claims the trial court
failed to accurately account for and value
the marital property and that therefore the
court's property distribution was inequitable. Wife does not articulate the basis
of her claim that the court's property distribution was inequitable. She does not explain what property she believes should
have been awarded to her or how the court
abused its discretion. Therefore, we affirm the property distribution.
ATTORNEY FEES AT TRIAL

The court's alimony award is not supported by adequate findings, and thus we
reverse and remand the alimony award for
additional findings on each of the Jones
factors in light of our opinion, and a reassessment of the alimony award based upon

151 A trial court has the power to
award attorney fees in divorce proceedings,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3
(1989). The award must be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to
pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d
1331, 1337 (Utah Ct.App.1988). The decision to make such an award and the
amount thereof rest primarily in the sound
discretion of the trial court. Kerr v. Kerr,
610 P.2d 13H0, 1384 (Utah 19H0) A court
may consider, among other factors, the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of
the attorneys, the reasonableness of the
number of hours spent on the case, the fee
customarily charged in the locality, the
amount involved in the case and the result
attained, and the expertise and experience

her for the help she extended Husband in getting his degree, or towards assisting her in acquiring her degree which would better enable
her to suppoit her daughter may well be closer
to the mark than the traditional alimony analysis. However, if this approach is taken, it
would be inappiopriale to impute income to
Wife at the level of her previous teaching salary
as the trial judge did. The purpose of rehabilitative alimony is in the short run to close the

gap between actual expenses and actual income
to enable the receiving spouse to then be better
able to suppoit hci self when the alimony and
schooling end Under this analvsis. Wife's in
come must be considered to be $863, the
amount she was actually earning as a teaching
assistant Furthermore, a non monctaiy award
of alimony would not establish a rehabilitative
result if there is a dcmonstiatcd difference between wife's income and expenses.

Second, the findings are inadequate as to
Wife's ability to support herself. Wife's
claimed expenses of $2,493 per month far
exceed her monthly income even at the
level imputed by the trial court.

of the attorneys involved. Rasband, 752
P.2d at 1336.
[6] At trial, Wife's counsel testified his
reasonable attorney fees expended m pursuing this divorce action were $2,350.
Husband did not challenge the reasonableness of these claimed fees. Nevertheless,
the trial court awarded Wife only $800 in
attorney fees. The court made no findings
on Wife's need for the payment of her fees,
Husband's ability to pay the fees, or the
reasonableness of the attorney fees. In
short, the court gave no explanation for
awarding only one-third of the requested
fees.
[7] To permit meaningful review of the
trial court's discretionary ruling, "[w]e
have consistently encouraged trial courts
to make findings to explain the factors
which they considered relevant in arriving
at an attorney fee award." Regional Sales
Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210,
1215 (Utah Ct.App.1989); see also Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 518 (Utah
Ct.App.1989) (for meaningful appellate review trial court must explain factors and
basis for sua sponte reduction of attorney
fees); Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684,
688 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (award of attorney
fees in divorce case remanded for more
adequate findings). In Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah CtApp.
1990), we held it was an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to award less than the
claimed amount of attorney fees without
any reasonable justification, and that a trial court must explain its sua sponte reduction in order to permit meaningful review
on appeal. See also Regional Sales Agency, Inc., 784 P.2d at 1215 (findings particularly important when the trial court has
reduced the attorney fees from the amount
requested, and amount requested was supported by undisputed evidence); Martindale, 111 P.2d at 518.
The trial court in this case gave no explanation for its reduction of attorney fees
incurred by Wife where their reasonableness was uncontroverted. Again, the
court's failure to address Wife's need or
Husband's ability to pay her attorney fees
leaves us with no adequate explanation for

the court's award. We therefore remand
for the trial court to make a redetermhiu
tion of awardable attorney fees in light of
our opinion and to make findings to SUTV
port the award.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Wife seeks an award of attorney fe^
incurred on appeal. "Ordinarily, when feet
in a divorce were awarded below to the
party who then prevails on appeal, fees wfll
also be awarded to that party on appeal."
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utatf
CtApp. 1990). Because Wife was awarded
attorney fees below, a result that is not
likely to change on remand although the1
amount may differ, and because she hat
prevailed on the main issue on appeal, we"
award her attorney fees in an amount to be
determined by the trial court on remand.
In summary, we reverse and remand on
the issues of alimony and attorney fees,
but affirm the trial court's property distribution.
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur.

In re J.D.M., A person under
eighteen years of age.
CACHE COUNTY, Appellant,
v.
A.W. LAURITZEN, Appellee.
No. 900033-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 25, 1991.
Attorney who was appointed to represent indigent parent in proceeding to terminate parent/child relationship was awarded
fees by the First District Juvenile Court,
Cache County, L. Kent Bachman, J., and
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Under the clearly erroneous standard,
he majority must show how the trial court
precluded from finding a reasonable
suspicion by reviewing the facts relied
non by the officer and explaining why, as
matter of law, it was improper to considthem. See, e.g., Mendoza, 748 P.2d at
183-84- Since the majority has failed to
foreclose the possibility of a finding that
•he officer had a reasonable articulable
suspicion as a matter of law, it errs in
substituting its judgment for that of the
tnal court. In essence, my colleagues
would require that the officer have subjective proof of drug dealing at the house
before they would find the officer's suspicion to be objectively reasonable. Not only
does such reasoning ignore the trial court's
proper role, it ignores the well-established
rule that "[t]he process does not deal with
hard certainties, but with probabilities."
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418,
101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).
Inasmuch as the trial court did not violate any legal principle in finding that the
officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion, I would defer to the trial court's findI therefore respectfully dissent.
mg

2>

efits, and awarded wife alimony and attorney fees. Both parties appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Russon, J., held that: (1)
findings on issue of alimony were insufficient; (2) findings on issue of attorney fees
were insufficient; (3) husband's future contract payments were postmarital income
and not marital property rights subject to
division; and (4) trial court should have
considered cashing out wife's share of retirement benefits.
Reversed and remanded in part and
affirmed in part.

1. Divorce <S=>235, 286(3)
Trial court is given considerable discretion to provide for spousal support and
such award will not be overturned on appeal unless there has been clear and prejuducial abuse of discretion.
2. Divorce <s=>237, 239
When determining alimony, trial court
should consider, among other things, wife's
level of education, health, and other matters concerning her immediate or eventual
employability; court must do more than
simply state that husband has ability to
pay alimony.

| KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

i 5 z^^^^^^V

Erin Jo CHAMBERS, Plaintiff,
Appellant, and CrossAppellee,
v.
Thomas D. CHAMBERS, Defendant,
Appellee, and Cross-Appellant.
No. 900631-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 21, 1992.
In dissolution action, the Second District, Weber County, Stanton M. Taylor, J.,
divided property, including husband's future contract payments and retirement ben-

3. Divorce <3=»239
Trial court's findings on alimony were
insufficient because findings did not address wife's level of education, health and
other matters concerning her immediate or
eventual employability, findings' reference
to "substantial income from assets that
have been awarded to her" was inadequate
to justify reduction of alimony and findings
did not do more than state that husband
had ability to pay alimony.
4. Divorce <s=>240(2), 296
If child support that party stipulated
to is insufficient to cover children's expenses, court must award sufficient child
support, not increase alimony to include
children's expenses.
5. Divorce <3=223, 227(1)
Both decision to award attorney fees
and amount of such fees are within sound
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discretion of trial court in divorce case.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3.
6. Divorce <$=>224
Award of attorney fees must be based
on evidence of reasonableness of requested
fees, as well as financial need of receiving
spouse, and ability of other spouse to pay.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3.
7. Divorce <&=>226
In awarding partial reimbursement of
attorney fees to wife in divorce case, trial
court should have addressed reasonableness of attorney fees and made findings as
to means of each party to pay fees.
8. Divorce <3=>252.3(1)
Husband's future contract payments
for playing professional basketball were
postmarital income and not marital property rights subject to division because future
income would be derived from husband's
playing basketball during term of his contract, rather than from past effort or product produced during marriage, husband's
right to benefit of salary would accrue at
that time and not during course of marriage and contract payments would be
made only if husband did not suffer injury,
illness, disability or death as result of certain off-court activities.
9. Divorce <s=>252.3(4)
When dividing retirement benefits, trial court should have considered option of
ordering
valuation
of
nonemployee
spouse's share and immediate cash-out
from other assets.
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for appellant.
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, and Mark J. Robens, Phoenix, Ariz., for appellee.
Before GARFF, ORME and RUSSON,
JJ.
RUSSON, Judge:
Erin Jo Chambers and Thomas D. Chambers appeal the trial court's order granting
divorce and specifying numerous property
and support provisions. We affirm in part,
and reverse and remand in part.

FACTS
Erin Jo Chambers and Thomas D.
bers were married on February 12,
While married, Mr. Chambers signe
first professional basketball contract
the San Diego Clippers, for whom]
played for two seasons. He was su
quently traded to the Seattle Superson
for whom he played for five seasonal
then signed a five year contract wiiM
Phoenix Suns, two seasons of whicnf
been completed at the time of divoe
Mrs. Chambers had virtually no emp
ment during the parties' marriage, pu
ant to an agreement between the pa
that she would stay at home with
three children.
^
Mrs. Chambers filed a complaint for
vorce on April 7, 1989, which was gran!
on November 30, 1990. During the con
of the proceedings, the parties stipulated^,
custody and visitation of the three
children, and valuation and distribution^
most of the marital assets. Thereafter, 1
trial court entered its order with respect t ^
the remaining property, alimony, and at
ney fees.
Both parties appeal the trial con
award of alimony and attorney fees to [
Chambers. Mrs. Chambers further
peals the trial court's determination
future contract payments for Mr. Ch
bers to play basketball for the Phoen
Suns were not property rights subject^
division. Mr. Chambers challenges the :
al court's division of his retirement
fits.
ALIMONY
Both parties challenge Mrs. Chambers'*,
alimony award. The trial court awarded
Mrs. Chambers $10,000 per month alimonjt
to be reduced to $5,000 per month after
three years, and to terminate after six.
years. Mrs. Chambers argues that the trial court erred in the amount of alimony
awarded to her, its automatic reduction af*
ter three years, and its termination after
six years. Mr. Chambers, on the other,
hand, contends that the trial court awarded
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to Mrs. Chambers which exceeds
ber needs.
rii The trial court is given considerable
A- cretion to provide for spousal support,
A such an award will not be overturned
appeal unless there has been a clear and
judicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v.
Wffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986); acJrd Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331,
1333 (Utah App.1988).
nV

[2] In Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d
g4 (Utah App.1989), we outlined the factors
be considered by a trial court in determining alimony: "(1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2)
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself;
and (3) the ability of the responding spouse
to provide support." Id. at 90 (citations
omitted). "If these three factors have been
considered, we will not disturb the trial
court's alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion/' Id. (citations
omitted). Moreover, "in considering these
factors, the trial court is required to make
adequate factual findings on all material
issues, unless the facts in the record are
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.' " Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d
421, 424 (Utah App.1990) (quoting Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121,
124 (Utah App.1988), quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)).

any award of alimony based upon the
substantial assets she is receiving. Considering defendant's "Exhibit 25," the
court finds that the plaintiff has a need
to maintain a standard of living somewhat close to what the parties maintained in the past. The court further
determines that the defendant has the
ability to pay and plaintiff should be
awarded alimony in the sum of $10,000.00 per month, which should continue
for three (3) years. Thereafter, plaintiff
should be paid alimony in the sum of
$5,000.00 per month for an additional
three (3) years after which alimony will
terminate. The reason that the alimony
should decline after three (3) years and
terminate after six (6) years, is based,
upon the finding by the court that the
plaintiff will earn substantial income
from assets that have been awarded to
her and which will, by the time three (3)
years have passed, be substantially in
her possession or under her control and
she will be able to invest these assets in
such a way as to produce income for her
own support.

As to the issue of alimony in the case at
bar, the trial court stated in Finding of
Fact number seven:
The plaintiff [Mrs. Chambers] presented to the court in her ''Exhibit 11," a
request and demonstrated need for alimony in the sum of $10,000.00 per month
with an additional $4,000.00 per month
being requested by plaintiff as necessary
to pay the income taxes on the $10,000.00
per month. Plaintiff testified that many
of the base expenses were also expenses
that would apply to the children as well
as herself. Defendant [Mr. Chambers]
contends that plaintiff is not entitled to

[3,4] This finding is insufficient. See
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 689
(Utah App.1990); Johnson v. Johnson, 111
P.2d 696, 699 (Utah App.1989); Marchant
v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 207 (Utah App.
1987). Contrary to the second prong of
Schindler, the trial court's findings do not
address Mrs. Chambers's level of education, health, and other matters concerning her immediate or eventual employability. Moreover, without further explanation,
the court's blanket reference to "substantial income from assets that have been
awarded to her" is inadequate to justify
the court's reduction of alimony. Without
more, we cannot determine whether such
reduction constituted an abuse of discretion. Lastly, as to the third prong of
Schindler, the court must do more than
simply state that "the defendant has the
ability to pay." Given the amount of conflicting evidence on these facts, the trial
court's award of alimony must be reversed
and remanded for further findings.1

1. Additionally, upon remand, the district court

must reconsider its apparent inclusion of the
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ATTORNEY FEES

Both parties appeal the trial court's
award of partial reimbursement of attorney fees to Mrs. Chambers. Mrs. Chambers argues that she should receive full
reimbursement of attorney fees, while Mr.
Chambers argues that attorney fees should
not be awarded due to Mrs. Chambers's
failure to prove the reasonableness of the
fees.
[5,6] Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989)
grants trial courts the power to award attorney fees in divorce cases. Both the
decision to award attorney fees and the
amount of such fees are within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Bell v. Bell,
810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App.1991) (citing
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah
1980)). However, such award must be
based on evidence of the reasonableness of
the requested fees, as well as the financial
need of the receiving spouse, and the ability of the other spouse to pay. Id. (citing
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337
(Utah App.1988)).
[7] As to the award of attorney fees in
the case at bar, the trial court found:
The plaintiff incurred attorney's fees
in the sum of $58,050.00 in prosecuting
this action, including estimated wrap-up
and completion time. The defendant had
previously paid, pursuant to Stipulation
between the parties, the sum of $12,500.00 toward the plaintiffs attorney's
fees. While it is true that there is probably adequate money being distributed to
both parties to pay their own attorney's
fees, in view of the sums of money that
Mr. Chambers is going to be making over
the next few years, the court determines
it is appropriate that he assist the plaintiff by payment in the sum of $10,000.00
[in addition to the sums already paid] for
her attorney's fees.
children's expenses in Mrs. Chambers's alimony
award In its findings, the court acknowledges
that many of the expenses listed in Mrs. Chambers's request for $10,000 per month alimony
were expenses that apply to the children. In
view of the district court's award of $4500 per
month in child support, it is plainly inequitable
that Mr. Chambers's alimony payment includes

Since the trial court, in awarding at
fees, did not address the reasonable
the fees, and stopped short of find
each party would have the means''
their own fees out of "the money
distributed to both," such award
ney fees constituted an abuse of <
Accordingly, we reverse the
award of partial reimbursement^
ney fees, and remand this i s s u e d
eration under the standards
Bell
FUTURE CONTRACT PAY1
Mrs. Chambers appeals the trial
conclusion that future contract pay
for Mr. Chambers to play baske
the Phoenix Suns were not proper
subject to division.
In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314'(!__
App.1990), we held that "the right t^jj
ture income is a marital asset where;
right is derived from efforts or pfodiu0
produced during the marriage.'* M-SE
1318 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)^
Moreover, in Woodward v. Woodward,
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the Utah Sup*
Court noted that "[t]he essential
is whether a right to the benefit
has accrued in whole or in part du
marriage. To the extent that the :
so accrued it is subject to equitable
bution." Id. at 432-33.
[8] In the case at bar, Mr. Chamfc
future income will be derived from his j
ing basketball during the term of his j
tract, rather than from some past ei
a product produced during the marriag^
Furthermore, his right to the benefit JW
that salary will accrue at that time, and did
not accrue during the course of the mii^
riage. This is especially true in light of the
fact that the contract payments will onlj^fe;
made provided that Mr. Chambers does'$ot,
suffer injury, illness, disability or death «s
the children's expenses. If the child support
that the parties stipulated to is insufficient to
cover the children's expenses, then the court
must award sufficient child support, ndtHft^
crease alimony to include the children's expenses. See generally Asper v. Asper, 753 P*2d
978, 981 (Utah App.1988) (increased child support is an unacceptable substitute for alimony)*
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result of participation or involvement in
one of a number of off-court activities.
Thus, the trial court correctly determined
^at Mr. Chambers's future contract payments were post-marital income and not
marital property rights subject to division.
Additionally, other jurisdictions that have
considered this question have held that future contract earnings for services to be
performed, not as payment for past performance, are not a property right subject to
division. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d
550, 555-56 (Alaska 1990); In re Marriage
of Sewell, 817 P.2d 594, 596 (Colo.App.
1991); In re Marriage of Anderson, 811
p.2d 419, 420 (Colo.App.1990). Accordingly we affirm the trial court's decision not
to include Mr. Chambers's future contract
payments in the property division.
ny

RETIREMENT BENEFITS
Lastly, Mr. Chambers argues that the
tnal court erred in the division of his retirement benefits, under Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).
In Woodward, the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
Long-term and deferred sharing of financial interests are obviously too susceptible to continued strife and hostility, circumstances which our courts traditionally strive to avoid to the greatest extent
possible. This goal may best be accomplished, if a present value of the pension
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for
all the appropriate considerations, including the length of time the pensioner must
survive to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of other assets leaving all pension benefits to the employee himself.
Id. at 433 (quoting Kikkert v. Kikkert, 111
NJ.Super. 471, 478, 427 A.2d 76, 79-80
(1981)).
As to the issue of retirement benefits in
the case at bar, the trial court ordered:
The retirement accumulated by the defendant with the NBA should be divided
between the parties by operation of a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order
(QDRO). If that can be effected by an
Order that will secure an immediate divi-

sion of the retirement accounts of the
two parties, that shall be effected. If
that cannot be done at the present time,
division shall be effected by a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) which
includes division of the interests of the
parties as set forth by the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah in the decision
of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d
431 (Utah 1982) in which plaintiff would
be entitled to one-half (lk) of the pension
proceeds for the number of years they
were married during the time the pension
was being accumulated.
[9] While "[t]he best method for distributing or allocating retirement benefits or
their value depends on the particular circumstances," Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232,
234 (Utah App.1989) (citing Gardner* v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988)),
cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), it
is preferable to "end [the] marriage and
allow the parties to make as much of a
clean break from each other as is reasonably possible.,, Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1079.
Pursuant to Woodward, the preferred
method for doing so is to fix the other
spouse's share of the pension plan, as adjusted for all the appropriate considerations, and satisfy the other spouse's share
out of other assets, thereby leaving all
pension benefits to the employee. See
Woodward, 656 P.2d at 433. This is especially true when there are sufficient other
assets for equitable distribution and a present value of the retirement benefits can be
established. See id However, in the case
at bar, it would appear that the trial court
did not even consider such possibility here.
Accordingly, the trial court's order with
regard to Mr. Chambers's retirement benefits is reversed and remanded with directions to reconsider its division of Mr.
Chambers's retirement benefits under the
analysis set forth in Woodward, including
particularly the preference for valuation of
the non-employee spouse's share and its
immediate cash-out from other assets.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we (1) reverse
and remand the trial court's awards of
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alimony and attorney fees to Mrs. Chambers, based on the insufficiency of the
court's findings; (2) affirm the trial court's
conclusion that Mr. Chambers's future contract payments are not marital property
rights subject to division; and (3) reverse
and remand the trial court's division of Mr.
Chambers's retirement benefits.
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur.
= KEY NUMMR SYSTEM

$

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

2. Conspiracy «=»24.15
Criminal Law «=>423(9)
Conspiracy was not complete until ai*?
dercover officer distributed share of o#£j
caine to coconspirators who insisted on &
for their participation in the conspiracy^
and, thus, coconspirators' statements we~~
made during conspiracy and were adn
ble under hearsay rule. Rules of
Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
3. Criminal Law <s=>l 169.7
Admission of coconspirator's stated
ments allegedly made after completion of.
conspiracy was harmless in prosecution for!
I
distributing cocaine; conviction was sup*
ported by undercover officer's observaf
of defendant's involvement in
Rules of Evid., Rule 801(dX2KE).

v.
Nena R. CHAVEZ, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 910723-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 22, 1992.

Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Anne M.
Stirba, J., of distributing cocaine. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Bench, P.J., held that: (1) statements of
coconspirators prior to defendant's involvement were admissible against defendant,
and (2) conspiracy was not complete until
undercover officer distributed share of cocaine to coconspirators who insisted on it
for their participation in the conspiracy.
Affirmed.
Billings, J., concurred in result

1. Criminal Law <&=>422(1)
With defendant's entry into conspiracy, statements of coconspirators prior to
defendant's involvement became admissible
against defendant under hearsay rule.
Rules of Evid., Rule 801(d)(2)(E).

Ronald S. Fujino and L. Clark Donaldson^
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appejh
lant
««
R. Paul Van Dam and Kenneth A. Bron-;
stoti, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and ap$eV
lee.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Defendant appeals her conviction for unlawfully distributing a controlled sujk-j
stance, a second degree felony, in violatray
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1X^0^
(1990). Defendant also appeals the trial
court's restitution order. We affirm.

FACTS

V

On June 20, 1990,' Patricia Jones called
Edward Lucas, an undercover Murray (S^0
Police Officer, to inform him that she coiflc^
obtain for Kim a quarter ounce of cocaiae^
for $360. Patricia informed officer Lucas,
that in order to obtain this cocaine he
would have to discuss the details with ht&"
daughter, Niciey At 8:30 p.m., officer Lu-"
cas arrived at the Jones residence. Nici§|L,
told officer Lucas that the cocaine was:***
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Personal service within the state shall be
as follows: (1) Upon a natural person of
the age of 14 years or over, by delivering
a copy thereof to him personally, or by
leaving such copy at his usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion there residing; or by delivering a copy to an agent authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service
of process.
[2,3] The trial court heard extensive
evidence that this is exactly what the deputy did. He left the summons and complaint
on the Weenig doorstep after a fruitless
conversation with a faceless individual inside the residence. That person identified
herself as being of suitable age and stated
that she was Erma's daughter.1 Even
though both of Erma's daughters denied
having spoken with the deputy constable,
the trial judge gave more credence to the
testimony of the official making the service. The trial judge stated he was "not
impressed with the candor or testimony of
Mrs. Weenig. It has not been convincing."
He further stated that the Musselman elements had not been met. This was not an
abuse of his discretion. We strongly believe that personal service should not become a "degrading game of wiles and
tricks" nor should a defendant be able to
defeat service simply by refusing to accept
the papers or instructing others, suitable
under the rules of civil procedure, also to
reject service. Business & Prof. Adj. Co.
v. Baker, 62 Or.App. 237, 659 P.2d 1025,
1027 (1983). Because the service on Erma
was valid there is no need to examine
whether the motion was timely or if she
possessed a meritorious defense, the other
requirements under Musselman.
The denial of the motion to set aside
default judgment is affirmed.
Costs
against the defendants.
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.
(o
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1. Erma admitted at the hearing that she had
only two daughters and that during August,

A. Lamar HANSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Cynthia Ann HANSEN, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 860198-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 12, 1987.

Husband appealed from order of the
7th District Court, Duchesne County, Richard C. Davidson, J., which granted divorce,
awarded custody of minor child to mother,
and made award of child support and divided property. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that: (1) award of $140 per
month in child support was not an abuse of
discretion; (2) court did not improperly apply tender years doctrine in awarding custody to mother; and (3) record supported
award of custody to mother.
Affirmed.

1. Divorce <&=>184(4)
Trial court is permitted considerable
discretion in adjusting financial interests of
parties to divorce and its actions are entitled to presumption of validity.
2. Divorce e=>308
Award of $140 per month in child support was not an abuse of discretion in view
of parties' myriad debts and meager assets,
despite father's claim that support schedule
allegedly used in the judicial district
showed that the proper support amount
was $78.
3. Divorce <s»252.4
Court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering husband to pay $3,000 debt to his
father, even though husband alleged that
1979, both lived with her in the Salt Lake City
residence.
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the debt had been used to pay wife's bail
and that wife had been ordered to pay all
debts arising out of fines owed for previous
criminal convictions.
4. Divorce «=»298(1)
Trial court's comment that "I don't
find any reason to deprive her of custody"
was not an improper use of the tender
years doctrine in awarding custody to
mother but, rather, a recognition of the
fact that mother had had custody since the
parties separated.
5. Divorce «=>298(1)
Although it is not determinative, court
may consider which parent the child has
lived with during the pendency of the divorce in determining custody.
6. Divorce $=>301
Award of custody of minor son to
mother was supported by evidence of father's history of assaultive behavior, mother's role as primary caretaker of child during marriage, parties' parenting abilities,
stability of child's environment, and fact
that mother had had custody during pendency of divorce.

Randall J. Holmgren, Shields, Shields &
Holmgren, Salt Lake City, for A. Lamar
Hansen.
John E. Schindler, Price, for Cynthia
Hansen.
Before JACKSON, GARPF and
BILLINGS, JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
In his appeal of an April, 1986, judgment
and decree of divorce, appellant A. Lamar
Hansen asserts that the trial court erred in:
(1) ordering him to pay $140 per month in
child support; (2) ordering him to pay a
$3,000 debt to his father; and (3) using an
unconstitutional presumption in awarding
custody of the parties' young son to respondent, Cynthia Ann Hansen. He also
challenges the sufficiency of the court's

findings of fact to support the custody
award. We affirm the judgment below.
[1] The trial court is permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial
interests of the parties to a divorce, and its
actions are entitled to a presumption of
validity. Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468,
470 (Utah 1984); Savage v. Savage, 658
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1983). We wffl not
upset the trial court's apportionment of
financial responsibilities in the absence of
manifest injustice or inequity that indicates
a clear abuse of that discretion. Cf. Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982).
Appellant first contends that he should
have been ordered to pay only $78.00 per
month in child support rather than $140.00.
This argument is based on his monthly
income of $1,700 and an obligation to pay
child support for four children from a previous marriage. He also argues that
$78.00 is the proper support amount because it is shown on a schedule allegedly
used in the Seventh Judicial District
[2] The schedule was not offered as
evidence at trial. If offered, its admissibility would be questionable. The record reveals that the trial judge had properly before him lists of the parties' myriad debts
and meager assets, their tax forms, financial declarations, paycheck stubs, and
monthly household expenses. The judge
was informed of their respective earning
capacities and the fact that respondent had
been receiving public assistance. He evaluated the support needs of the minor child
and the parties' relative abilities to meet
them. Appellant had been paying court-ordered temporary child support of $140
since May, 1985, and his payments were
current at the time of trial. He made no
attempt to demonstrate an inability to continue making those payments. We hold it
was not an abuse of discretion for the court
to set child support at $140 per month.
[3] Neither are we persuaded that the
trial judge abused his discretion in dividing
the parties' substantial debts. Appellant
complains that the part of the decree ordering him to pay one particular $3,000 debt to
his father is inconsistent with a previous
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order of the court directing Cynthia Ann
Hansen to pay all debts arising out of fines
owed for her previous criminal convictions.
There was, however, conflicting evidence
about whether the loan of $3,000 was used
to pay her bail or to pay household expenses. The trial judge considered the nature of all the debts, the parties' relative
abilities to repay them, and their conflicting claims about the use made of the $3,000
loan. We see no manifest injustice or inequity in the judge's allocation of debts between the parties.
Appellant next contends that the trial
court used an unconstitutional preference
for the respondent in awarding her custody
of their 30-month-old son. Such a genderbased custodial preference for mothers of
small children, called the "tender years"
presumption, was explicitly disapproved by
the Utah Supreme Court in Pusey v. Pusey,
728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986), three
months after the Hansens' divorce trial.
At the trial, each party presented evidence of the other's lack of fitness as a
proper custodian. This included evidence
of appellant's physical abuse of the respondent, as well as his former wife, and evidence of respondent's convictions for money order theft, check alteration, and making a false statement on a loan application.
Appellant claims that a gender-based preference was used to tip the scales in respondent's favor, based on one highlighted sentence in the judge's ruling from the bench:
Custody of the child will be awarded to
the defendant The reason for that is as
follows:
The court finds that the defendant is
the primary care-giving parent. The
only thing anybody can really say bad
about this party is that she has been in
trouble.
On the other hand, by the plaintiffs
own admission he has committed, I think,
six different assaults, which has got to
count for something. So if they are going to start painting each other black, I
think the brush will fit both. / don't
find any reason to deprive her of custody. It seems to have worked. I don't
see anything wrong with her as a custodial parent. From the testimony that's

been given here, particularly by the preschool lady, she has been working very
diligently in taking care of this child, and
the court finds that she is a fit and
proper person and does award custody to
her.
[4,5] We do not believe the emphasized
remark shows any use of an improper preference in awarding custody to respondent
The trial judge was referring to the fact
that, at the time of trial in April, 1986, the
child had been in the sole custody and care
of his mother since the parties separated in
February, 1985. His reference to not depriving her of custody reflects this fact and
shows that he considered which parent the
child had lived with during the pendency of
the divorce. Although not determinative,
this is one of many relevant factors in a
custody determination. Pusey, 728 P.2d at
120.
The judge's oral findings quoted above,
recorded in court in the presence of the
parties, are also germane to the final issue
raised by appellant. He asserts that the
written findings of fact pertaining to custody are insufficient to show that the award
was based on a determination of the child's
best interests. He relies on Smith v.
Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) and
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah
1982).
In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court determined that the trial court's written findings
of fact in a custody dispute were inadequate to afford the noncustodial parent a
meaningful appellate review of the custody
award. Smith, 726 P.2d at 426. The
Court described adequate factual findings
as follows:
To ensure that the trial court's custody
determination, discretionary as it is,
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41,
is rationally based, it is essential that the
court set forth in its findings of fact not
only that it finds one parent to be the
better person to care for the child, but
also the basic facts which show why the
ultimate conclusion is justified.
Smith, 726 P.2d at 426.
In the case before us, there is only one
written finding of fact that relates to child
custody:
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10. Defendant is a fit and proper person
to be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties
subject to the following visitation rights
provided the plaintiff properly demean
himself:
[detailed dates and times of visitation by
appellant]
In holding that a custody decision must be
supported by written findings and conclusions, the Court in Smith cited Hutchison
and Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). The Court concluded that the trial judge's statements
while ruling from the bench were "not a
sufficient substitute for adequate findings." Smith, 726 P.2d at 426.
Under the standard enunciated in Smith
and Hutchison, the one conclusory written
finding quoted above, by itself, is clearly
inadequate to support the custody determination. See also Martinez v. Martinez,
728 P.2d 994 (Utah 1986). Our inquiry,
however, does not end here. Subsequent
to Smith, there was a material amendment
of Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). It now reads:
(a) Effect
In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon,
and judgment shall be entered pursuant
to Rule 58A
Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. The findings of a master, to
the extent that the court adopts them,
shall be considered as the findings of the
court. It will be sufficient if the findings offact and conclusions of law are
stated orally and recorded in open
court following the close of the evidence—
1. These rules shall take effect on January 1,
1950; and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
They govern all proceedings in actions
brought after they take effect and also all
further proceedings in actions then pending,
except to the extent that in the opinion of the
court their application in a particular action

[6] The emphasized sentences were
added by order of the Utah Supreme Court
on October 30, 1986, and became effective
on January 1, 1987. The new provisions
govern in all actions pending on the effective date. Cf Utah R.Civ.P. 1(b).1 Thus,
Rule 52(a) now explicitly authorizes us to
look beyond the written findings of fact to
the trial record and evaluate the sufficiency of the judge's oral findings, quoted
above, rendered from the bench. It is apparent from those findings that the trial
judge considered and weighed several
factors in reaching a custody determination
that was in the best interests of the Hansens' minor son. They include: appellant's
history of assaultive behavior, respondent's history of criminal behavior; the
identity of the primary caretaker of the
child during the marriage; parenting abilities; the stability of the child's environment; and the identity of the custodian
during the pending divorce. Each of these
factors is relevant in a custody determination. Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d at 426
(specific attributes of the parents); Pusey
v. Pusey, 728 P.2d at 120 (identity of primary caretaker, environmental stability,
custodian during lengthy pendency of custody determination); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41 (moral character and
emotional stability of parents, temporary
custodian); Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d
at 995 (ability of each parent to meet
child's needs).
We hold that the oral findings made by
the trial judge at the close of the evidence
are sufficient to support the custody award
and demonstrate that the determination
was based on factors relevant to the best
interests of the Hansens' son. They provide this Court, and the parties themselves,
with a detailed and logical factual basis for
the ultimate decision awarding custody to
respondent, thus satisfying the requirements of Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a) and Smith.
pending when the rules take effect would not
be feasible or would work injustice
Utah RXiv.P. 1(b) (emphasis added).
The first emphasized sentence of amended
Rule 52(a) was recently applied as the controlling standard of appellate court review of a trial
court's findings of fact. Ashton v. Ashton, 733
P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 1987).
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The judgment is affirmed, Costs to respondent
GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Rodney James RAMON, Defendant
and Appellant
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Minnette M. RIEDMAN, Defendant
and Appellant.
Nos. 860005-CA, 860013-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 12, 1987.
Rehearing Denied July 13,1987.
Defendants were convicted in the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay
E. Banks, J., of theft by receiving stolen
property and they appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Bench, J., held that amendment to
information, charging receiving stolen
goods, which alleged that defendants received or concealed stolen goods was improper as it added an additional offense.
Reversed.
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Orme, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Judge concurring specially.) U.C.A.1953,
77-35-4(d).
2. Receiving Stolen Goods e»2
One distinction between concealing stolen goods and receiving stolen goods is that
subject property need not be stolen in order
to support conviction for receiving stolen
goods, as defendant need only believe the
property to have been stolen. (Per Bench,
J., with one Judge concurring specially.)
U.C.A.1953, 76-6-408(1).
3. Criminal Law e=»29
Three different ways in which offense
of receiving stolen goods may be committed and three different ways in which offense of concealing stolen goods may be
committed do not give rise to six separate
offenses. (Per Bench, J., with one Judge
concurring specially.) U.C.A.1953, 76-6408(1).
4. Indictment and Information <&=>161(5)
It was error to permit amendment to
information charging receiving stolen
goods to add allegation that the defendants
concealed the stolen goods as the amendment charged an additional or different
offense than that originally charged. (Per
Bench, J., with one Judge concurring specially.) U.C.A.1953, 76-6-408(1).
Martin Verhoef, Barber, Verhoef & Yocom, Salt Lake City, for Ramon and Riedman.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Kimberly
Hornak, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Before JACKSON, ORME and
BENCH, JJ.
OPINION

1. Indictment and Information «3=>161(1)
Court may allow information to be
amended if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights
of the defendants are not prejudiced; those
two conditions are generally met where the
proposed amendment to an information
merely recites language of the statute originally charged. (Per Bench, J., with one

BENCH, Judge:
Defendants Rodney James Ramon and
Minnette M. Riedman appeal their separate
convictions of theft by receiving stolen
property.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6408(1X1986). Because the cases involve the
same facts and the same dispositive issue,
we consolidate the cases, sua sponte, and
reverse both convictions.
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Walter James HOWELL, Plaintiff
and Appellee,
v.
Barbara Joyce HOWELL, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890596-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 28, 1991.
Divorce was sought. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Frank G.
Noel, J., granted divorce, awarded alimony,
and divided property. Former wife appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J.,
held that: (1) trial court erroneously looked
to preseparation standard of living in setting alimony and should have considered
standard of living during marriage up to
time of trial approximately two years after
separation; (2) monthly alimony award was
inadequate to equalize parties' standard of
living at time of divorce; and (3) trial court
could refuse to speculate about hypothetical future tax consequences of property
division pursuant to divorce.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
Bench, J., concurred in part, dissented
in part, and filed opinion.
1. Divorce <a=>237
Alimony was erroneously based on preseparation standard of living and should
have been based on standard of living during the marriage up to time of divorce trial
about two years after separation; during
that two-year period, husband's income
doubled because another airline purchased
husband's employer, and husband's ability
to take advantage of that change in part
resulted from perseverance during lean
times.
2. Divorce <^253(3)
Value of marital property is determined as of time of divorce decree or at
trial, but courts can, in exercise of their
equitable powers, use different date, such

as date of separation, if one party has
acted obstructively.
3. Divorce <£»237
Determining standard of living in order to set alimony after divorce is fact-sensitive, subjective task and is not determined
by actual expenses alone.
4. Divorce <s=>235
Trial courts have discretion to determine standard of living which existed during marriage after consideration of relevant facts and equitable principles.
5. Divorce <s=*237
Trial courts must consider the following factors in setting alimony after divorce:
financial conditions and needs of recipient
spouse, recipient's ability to produce income, and ability of payor spouse to provide support.
6. Divorce <s=>240(2)
Trial court setting alimony after divorce should first determine financial needs
and resources of both parties and should
set alimony as permitted by those parameters to approximate parties' standard of
living during marriage as closely as possible.
7. Divorce e=>240(2)
If payor spouse's resources are adequate, alimony following divorce need not
be limited to provide for only basic needs,
but should also consider recipient spouse's
station in life.
8. Divorce <3=>239
Trial court setting alimony after divorce must make findings on all material
issues.
9. Divorce <s=*239, 286(9)
Trial court's failure to make findings
on all issues material to setting alimony
after divorce constitutes reversible error,
unless pertinent facts in record are clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting
only finding in favor of judgment.
10. Divorce <^240(4)
Monthly alimony award of $1,800 was
inadequate to equalize abilities of former
wife and former husband to go forward
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with their lives; wife was approximately 50
years old, spent most of the 30 plus years
of the marriage caring for children and
home, and had minimal job skills, and husband had gross monthly income of $10,120,
would have no child support obligation approximately 15 months after decree, and
would then have gross monthly income of
approximately $8,200 in comparison to
wife's gross monthly income of $2,445.
11. Divorce <S=>252.2
Exact mathematical equality of income
is not required when equalizing parties'
standard of living as of time of divorce, but
sufficient parity to allow both parties to be
on equal footing financially as of time of
divorce is required.
12. Divorce <s=*252.2
Trial court could refuse to speculate
about hypothetical future tax consequences
of property division pursuant to divorce.
Paul H. Liapis, Helen E. Christian (argued), Kim M. Luhn, Gustin, Green, Stegall
& Liapis, Salt Lake City, for defendant and
appellant.
David S. Dolowitz (argued), Michael S.
Evans, M. Joy Douglas, Cohne, Rappaport
& Segal, P.C., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and appellee.
Before BENCH, GARFF and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Defendant, Barbara Joyce Howell, appeals from a divorce decree's award of
alimony and division of equity in a California home. We affirm the property division
but reverse and remand as to alimony.

ried. He continued to be employed as a
pilot with Western, later taken over.fci"
Delta Airlines, throughout the parties' n\arv
riage. The parties had five children, four
of whom were emancipated at the time d
trial. The parties had marital difficulties
on and off for a number of years and
separated in November 1986. At that time
plaintiffs gross income was between $5500
and $5600 per month, and had been at that
level for the prior five years. Western
Airlines experienced financial problems prior to the takeover by Delta Airlines. As g*
result of negotiations between Western
and its pilots, plaintiff received virtually no
pay raises between 1981 and 1986, despite
increases in the cost of living. Both parties testified that their family finances
were strained during that time period. ^
Plaintiff filed for divorce in November
1987. At the time of trial, December 19§8„$
his gross monthly income had increased^
$10,120. Plaintiffs financial declaration indicated monthly expenses of $7960, wWcljf
included $2400 for alimony and child sup-?
port, $372 for vacations, and $633 for attor^
ney fees.
During the parties' marriage, defendant
was a homemaker and had worked only
part time at unskilled labor jobs. At the
time of trial defendant earned $649.80 per
month, though that job was only temporary
and terminated in December 1988. She
testified at trial that she had monthly ex:t
penses totaling $5021.l
The parties owned homes in Utah and
California, as well as real property in Texas. Plaintiff testified that the Utah home
had little, if any, equity, while the California home would yield substantial equity.
Plaintiff wanted to sell all the properties
and divide the net proceeds. Defendant
testified she would prefer to live in the
California home.

Defendant and plaintiff, Walter James
Howell, were married on October 14, 1956.
Plaintiff began working as a pilot for Western Airlines shortly after the parties mar-

After trial, the court entered findings of
fact, conclusions of law. and a decree of
divorce on May 12. 1959 In its findings,
the court states its belief that "the income
level of $5500 reflects the income level and
living standards of the parties during the

1. Defendant filed an earlier declaration of
monthly expenses totaling $4464 62, but includ-

ed no expenses for rea' property taxes or insurance, indicating that the> uere then unknown.

FACTS
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last five years of their lives together."
The court found that defendant was capable of earning $625 per month, and that
plaintiff had income of $10,000 per month.
The findings further state that "[t]he court
has determined in setting alimony that
while $5,500.00 per month represents the
living standards of the parties in the last 5
years of the marriage, when the parties
resided together, the ability of the plaintiff
to pay alimony is based upon his present
income of $10,000.00 per month." Defendant was awarded $1800 per month alimony and $1363 per month child support for
the parties' then sixteen year-old child,
based on the child support guidelines then
m effect. The court ordered that all of the
real property, including the California
home, be sold and the net proceeds divided
equally between the parties.
On appeal, defendant asserts (1) the parties' standard of living, for purposes of
determining alimony, should be based on
that at the time of trial; (2) the alimony
awarded is insufficient; and (3) the trial
court should have taken into consideration
the tax consequences of selling the California home.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Trial courts have considerable discretion
in determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld
on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333
(Utah Ct.App.1988). Findings of fact m
divorce appeals are subject to the clearly
erroneous standard of review such that
"due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R Civ P 52(a);
Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah
Ct.App.1989). Conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for correctness and given no special deference on appeal Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P2d 1174, 1175 (Utah
1989); Smith v. Smith, 793 P 2d 407, 409
(Utah Ct.App.1990).
ALIMONY
[1] Defendant claims that the alimony
award would have been higher if the trial

court had considered the parties* standard
of living at the time of trial rather than
when the parties separated, approximately
two years earlier. Additionally, defendant
claims alimony should have been higher
because of the disparity in the parties' income, length of the marriage, and the parties' respective earning abilities and expenses. We consider first the applicable
standard of living question.
[2] The value of marital property is determined as of the time of the divorce
decree or trial. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615
P 2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980). See also
Berger v Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah
1985). The reason for the rule is that "[b]y
the very nature of a property division, the
marital estate is evaluated according to
what property exists at the time the marriage is terminated." Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). Courts
can, however, in the exercise of their equitable powers, use a different date, such
as the date of separation, if one party has
"acted obstructively, . . . " Peck v. Peek,
738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah Ct.App.1987).
No cases in Utah or elsewhere, that we
or counsel have discovered, have specifically addressed the question of when a couple's "standard of living" should be determined for the purpose of calculating alimony, be it separation or trial or some other
time. Most speak only of the standard of
living during marriage. See Savage v.
Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983).
"Standard of living" is defined as "a minimum of necessities, comforts, or luxuries
that is essential to maintaining a person in
customary or proper status or circumstances " Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2223 (1986). "An alimony award should, to the extent possible,
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce
hvmg standards
" Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah Ct.App.
1980).
In this case, the parties were separated
for approximately one year before plaintiff
filed for divorce. About one year later,
trial was held We note that a separation
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of two years before trial in a divorce action
is certainly not unusual. During that twoyear period, plaintiffs income doubled because of the successful takeover of Western Airlines by Delta Airlines. Plaintiffs
ability to take advantage of that change
was at least in part a result of having
persevered during the lean times, as did his
wife and children. The impact of the salary increase on the parties' standard of living, however, was certainly affected by the
fact that it was used to maintain separate
living arrangements.
13,4] We believe it is consistent with
the goal of equalizing the parties' post
divorce status to look to the standard of
living existing at or near the time of trial in
determining alimony. This is consonant
with the treatment of both marital property
and child support and is better designed to
equip both parties to go forward with their
separate lives with relatively equal odds.
It is further justified because any future
changes in alimony are limited to instances
where a material change of circumstances
has occurred. Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah CtApp.
1990). In so holding, we agree with the
dissenting opinion that determining standard of living is a "fact-sensitive, subjective task." We disagree, however, that
standard of living is determined by actual
expenses alone. Those expenses may be
necessarily lower than needed to maintain
an appropriate standard of living for various reasons, including, possibly, lack of
income. As Webster says, standard of living includes "customary or proper status"
considering the parties' circumstances.
Those circumstances should be evaluated
at the time of trial and, contrary to the
dissent, can properly address what situation would have existed if the parties had
not separated earlier. In this case, the
post-separation substantial increase in
plaintiffs income was akin to deferred income. In light of the facts of this case, we
conclude that the trial court erred in looking at the pre-separation standard of living
in setting alimony, but should have instead
considered the standard of living "during
the marriage" up to the time of trial. In so
concluding we do not intend to establish a

rigid rule which must be followed in tall
domestic cases, but acknowledge that trial
courts have discretion to determine' the
standard of living which existed during the
marriage after consideration of all relevant
facts and equitable principles. In this case'
it was inequitable and an abuse of discre^
tion to pinpoint standard of living as of the
time of the parties' separation.
[5-7] We now turn to defendant's argument that the court did not properly consider all relevant factors, resulting in an un-y
justifiably low alimony award. Trial courts
must consider the following factors in setting alimony: (1) the financial condition and
needs of the recipient spouse; (2) the recipient's ability to produce income; and (3) the
ability of the payor spouse to provide suj>
port. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649
(Utah 1988). Utah cases have stated that
the purpose of alimony is to prevent the
receiving spouse "from becoming a public*
charge" and to maintain the standard of
living enjoyed during the marriage, to th£
extent possible. Fletcher, 615 P.2d at
1223. Therefore, trial courts should first/
determine the financial needs and resources for both parties, by examining the
three factors enumerated. Second, the
court should set alimony as permitted by
those parameters, to approximate the parties' standard of living during the marriage
as closely as possible. It follows that if the
payor spouse's resources are adequate, alimony need not be limited to provide for
only basic needs, but should also consider
the recipient spouse's "station in life."
Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147
(Utah 1978). In Gardner v. Gardner, 748
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme
Court reviewed an alimony award after a
long-term marriage. The court found that
the alimony award in that situation should,
"to the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective standards of living and
maintain them at a level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." Id. at 1081. See also
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 103 (Utah
1986); Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566
(Utah 1985).

HOWELL v. HOWELL
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[8,9] The trial court must make findjnes on all material issues. Failure to do
«o constitutes reversible error, unless pertinent facts in the record are "clear, unconuoverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment." Anderstn v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah
Ct.App.W88).
Utah's appellate courts have considered
the appropriateness of alimony after a long
fcerm marriage, where the wife (usually)
has worked primarily in the home, has limited job skills, and is in her late forties or
fifties. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076; Rasband,
752 P.2d 1331, 1333. In Jones v. Jones, 700
p 2d 1072 (Utah 1985), the supreme court
found alimony awarded inadequate to allow
the wife a standard of living even approaching that experienced during the marriage, and described the marriage as follows:
During most of the marriage, with the
full consent and support of her husband,
[the wife] devoted her time to raising
their four children and donating her services to various social service organizations
It is entirely unrealistic to assume that a woman in her mid-50's with
no substantial work experience or training will be able to enter the job market
and support herself in anything even resembling the style in which the couple
had been living.
Id. at 1075.
(10,11] In this case the court made
findings as to both plaintiffs and defendant's gross incomes It did not, however,
make the required finding as to defendant's financial needs, although defendant
testified to monthly expenses of approximately $5,000. Child support set pursuant
to child support guidelines at $1363, plus
alimony of $1800, plus defendant's potential salary as determined by the court of
$645, yields total gross monthly income of
$3808 for defendant and her son. Plaintiff,
2. "If courts award child support in lieu of permanent alimony, they may fail to anticipate the
financial impact on the remaining family as
each child reaches age 18 and his or her award
terminates." March 1990 Utah Task Force on
Gender and Justice Report to the Utah Judicial
Council 38.

Utah
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after deducting child support and alimony,
has gross monthly income of $6837. When
his child support obligation ceases, approximately fifteen months after the decree, he
will have gross monthly income of $8200 in
comparison to defendant's $2445.2 Defendant fits the profile described in Jones and
other cases: she is approximately fifty
years old, has minimal marketable job
skills, and has spent most of the thirty plus
years of the parties' marriage raising and
caring for their five children and their
home, presumably with the concurrence of
plaintiff. Her likelihood of achieving significant salary levels in the future is slim.
The alimony set by the court does not come
close to equalizing the parties' standard of
living as of the time of the divorce, but
allows plaintiff a two to four times advantage.** We, therefore, hold that the alimony amount set by the court was clearly
erroneous.
We reverse and remand to the trial court
on the issue of alimony, for findings as to
defendant's financial needs, the parties'
standard of living at the time of the trial,
and for adjustment of the amount of alimony to better equalize the parties' abilities to
go forward with their respective lives.
TAX CONSIDERATIONS
[12] Defendant also urges that the
court erred by failing to consider the tax
consequences of selling the California
home. Defendant produced an expert witness at trial who testified as to the possible
tax ramifications of the sale. He discussed
capital gams tax, but said the amount
would depend on the sales price, and that it
might be avoided pursuant to tax regulations. He testified that taxes might be
deferred, or "rolled over," but could not
say with any certainty how the IRS would
rule. There is no abuse of discretion if a
court refuses to speculate about hypothetical future tax consequences of a property
3.

Exact mathematical equality of income is not
required, but sufficient parity to allow both parties to be on equal footing financially as of the
time of the divorce is required.
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division made pursuant to a divorce. Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224
(Utah 1987). Tax consequences in this case
were speculative as to whether they could
be avoided or delayed, and as to amount.
The court heard testimony and evidence
regarding possible tax implications, but did
not err in refusing to adjust property distribution because of those theoretical consequences.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's property distribution order but reverse as to the alimony award and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GARFF, J., concurs.
BENCH, Judge (concurring in part,
dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority opinion's treatment of the "tax considerations/1 I also
agree that this case must be remanded for
entry of appropriate findings as to the
needs of defendant for alimony and the
ability of plaintiff to pay alimony. I respectfully disagree with the majority, however, as to how the parties' standard of
living during the marriage impacts the alimony computations. The majority rules, as
a matter of law, that in computing the
alimony award, the trial court should have
considered a hypothetical standard of living
as if the parties were living together at the
time of trial rather than their actual standard of living enjoyed prior to separation.1
There are no cases addressing when the
parties' standard or living is determined
because a "standard of living" cannot, as
the majority implies, be quantified by the
trial court. It is not like marital property
which is capable of objective valuation at a
given time. Nor is it capable of being
calculated based on set figures of income
1. Contrary to the majority's assertion, the trial
court did not "pinpoint" the parties' standard of
living as of the time of separation The trial
court took the parties' average income over a
five-year period prior to separation and assumed that their average income was their
"standard of living." While it is clear that the
trial court erred in assuming that income alone

as are child support payments. Determining the parties' standard of living during
marriage is a fact-sensitive, subjective task
that requires a trial court to look at ihe
totality of the parties' financial circumstances during the marriage. The Utah
Supreme Court has therefore established
objective factors that must be considered
by the trial court when it determines an
award of alimony.
"The most important function of alimony
is to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of
living she enjoyed during marriage, and
to prevent the wife from becoming a
public charge." English v. English, 565
P.2d [409] at 411. [(Utah 1977)] With
this purpose in mind, the Court in English articulated three factors that must
be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award:
[1] the financial condition and needs of
the wife;
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to provide
support.
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah
1985). Accord Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d
96, 100-01 (Utah 1986) (failure to consider
these factors is an abuse of discretion);
Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Utah
1985) (an appellate court will not disturb a
trial court's ruling if these factors are adequately addressed).
As is apparent from the foregoing quotation, the receiving spouse's previous standard of living is not an independent factor
to be quantified and incorporated into a
formula for calculating alimony. Rather, it
is a frame of reference for determining the
reasonableness of the alimony award. See
generally, 2 H. Clark, Jr., The Law Of
Domestic Relations In The United States
§ 17.5(8) (2d ed. 1987). In the present case,
establishes a standard of liwng, it may not be
said that it made the mistake of pinpointing that
standard of living The majority therefore errs
in finding that the trial court abused its discretion when the trial court did not even make the
mistake that the majont) is accusing it of making
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w e are not concerned with the risk of defendant becoming a public charge given the
apparent ability of plaintiff to cover defendant's basic needs. The question is how
much additional support above defendant's
basic needs should be granted. The parties' standard of living prior to separation
helps to establish what would be reasonable by showing the lifestyle to which the
parties have grown accustomed.
Defendant seeks to benefit from plaintiffs raise by mistakenly, and unnecessarily, claiming that the raise entitled her to
alimony based upon a hypothetical standard of living to be calculated from plaintiffs new annual salary of $120,000, an
income to which she has never grown accustomed.2 In other words, defendant
claims that her relevant standard of living
is the unknown standard of living that she
might have enjoyed were the parties not
terminating their marriage. Since any attempt to determine a standard of living for
two separated parties as if they were not
separated would be purely speculative, the
majority's ruling is judicially unworkable.
There is no rational way of knowing how
the parties might have utilized the increased income had they remained together. Would they have bought a new car, a
new house, or maybe a vacation timeshare?
Or would they have simply saved the money for retirement? Since a couple's standard of living is determined in large part
by how they spend their resources, a trial
court could do nothing but speculate about
the possible standard of living if the marital relationship had continued beyond separation.

Not only is such an approach unworkable, it is not needed if the traditional approach outlined in English is followed. In
the present case, the trial court clearly
2. Defendant claims, and the majority seems to
agree, that defendant is entitled to a larger
amount of ahmon> because she "persevered
during the lean times." Such an argument does
not, however, justify an amount in excess of the
needs substantiated bj the receiving spouse
English, 565 P.2d at 412 The majority's summary conclusion that the income was "akin to
deferred income," is totally unsupported
While the parties ma\ have perservered at Western Airlines during the lean times, there is no
evidence that there was an> commitment from

failed to determine defendant's financial
condition and needs based on the expenses
she claimed to be necessary to maintain the
standard of living she enjoyed during the
marriage. See, e.g., Olson, 704 R2d at 567
("to maintain the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage, the living expenses of
the wife and minor children would be
$4,200 per month").
Defendant presented to the trial court
evidence of the expenses which she claimed
would be necessary to maintain her standard of living, but the trial court made no
findings thereon.3 The trial court should
have reviewed the expenses claimed and
determined which expenses could be
deemed reasonable in light of the standard of living she had enjoyed prior to
the separation. See, e.g., Jones, 700 P.2d
at 1075 (the couple had enjoyed a "very
comfortable lifestyle," alimony award of
$1,000 per month was insufficient for wife
to "maintain anything even approaching
the standard of living she enjoyed during
the marriage"). Her reasonable expenses
should have then been offset by her own
resources, i.e., any investment income and
her own wage-earning capacity. Only then
could the trial court have made a finding as
to defendant's needs.
The trial court should have then gone
through the same analysis as to the plaintiffs needs and resources in order to determine his ability to pay. Again, the reasonableness of his claimed expenses should be
reviewed with the parties' prior standard of
living in mind. The trial court should have
then determined whether plaintiffs resources exceeded his reasonable needs. At
this point the trial court should have, and
in fact did, consider the impact of the dramatic increase in plaintiffs income. If
Western that plaintiffs income would increase
if and because he stayed with the airline
3.

Defendant's actual expenses at the time of trial
were hkel> greatlv diminished due to her limited income at the time She therefore correctly
sought to present not only her actual expenses
during the separation, but also the expenses she
claimed would be necessary to maintain or, in
many cases return to, the standard of living she
enjoyed prior to separation
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plaintiff had not received the raise, then his
ability to pay would be approximately
$4,500 less per month, in which case neither party would likely be able to enjoy a
standard of living anywhere near their previous standard. Inasmuch as plaintiffs
raise has increased his ability to pay, defendant will be directly benefitted without resort to a hypothetical standard of living to
which she had not grown accustomed.
After determining what resources were
available to the parties to meet their own
reasonable expenses, the trial court should
have considered any imbalance in the prospective standards of living if the parties
were left to support themselves with their
own resources. If it were apparent that
defendant could not maintain her previous
standard of living with her own resources,
and that the plaintiff with his dramatically
increased income could maintain a higher
standard of living, then the trial court
could have awarded alimony to raise the
standard of living of the defendant. Davis
v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988)
("the ultimate test of the propriety of an
alimony award is whether, given all of
these factors, the party receiving alimony
will be unable to support him- or herself 'as
nearly as possible at the standard of living
. . . enjoyed during the marriage,' " quoting
English, 565 P.2d at 411).4
Inasmuch as the trial court failed to follow the foregoing approach, the court
abused its discretion in making the alimony
award. I therefore concur with the majority that this case must be remanded to
allow the trial court to properly consider
the established factors and make appropriate findings. However, since plaintiffs
raise will be fully considered when his ability to pay alimony is determined, I believe
there is no need to depart from the established criteria for determining alimony
The parties' standard of living need not,
and should not, be extrapolated so as to
4. The alimony award, however, need not be
large enough to maintain the receiving spouse
at the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage if that amount of alimony would low
er the standard of living of the paying spouse
below that of the receiving spouse Alimony
may only raise the standard of living of the

include speculations about what their standard of Irving might have been at the time
of trial if they had not separated. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority
opinion's legal ruling on that point

STATE of Utah in the Interest of M.S.,
a person under the age of
eighteen years,
v.
Michael SALATA, Appellant
No. 900193-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Feb. 28, 1991.

Father appealed from order of the
Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake
County, Arthur G. Chnstean, J., which teis
mmated parental rights. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that evidence sustained trial court's factual findings and d&
termination that father was unfit
Affirmed

1. Infants <3=»248
Claim that court had improperly considered inadmissible hearsay in reaching its
findings in parental rights termination case
would not be considered on appeal where
parent dxi not refer to the rule of evidence
against admitting hearsay to the definition
of hearsay, to any cases resolving hearsay
issues, or to am asserted hearsay admitted
by the court Rules App.Proc , Rule 24(a).
receiving spouse until it i* roughlv equal to that
of the paving spouse It is in this sense that
ahmon\ should seek "to the extent possible, [to]
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards," Rasband t Rasband, 752 P.2d
1331, 1333 (Utah CuApp 19S8)
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Because Erickson made no effort at any
time to procure a buyer for either piece of
equipment and had approved the sale of the
shear on the day set forth in the notice for
less than was eventually obtained, we cannot find that he was prejudiced by either
the technical defects in the notice or the
slight delay in the sale. In fact, since he
acquiesced to the lower bid, the delay actually worked to his advantage by lessening
the deficiency by $2,000. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the notice
was reasonable.
The deficiency judgment entered by the
lower court against Erickson is therefore
affirmed. In light of the facts that the
leases involved in this matter provided for
an award of attorney fees to Scharf in any
action necessary to enforce the leases and
the trial court awarded them to her in
connection with the proceedings below, we
remand the case for determination of reasonable fees in connection with this appeal
as well. Management Services Corp. v.
Development Associates, Utah, 617 P.2d
406, 409 (1980).
HALL, C.J., and HOWE and DURHAM,
JJ., concur.
STEWART, J, concurs in the result.
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DeMar D. JONES, Plaintiff
and Respondent.
v.
Harriet H. JONES, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 18733.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 17, 1985.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Raymond S. Uno, J., entered de-

cree of divorce, divided marital assets, and
determined alimony. Wife appealed the
property division and alimony award. The
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that:
(1) Supreme Court could not determine
whether trial court distributed marital assets equitably; (2) trial court abused its
discretion in fixing monthly alimony award
to wife at $1,000 for five years, $750 for
five additional years, and $500 thereafter;
and (3) how husband chose to allocate profits between himself and his business was
not binding on court in determining husband's ability to pay alimony.
Remanded.

1. Divorce <S=>253(4)
Supreme Court could not determine
from the record whether trial court equitably distributed property in divorce proceeding and trial court's statement that property distribution was "fair and equitable"
was insufficient finding where trial court
provided no findings of fact that fixed values of marital assets.
2. Divorce <s=>253(4)
In divorce proceeding, when one of the
parties to a property distribution raises a
serious question as to value of one or more
of the marital assets, trial court's distribution of those assets should be based upon
written findings of fact that will permit
appellate review.
3. Divorce <&=>286(1)
Wife waived claim that distribution of
marital assets was inequitable where wife's
attorney prepared the inadequate findings
of fact regarding marital asset values and
where wife's attorney made no motion to
have trial court amend the findings to include values.
4. Divorce <s=*237
In fixing a reasonable alimony award,
court should consider the financial conditions and needs of the wife, the ability of
the wife to produce a sufficient income for
herself, and the ability of the husband to
provide support.
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5. Divorce <3»240(4)
Alimony award to wife allowing her
monthly alimony of $1,000 for five years,
$750 for five additional years, and $500
thereafter was insufficient where, other
than assets awarded to her in property
distribution, wife had no assets and no
outside income, where husband and wife
had formerly enjoyed a very comfortable
life style, where wife was awarded no income-producing assets, where wife was obligated to make mortgage payments of
nearly $700 per month on residence, where
wife would be unable to maintain anything
like the standard of living she enjoyed during
marriage, where wife was 52 years old and
had no professional training and few marketable skills, and where husband was in an
excellent position to provide adequate continuing support to wife.

The parties were married on December
13, 1952. They separated during May of
1980, and their divorce decree was entered
on June 14, 1982. During the course of the
marriage, the couple raised four children,
buflt a 4$00-square-ioot home ion Sandy,
Utah, and established a retail pharmacy
business, Riverton Drug, which was the
primary income-producing asset of the marriage. The husband is a licensed pharmacist During the early years of the marriage, the wife worked in minor clerical
jobs. However, after the family began to
grow, she worked only intermittently,
usually at the pharmacy or the associated
gift shop. Her primary occupation during
the marriage was raising the children, although she also volunteered considerable
time to a variety of social service organizations.

6. Divorce <fc*237
How husband chose to allocate profit
from his business between himself and the
business was not binding on court in determining husband's ability to pay a\iraony, full profit produced by the business,
adjusted for legitimate and reasonable
needs of the business for additional capital,
should have been used by trial court as
basis for assessing husband's ability to provide alimony; trial court should not permit
claims of need for capital on the part of the
business to take precedence over support
needs of wife.

After a day-long trial, the trial court
issued a memorandum opinion awarding
the parties a divorce and describing the
property to be awarded to each. Shortly
thereafter, the wife's counsel submitted
fmdi&gs of ffcct, wV\kh were approved by
the trial court. The findings consisted of
nothing more than statements taken from
the court's memorandum opinion setting
out the property division and reciting that
it was "fair and equitable." Neither the
memorandum decision nor the findings assigned individual values to each of the assets or a total value to the cumulative
share being awarded to each party. Under
the terms of the decree, the husband received Riverton Drug, including the land,
building, and balance sheet assets, a condominium he had purchased subsequent to
the parties' separation, together with its
furnishings, a country club membership,
and all interest in a time-share condominium in Mazatlan. The wife received the
family home with its furnishings, a country
club membership, a 1980 automobile, and
several securities. In addition to the specific items oi property, the wiie -was awarded $10,000 in cash, $3,500 in attorney fees,
and monthly alimony of $1,000 for five
years, $750 for five additional years, and
$500 thereafter. The wife challenges both

B.L. Dart, John D. Parken, Salt Lake
City, for defendant and appellant
Glenn Richman, Salt Lake City, plaintiff
and respondent.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Defendant appeals from the property distribution and alimony provisions of a decree of divorce, contending that she was
not given an appropriate share of the marital assets and that the aVimony award is
insufficient. We affirm the property division, but reverse the alimony award and
remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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the property distribution and alimony provisions of the decree.
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court
may make such orders concerning property
distribution and alimony as are equitable.
U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5 (1984 ed.). The trial
court has broad latitude in such matters,
and orders distributing property and setting alimony will not be lightly disturbed.
See e.g., Higley v. Higley, Utah, 676 P.2d
379, 382 (1983); Dority v. Dority, Utah,
645 P.2d 56, 59 (1982); English v. English,
Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (1977). However,
the trial court must exercise its discretion
in accordance with the standards that have
been set by this Court. In the present
case, we find that the trial court did not
comply with those standards. We therefore reverse and remand, but only as to the
alimony issue.
We address first the property distribution. The wife argues that the trial court
awarded her such a small portion of the
marital assets as to make the entire distribution inequitable. Ordinarily, we would
assess the merit of such an assertion by
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact
and the values it assigned to the various
items of property included in the distribution. However, in the present case there
are no findings of fact that fix these values. In an attempt to compensate for the
trial court's failure to make such findings,
we have reviewed the record to determine
whether the values were apparent from the
evidence. However, that examination reveals that the valuation of the most important assets was hotly disputed by the parties. If the trial court accepted one set of
values, the wife was clearly awarded too
little; if another set was adopted, it is
possible that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion.
[1,2] On the present record, we cannot
determine whether the trial court distributed the property equitably. In re Marriage
of Martin, 22 Wash App. 295, 588 P.2d
1235, 1236 (1979). To avoid problems of
this nature, we require that when one of
the parties to a property distribution raises
a serious question as to the value of one or

more of the assets, the trial court's distribution of those assets should be based
upon written findings of fact that wOl permit appellate review. Cf Chandler v.
West, Utah, 610 P.2d 1299,1301 (1980).
Counsel for the wife contends that the
matter should be remanded to the trial
court for entry of the required findings.
The husband contends that such a remand
is unnecessary. He relies on Pearson v.
Pearson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1080 (1977), for
the proposition that the trial court need
only make generalized findings of fact to
support its judgment and that the trial
court's statement that the distribution was
"fair and equitable" is a sufficient finding
to sustain the judgment.
The husband misreads Pearson. There
the court entered a decree dividing the
marital property pursuant to a general formula stipulated to by the parties. Appellant asserted that the court failed to make
detailed findings of fact showing that the
distribution was in accord with the stipulation. We held that the discretion conferred
on the trial court by section 30-3-5 of the
Code could not be controlled by a stipulation of the parties and that the trial court's
general and rather conclusory findings of
fact were sufficient to support the property
distribution. Id. at 1082. However, we
specifically observed that the Pearson appellant did not claim that the ultimate distribution was inequitable. That fact was
critical to the affirmance. In contrast, the
gravamen of the wife's claim here is that
the distribution was inequitable. To determine whether equity was done, we must
have before us specific findings on the
facts pertinent to that issue.
[3] Normally, we would grant the remedy sought by the wife and remand for
findings on the specific value of the assets.
In this case, however, the wife's attorney
prepared the inadequate findings of fact
she challenges on appeal and the conclusions of law and decree of divorce, all of
which the court entered without alteration.
Counsel for the wife made no motion to
have the trial court amend the findings to
include values. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(b).
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The wife cannot come now, albeit through
new counsel, and complain of her own failure to include specific property values in
the findings of fact She has waived the
claim.
The wife's second claim is that the trial
court abused its discretion in making the
alimony award, considering both the length
of the marriage and the present financial
resources of the parties. We agree.
[4,5] This Court has described the purpose of alimony: "[T]he most important
function of alimony is to provide support
for the wife as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." English v. English,
565 P.2d at 411. With this purpose in
mind, the Court in English articulated
three factors that must be considered in
fixing a reasonable alimony award:
[1] the financial conditions and needs of
the wife;
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a
sufficient income for herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to provide
support
Id at 411-12 (citations omitted). See also
Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P.2d 144,
147 (1978); Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615
P.2d 1218, 1223 (1980). Nowhere in the
trial court's memorandum decision, its findings of fact, or its statements made on the
record at the conclusion of the hearing is
there any indication that the court analyzed
the circumstances of the parties in light of
these three factors. And our attempt to
perform this analysis through a review of
the record evidence compels us to conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in
fixing the alimony award.
As noted, the first factor to be considered is the financial condition and needs
of the wife. Other than the assets awarded her in the property distribution, the wife
has no assets and no outside income. As a
result of the success of Riverton Drug, the
couple had enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle. In the property settlement, the wife
was awarded no income-producing assets.
She was awarded $10,000 in cash and sev-

eral securities of relatively small value and
limited liquidity. She now must make
mortgage payments of nearly $700 per
month on the residence, wholly apart from
ordinary and necessary expenses of food,
clothing, and transportation. Assuming
that she sells the house and uses the equity
to purchase more modest accommodations,
it is almost certain that she will be unable
to maintain anything even approaching the
standard of living she enjoyed during the
marriage, given the $1,000 per month alimony awarded by the trial court for the
first five years and the decreased amounts
awarded for the following years.
The second factor to be considered is the
wife's ability to produce a sufficient income
for herself. She was married at the age of
23 and was 52 years old at the time of trial.
The paid work she did in the early years of
the marriage and the miscellaneous functions she performed at the pharmacy and
gift shop were all relatively unskilled in
nature. During most of the marriage, with
the full consent and support of her husband, she devoted her time to raising their
four children and donating her services to
various social service organizations. She
has no professional training and few marketable skills. The husband managed the
finances of both the family and the business and provided his wife with an allowance to cover her expenses. When Riverton Drug was finally incorporated, the
stock was issued entirely in the husband's
name. The wife has no independent income. It is entirely unrealistic to assume
that a woman in her mid-50's with no substantial work experience or training will be
able to enter the job market and support
herself in anything even resembling the
style in which the couple had been living.
See Higley v. Higley, Utah, 676 P.2d 379,
381 (1983).
The final factor to be considered is the
ability of the husband to provide support to
the wife. The record shows that although
the husband paid himself an annual $45,000
from the proceeds of Riverton Drug, the
total profits from the business actually
amounted to almost $90,000 per year.
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While the trial court apparently viewed
$45,000 as the husband's total annual income for purposes of determining alimony,
in fact he had control over the entire profit,
but chose to take only half of it as personal
income and to set the rest aside for reinvestment in the business.
[6] The apportionment of income between personal and business uses is quite
properly a matter left to the discretion of
the husband as owner of the pharmacy and
gift shop. However, how he chooses to
allocate that profit is not binding on the
court in determining his ability to pay alimony to his ex-spouse. The full profit produced by the business,- adjusted by the
court to take into account legitimate and
reasonable needs of the business for additional capital, should have been used as the
basis for assessing the husband's ability to
provide for his spouse. In making this
analysis, the trial court should not permit
all claims of need for capital on the part of
the business to take precedence over the
support needs of the wife. If these capital
needs are a result of discretionary decisions of the husband to expand and improve the business, rather than to maintain
it in its present condition, then to permit
him to divert income into the!' business at
the expense of his ex-spouse's support
needs would be to permit him to enrich
himself at her expense. Cf. Christiansen
v. Christiansen, Utah, 667 P.2d 592, 594
(1983).
On the record, there is no reason to
surmise that the income generated by the
business will decrease in the future. The
husband, therefore, as sole owner, is in an
excellent position to provide adequate continuing support to his ex-spouse.
The foregoing analysis leads inexorably
to the conclusion that the trial court's alimony award was inequitable, both in terms
of the initial amount and the graduated
diminution over time The wife is in her
mid-50's, possesses few marketable job
skills, and has little hope of retraining.
This is simply not the sort of situation in
which a decreasing rehabilitative alimony
award is appropriate. The husband oper-

ates a financially successful business, built
up over the course of the marriage through
the joint efforts of both the husband and
the wife. These facts clearly call for some
form of continuing spousal maintenance.
The original award must be more substantial, considering the husband's real discretionary income, and should continue at that
level for the foreseeable future.
We remand for further findings consists
ent with this opinion. The trial court,4 of
course, will retain continuing jurisdiction
over the matter and may modify the decree
on petition of a complaining ex-spouse if
the circumstances should change in the future. U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5 <Supp.l983).
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE, and
DURHAM, JJ. concur.

STATE of Utah, IN the INTEREST OF
CLATTERBUCK, Nick Alan.
No. 19937.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 18, 1985.
Juvenile charged with criminal homicide and first-degree murder was certified
by the Third Juvenile District Court, Utah
County, Leslie D. Brown, J., for trial as an
adult. The 15-year-old juvenile appealed
certification order. The Supreme Court,
Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) statute empowering juvenile court to certify juvenile
for trial as an adult provides a substantive
standard for certification; (2) even though
statute empowering juvenile court to certify juvenile for trial as adult does not specify burden of proof that State must meet to
justify certification, statute does not violate
due process; (3) juvenile court's failure to
expressly state standard of proof that
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tion and needs of party seeking alimony,
party's ability to produce sufficient income
for himself, and ability of other party to
provide support
5. Divorce <*»235
Court's failure to analyze parties' circumstances when fixing reasonable alimoNo. 860126-CA.
ny award constitutes abuse of discretion.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
6. Divorce <$=>24(K2)
Alimony award of $800 to wife was
March 22, 1988.
proper where wife was 59 years old and
had spent last 16 years of her life as full
In a divorce proceeding, the District time homemaker while husband developed
Court, J. Dennis Frederick, J., awarded trucking business, it was highly unlikely
wife use and possession of home subject to that wife would be able to provide suffilien in favor of husband, $800 a month cient income to support herself, and award
alimony, proceeds from sales contract of was only slightly more than one third of
home, share in husband's injury award, and husband's monthly income.
other marital property for total of $111,846, and awarded to husband additional 7. Divorce «»252.3(3)
As general rule, premarital property,
property of $118,009, and husband appealgifts,
and inheritances may be viewed as
ed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held
separate
property when making distributhat (1) awards made to wife were proper,
tion
of
property
in divorce proceeding;
and (2) husband's motion to modify divorce
however,
in
appropriate
circumstances one
decree was properly denied.
spouse may be awarded property which
Affirmed.
other spouse brought into marriage.
8. Divorce *»252.2
1. Divorce «»252.2
In fashioning equitable property diviThere is no fixed formula upon which sion in divorce proceeding, court must conto determine division of property in divorce sider all of pertinent circumstances including amount and kind of property to be
action.
divided, source of property, parties' health,
2. Divorce «=>286(2)
parties' standard of living and respective
Trial court has considerable latitude in financial conditions, parties' needs and
adjusting financial and property interests earning capacities, duration of marriage,
when dividing property in divorce action, what parties gave up by marriage, and
and court's actions are entitled to presump- relationship property division has with
tion of validity.
amount of alimony awarded.
3. Divorce *»286(5, 8, 9)
9. Divorce «=»252.3(1)
Changes will be made in trial court's
In dividing parties' property in divorce
property division determination in divorce proceeding, award to wife of all proceeds
action only if there was misunderstanding from sales contract of parties' home was
or misapplication of law resulting in sub- proper where court took into consideration
stantial and prejudicial error, evidence amount and kind of property to be divided,
clearly preponderated against findings, or circumstances of the parties, and fact that
such serious inequity resulted as to mank wife would enjoy minimal standard of livfest clear abuse of discretion.
ing under alimony award.
4. Divorce «=»237
10. Divorce <*=»252.5U)
When fixing reasonable alimony
In dividing parties' property in divorce
award, court must considerfinancialcondi- proceeding, award to wife of occupancy of
Helen NARANJO, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Jose L. NARANJO, Defendant
and Appellant
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parties' home was proper where husband
retained one-half ownership interest in
property, and wife was required to pay off
husband's $31,000 lien against home upon
occurrence of one of several contingencies.
11. Divorce *»252.3(3)
Because of personal nature of special
damages, amounts received as compensation for pain, suffering, disfigurement, disability, or other personal debilitation are
generally personal property of injured
spouse in divorce actions.
12. Divorce *=>252.3(1)
Money realized as compensation for
lost wages and medical expenses, which
diminish marital estate, are considered to
be marital property in divorce actions.
13. Divorce *»252.3(3)
Title to marital property prior to divorce decree is not necessarily binding on
trial court in its distribution of marital
property.
14. Divorce ^252.3(5)
In-kind distribution of closely held cor
porate stock is appropriate in distribution
of marital property in divorce proceeding
where evidence fails to establish stock's
value.
15. Divorce *=>252.3(5)
In distribution of marital property in
divorce proceeding, award to wife of one
half of closely held corporate stock and
award to husband of other half of stock
and all remaining cash proceeds was proper, where value of stock was speculative in
nature, and husband had already been
awarded major income-producing assets.
16. juivorce «=»164
Husband's motion to modify divorce
decree was properly denied where husband
neither alleged nor proved changed circumstances. U.C.A.1953, 30-S-5.

Samuel King (argued), Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant
Phil L Hansen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent

Before BENCH, GARFF and
GREENWOOD, JJ.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Defendant appeals the trial court's judgment in this divorce action, seeking amendment of the judgment
Plaintiff/respondent, Helen Naranjo, and
defendant/appellant, Jose Naranjo, were
married on December 4, 1968 and were
divorced on February 25, 1985. They had
no children during the nearly seventeen
year marriage, although defendant helped
to raise plaintiffs five children from a previous marriage.
At the time of trial, plaintiff was fiftynine years old, had ulcers, but was otherwise in good health. During the marriage,
she worked intermittently at low-paying
jobs. At the time of trial, she was having
difficulty finding a job because of her age
and lack of skills. Defendant, fifty-one
years old at the time of trial, was self-employed as a long-line truck driver and owns
his own diesel truck and flat-bed trailer.
In the twelve months prior to the divorce,
his net income was $27,905. Because of
the length of the marriage and the disparity in the parties' earning capacity, the trial
court ruled that defendant pay plaintiff
$800 per month alimony.
The parties owned a home and property
in Magna, Utah, on which the parties had
built an oversized garage used by defendant as a truck maintenance and storage
facility. The trial court found that this
real property had a fair market value of
$75,000 at the time of trial, and that the
parties' equity in it was $62,242. The trial
court awarded plaintiff use and possession
of the home, subject to the outstanding
mortgage obligation and a lien in favor of
defendant for $31,121.
When the parties were first married, defendant owned a house in Kearns. The
parties lived in the home for a period of
time, jointly made improvements on it and
then sold it on contract, with a balance due
to them of $37,900. At the time of trial,
this contract was in default. The trial
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court found that the parties had merged
their assets, making the full equity in this
house a marital asset, and awarded the
contract proceeds to plaintiff.
During the marriage, in 1980, defendant's left knee was seriously injured in an
industrial accident As a consequence, he
underwent several surgeries and was unable to work for nine months. Defendant's
doctor conjectured that defendant could
continue working for only five to ten more
years because his knee was steadily becoming more painful and could require future
surgery. Subsequently, defendant was
awarded a $110,000 judgment in connection
with the knee injury, $61,459 of which he
ultimately received. Defendant converted
$50,000 of these proceeds into joint thrift
certificates in his and plaintiffs names and
used the remainder for family expenses.
The trial court found that defendant did
not meet his burden of showing the amount
of the award attributable to pain and suffering, and that the injury award was for
lost income and, therefore, joint property.
Thus, plaintiff was entitled to share in the
injury award. In making these determinations, the trial court explicitly took into
account the possibility that defendant
would require future surgery by awarding
him the majority of the income-producing
assets of the marriage, but also found that
his possible need for future surgery was
"speculative."
Defendant testified that he planned to
use the award proceeds to meet his future
medical expenses and to offset his potential
reduced earning capacity. Plaintiff, without defendant's knowledge or authorization, cashed $30,000 of the certificates and,
in her own name, invested them in stock in
National Military Underwriters Co., a closely-held corporation for which she worked.
In distributing the award proceeds, the trial court split the stock equally between the
parties and awarded the remaining thrift
certificates to defendant
The trial court also awarded to plaintiff
other marital property so that the value of
her award totalled $111,846. Defendant
was also awarded additional property,

bringing the total value of his award to
$118,009.
On appeal, defendant alleges that the
trial court erred in: (1) awarding plaintiff
$800 alimony per month; (2) awarding
plaintiff all the proceeds from the sales
contract of the Kearns home that defendant owned before marriage to plaintiff; (3)
awarding plaintiff occupancy rather than
just equal ownership of the Magna home;
(4) giving plaintiff an equal share of defendant's personal injury proceeds; (5)
splitting the National Military Underwriters stock equally between defendant and
plaintiff rather than awarding it all to
plaintiff and awarding defendant other,
offsetting assets; and (6) not looking to the
effect of the decree with respect to defendant's future medical needs.
[1-3] There is no fixed formula upon
which to determine a division of properties
in a divorce action, Turner v. Turner, 649
P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982), the trial court has
considerable latitude in adjusting financial
and property interests, and its actions are
entitled to a presumption of validity. Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah
1983). Changes will be made only if there
was a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion. English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977);
Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah
CtApp.1987).
I
Alimony
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as
possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse
from becoming a public charge." Paffel v.
Paffel, 732 P.2d 96,100 (Utah 1986); Jones
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).
It should, so far as possible, equalize the
parties' "respective standards of living and
maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during
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the marriage." Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d sufficient income to support herself. See
564, 566 (Utah 1985); Hxgley v. Higley, 676 Higley, 676 P.2d at 381. Considering the
P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983). "[T]he ultimate needs of plaintiff and the parties' ability to
test of the propriety of an alimony award is produce income,
whether, given all of these factors, the
[w]here a marriage is of long duration
party receiving alimony will be able to supand the earning capacity of one spouse
port him- or herself 'as nearly as possible
greatly exceeds that of the other ... it is
at the standard of living ... enjoyed during
appropriate to order alimony ... at a
marriage/ " Dams v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647,
level which will insure that the supported
649 (Utah 1988) (quoting English, 565 P.2d
spouse ... may maintain a standard of
at 411).
living not unduly disproportionate to that
which [she] would have enjoyed had the
[4,5] The Utah Supreme Court has consistently articulated three factors which
marriage continued.
must be considered in fixing a reasonable Savage, 658 P.2d at 1205 (Utah 1983). Dealimony award: (1) the financial condition fendant's approximate monthly income is
and needs of the party seeking alimony; (2) $2,300. The alimony award of $800 is
that party's ability to produce a sufficient slightly more than one-third of defendant's
income for him- or herself; and (3) the monthly income, not an unreasonable distriability of the other party to provide sup- bution. As such, we find that there has
port English, 565 P.2d at 411-12; Davis, been no abuse of discretion and affirm the
749 P.2d at 649; Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, trial court's award of alimony.
1382 (Utah CtApp.1987). Failure to analyze the parties' circumstances in the light
II
of these three factors constitutes an abuse
Equity in Kearns Home
of discretion. Paffel, 732 P.2d at 101;
Defendant asserts that the trial court
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075; Boyle v. Boyle,
735 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah CtApp.1987). As erred in awarding plaintiff all the proceeds
long as the "trial court exercises its discre- from the sales contract of the parties'
tion within the bounds and under the stan- Kearns home because his pre-marital equidards we have set and has supported its ty in the home was traceable and because
decision with adequate findings and conclu- there was no trial court finding that the
sions, we wfll not disturb its rulings." parties had merged their pre-marital assets.1
Davis, 749 P.2d at 649.
The trial court found plaintiff, at the
[7,8] As a general rule, pre-marital
time of trial, was unemployed and had no property, gifts, and inheritances may be
income, and defendant was self-employed, viewed as the separate property of the
making a net yearly income of approxi- parties. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133,135
mately $28,000. The Utah Supreme Court (Utah 1987). However, in appropriate cirhas noted that "[i]t is unrealistic to assume cumstances, a party may be awarded propthat a woman in her mid-50's with no sub- erty which the other spouse brought into
stantial work experience or training will be the marriage. Id. In fashioning an eqable to enter the job market and support uitable property division, trial courts must
herself in anything even resembling the consider all of the pertinent circumstances,
style in which the couple had been living." including the amount and kind of property
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075.
to be divided, the source of the property,
[6] Plaintiff, who isfifty-nineyears old, the parties' health, the parties' standard of
has spent the last sixteen years of her life living and respective financial conditions,
as a full-time homemaker while defendant their needs and earning capacities, the dudeveloped his trucking business. It is high- ration of the marriage, what the parties
ly unlikely that she will be able to provide gave up by the marriage, and the relation1. The trial court found that the parties had
merged their marital assets. Appellant attempts

to argue that this finding does not include premarital assets.
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ship the property division has with the
amount of alimony awarded. Id. Trial
courts "need be guided by the general purpose to be achieved by a property division,
which is to allocate the property in a manner which best serves the needs of the
parties and best permits them to pursue
their separate lives." Id.
[9] In this case, we have already noted
that the trial court took these factors into
account in determining alimony. Given defendant's obligation for spousal support
and the minimal standard of living which
plaintiff will enjoy under the alimony
award, we find no abuse of discretion.

property, it is "inappropriate for this Court
to reverse on an isolated item of property
or debt distribution. Rather, this Court
must examine the entire distribution to determine if the trial court abused its discretion." Boyle, 735 P.2d at 670-71. We find
no abuse of discretion with respect to this
issue.
IV

Personal Injury Proceeds and National
Military Underwriters Stock
[11,12] Because of the personal nature
of special damages, amounts received as
compensation for pain, suffering, disfigurement, disability, or other personal debilitaHI
tion are generally found to be the personal
Occupancy of Magna Home
property of the injured spouse in divorce
Defendant argues that the trial court's actions. See Izatt v. Izatt, 627 P.2d 49, 51
award to plaintiff of occupancy of the par- (Utah 1981). Likewise, money realized as
ties' Magna home is unfair, in that defend- compensation for lost wages and medical
ant entered the marriage with a home and expenses, which diminish the marital esleaves without one while plaintiff entered tate, are considered to be marital property.
the marriage without a home and leaves See Bugh v. Bugh, 125 Ariz. 190, 608 P.2d
with one. He also argues that the award is 329, 331 (1980).
arbitrary, in that the garage on the properThe trial court found that defendant's
ty will stand empty while defendant is com- personal injury award was joint property,
pelled to rent comparable truck storage and awarded plaintiff a portion of it It
and maintenance facilities. Defendant pro- reasoned that defendant did not meet his
poses that he receive the entire equity in burden of showing the amount of the injuthe Magna home while plaintiff receives ry award attributable to compensation for
the entire investment in National Military pain and suffering. Defendant argues that
Underwriters stock and the $37,900 con- he was unable to meet this burden because
tract on the Kearns home.
the judgment was awarded in Colorado,
[10] Although defendant entered the and, according to Colorado procedure, the
parties' marriage with a home and now jury verdict was not broken into general
leaves without occupancy of one, he retains and special damages.
a one-half ownership interest in the Magna
[13] In this case, it is irrelevant whethproperty. Under the terms of the divorce er or not defendant carried this burden of
decree, plaintiff is required to pay off de- proof because the trial court has power "to
fendant's $31,121 lien upon the occurrence make such distributions as are just and
of the first of several contingencies, includ- equitable, and may compel such conveyancing the expiration of five years from the es as are necessary to that end." Jackson
date of entry of the divorce decree. The v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Utah
trial court found that the parties had 1980). See also Burnham v. Burnham,
merged their assets over the course of the 716 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986). In so doing,
marriage and that the full equity is an the court may take into consideration all of
asset of the marriage. This finding is sub- the pertinent circumstances in distributing
stantiated by the record.
the parties' property. Wilkins v. Stout,
Even though we appreciate the need 588 P.2d 145, 146 (Utah 1978). Title to
which defendant has for the garage on the marital property prior to a divorce decree is
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not necessarily binding on the trial court in
its distribution of marital property. Jackson, 617 P.2d at 340.
[14,15] At the time of trial, plaintiff
had already invested $30,000 of the award
proceeds in the National Military Underwriters stock. When plaintiff purchased
the stock, it was valued at its purchase
price, but its current value is unknown.
An in-kind distribution of closely-held corporate stock is appropriate where the evidence fails to establish the stock's value.
Savage, 658 P.2d at 1204-05. The trial
court awarded plaintiff one-half of the
stock and defendant the other half and all
the remaining cash proceeds. It would be
inappropriate, given the speculative nature
of the investment and the fact that defendant has already been awarded the major
income-producing assets, for plaintiff to receive all of the stock and defendant to
receive offsetting property. We further
note that plaintiff was not given an equal
share in the award proceeds from the outset, but only an equal share in the National
Military Underwriters stock, so defendant's
objection to an equal division of the award
proceeds is not well taken. While we do
not condone plaintiffs behavior in awarding herself a pre-trial "distribution" of joint
assets, in view of the entire allocation of
marital assets, we do not find that the trial
court abused its discretion. See Boyle, 785
P.2d at 670-71.

Future Effect of Decree With Respect
to Defendant's Medical Needs
Defendant argues that the trial court did
not look ahead to his future medical needs
in fashioning the decree. Immediately after the decree was entered, defendant filed
a motion to modify, which the court denied.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1984) has been
consistently interpreted to mean that the
trial court has continuing jurisdiction over
the divorce decree with respect to property
distributions, and the decree may be mod2. Since the tiling of this appeal, the trial court,
under its continuing jurisdiction, entered a supplemental recommendation and order reducing

ified when there has been a change in the
circumstances or condition of a party since
the entry of the original decree. Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah
1985); Chandler u West, 610 P.2d 1299,
1300 (Utah 1980).
[16] However, defendant has neither alleged nor proven such changed circumstances, so the trial court did not err in
refusing to modify the decree.2
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm
the trial court's order and award costs to
plaintiff.
BENCH and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
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Charlotte B. SMITH, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
•.

Daniel Harold SMITH, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 860252-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 23, 1988.
Parties' marriage was dissolved by the
Sixth District Court, Garfield County, Don
V. Tibbs, J., and husband appealed from
court's property distribution and alimony
awards. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J.,
held that (1) divorce court order awarding
wife the marital home and all furnishings
and appliances therein and ordering husband to repay mother's purchase-money
loan was not abuse of discretion, and (2)
award of $425 per month in temporary
alimony was not abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
the alimony award to $350 per month due to a
reduction in defendant's income.
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A typical example is the case of the
couple who are divorced in state A, their
matrimonial home state, and whose children are awarded to the wife, subject to
visitation rights of the husband. Wife
and children move to state B, with or
without permission of the court to remove the children- State A has continuing jurisdiction and the courts in state B
may not hear the wife's petition to make
her the sole custodian, eliminate visitation rights, or make any other modification of the decree, even though state B
has in the meantime become the "home
state" under section 3. The jurisdiction
of state A continues and is exclusive as
long as the husband lives in state A
unless he loses contact with the children,
for example, by not using his visitation
privileges for three years.
Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act A Legislative Remedy
for Children Caught in the Conflict of
Laws, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1207, 1237 (1969)
(quoted in State ex reL Cooper v. Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d 821, 826 (Tenn.1985)).
Under the facts of this case, Utah's jurisdiction over custody issues was primary
and Washington's jurisdiction was secondary. The parties were divorced in Utah.
Rawlings subsequently moved to Washington, taking the children with her. Weiner
remained in Utah, and continually sought
enforcement of his visitation rights under
the Utah decree. At Rawlings' request,
Washington took emergency jurisdiction
under UCCJA. On discovering that Utah
had continuing jurisdiction over custody,
Washington declined any further jurisdiction under section 14(1). That was precisely what should have happened under
UCCJA. Because Utah had primary jurisdiction over custody of the children, I concur in affirming the judgment of the trial
court
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Russell Bourne RASBAND, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Carol T. RASBAND, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 870081-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 18, 1988.

In divorce proceeding in the District
Court, Rodney Page, J., wife was awarded
automatically decreasing monthly alimony,
property was divided equally between husband and wife, and reasonable attorney
fees for wife were fixed at $3,500, and wife
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson,
J., held that: (1) decreasing alimony award
was improper; (2) court properly distributed parties' assets and debts by dividing
them equally between parties; and (3)
court properly determined wife's attorney
fees at $3,500.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded.

1. Divorce <s=*286(3)
Court's award of spousal support will
not be disturbed absent showing of clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion.
2. Divorce <3=>240(2)
Alimony award should, to extent possible, equalize parties' respective postdivorce
living standards and maintain them at levels as close as possible to that standard of
living enjoyed during marriage.
3. Divorce <&=>235
When determining reasonable alimony
award, failure to consider financial conditions and needs of requesting spouse, ability of requesting spouse to produce sufficient income for himself, and ability of
other spouse to provide support constitutes
abuse of court's discretion.
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4. Divorce «=>240<1)
Decreasing alimony, based on speculation of alimony recipient's future ability to
earn, is generally inappropriate in view of
court's continuing jurisdiction to modify
original decree. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
5. Divorce <*=>247
Award of alimony of $800 per month
for one year, decreasing to $700 per month
for two years, and then to $350 per month
for five years was improper, where court
failed to consider husband's clear ability to
provide support, wife's severely limited
ability to meet her own established financial needs, and fact that husband would
have discretionary income of $10,000 annually and wife would have none.

9. Divorce *»227(1)
Court's determination that wife incurred reasonable attorney fees of $3,500
in divorce proceeding was proper although
attorney fees amounted to more than
$7,000; case was not difficult from legal,
factual, or discovery standpoint
David S. Dolowitz (argued), Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant
Pete N. Vlahos (argued), Vlahos &
Sharp, Ogden, for plaintiff and respondent
Before DAVIDSON, GREENWOOD
and JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION

6. Divorce «=*286(2, 8)
Court's distribution of property in divorce proceeding is endowed with presumption of validity and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is clearly unjust or clear
abuse of discretion.
7. Divorce <&*252.4, 252.5(1)
Court properly distributed parties' assets and obligations in divorce proceeding
by dividing assets equally, and by dividing
net equity in home equally after reimbursing husband for payment of family debts,
despite wife's contention that husband had
gained intangible assets which should be
offset by awarding wife all parties' tangible assets, where court ordered husband to
pay tangible business debts, wife withdrew
$8,500 from bank account and did not account for all money she used, and husband
used inheritance to pay family expenses or
to set up savings accounts.
8. Divorce <&=>223
Court has power to award attorney
fees in divorce proceedings, and decision to
make such award and amount thereof rests
primarily in sound discretion of court; however, award must be based on evidence of
both financial need and reasonableness.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3.

JACKSON, Judge:
Carol Rasband's appeal challenges the
alimony award, the property division, and
the legal fee award in the parties' February,
1987 judgment and decree of divorce. We
affirm in part and vacate and remand in
part
The parties were married in 1957, a few
months after graduating from high school.
Four children were born as issue of the
marriage. The youngest child was emancipated two months after entry of the decree; another is an adult incapable of selfsupport Mrs. Rasband worked occasionally at low-skilled, minimum wage jobs and
did some typing to help Mr. Rasband in his
work. He was a manager of insurance
agents from 1977 untfl 1984 when he elected to work as an independent agent
Their assets and debts were divided
about evenly by the trial court Equality
was to be ultimately achieved by sale of
the family home within three years (to be
used by appellant in the interim), with the
net equity divided equally at that time after reimbursement of respondent for paying $9,992 in family debts and payment to
him of an additional $5,400. Mr. Rasband
was ordered to pay $250 in monthly support for the handicapped adult child, pend-
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ing further review of her condition.1 Mrs.
Rasband was awarded automatically-decreasing monthly alimony of $800 for one
year, decreasing to $700 for two years,
then to $350 for five years, and ending at
$1 per year. She requested payment by
respondent of $7,970 in legal expenses and
was awarded $1,000 of that request
ALIMONY
[1] This court will not disturb the trial
court's award of spousal support absent a
showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96,
100 (Utah 1986). In this appeal, Mrs. Rasband asserts that the trial court committed
such an abuse in determining the amount
of alimony and in providing for its automatic decline. We agree on both of these
related points.
[2,3] An alimony award should, to the
extent possible, equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards and
maintain them at a level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Gardner v. Gardner,
748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).
See also Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649
(Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has
articulated three factors that must be considered by the trial court in determining a
reasonable alimony award: (1) the financial
conditions and needs of the requesting
spouse; (2) the ability of the requesting
spouse to produce a sufficient income for
himself or herself; and (3) the ability of the
other spouse to provide support Gardner,
748 P.2d at 1081; Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d
564, 566 (Utah 1985);' Jones, 700 P.2d at
1075. Failure to consider these factors
constitutes an abuse of the trial court's
discretion. Paffel, 732 P.2d at 101.

ting the first year of support at only $800
per month and in decreasing it to $1 over
eight years, failed to consider Mr. Rasband's clear ability to provide support and
Mrs. Rasband's severely limited ability to
meet her own established financial needs.
The parties' thirty-year marriage began as
they graduated from high school. Mr. Rasband produces about $7,000 gross income
per month; Mrs. Rasband has no income.
Their assets consisted of the insurance
business, a large home, vehicles and personal property, all acquired through joint
efforts. He contributed his income and
labor; although Mrs. Rasband has average
typing skills, she primarily contributed her
unpaid labor. Her homemaking and childrearing efforts advanced his career pursuits. Both parties are functioning adults
with health problems not untypical of persons nearing fifty years of age. The trial
court found that Mr. Rasband's net monthly earnings (after business expenses but
before taxes) were $3,800 and that his
needs were $1,500 per month, "including
payment of the family debts." Mrs. Rasband's needs were specifically found to be
between $1,250 and $1,400 per month.
These findings have not been challenged on
appeal.
The disparity between Mr. Rasband's annual net income of $45,600 and her zero
income is striking. During the one year of
$800 monthly alimony awarded by the trial
court, his income would be $36,000 and
hers only $9,600. His standard of living
will be much nearer that enjoyed during
the marriage than will hers. This disparity
is augmented by his ability to expense
some personal use items through his business and by her additional expense in caring for their adult daughter.

Based on our review of the record, we
must conclude that the trial court, in set-

[4] The trial court made only one
vague, conclusory finding regarding Mrs.
Rasband's present and future ability to
produce a sufficient income to meet her

1. Although the court's order with respect to the
adult child was only "temporary" until the court
received an evaluation of her condition by Davis
County Mental Health, the record contains no

such report or any ruling or further order of the
court modifying or terminating this provision of
the decree, which neither party has objected to
on appeal.
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needs, i.e., that she is "capable of meaningful employment in the future." It is this
finding that apparently formed the basis
for the court's determination of the amount
and the nonpermanence of the alimony
awarded. However, as the Utah Supreme
Court has recently pointed out,
[t]he findings of fact must show that the
court's judgment or decree "follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423,
426 (Utah 1986). The findings "should
be sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on
each factual issue was reached."
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah
1987) (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d
1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). See also Parks v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601
(Utah 1983) (findings of fact must clearly
indicate the mind of the court).2
Mr. Rasband is clearly capable of paying
support sufficient to meet Mrs. Rasband's
entire determined living expense need, now
and in the future, if she is unable to do so
on her own. Detailed findings regarding
her earning capacity are critically important to this reviewing court since the
record evidence indicates that appellant's
present and future earning capacity is minimal. She had no earnings in the year
before trial; she has only a high school
education and average job skills to market
2. The decree attributes present and future work
and income to Mrs. Rasband with which she is
expected to provide ongoing support for herself
and her adult daughter. The court, however,
made no specific earning capacity finding, i.e., a
dollar amount the trial court believes she is
capable of earning monthly. She needs such a
"baseline" in order to seek a modification of
alimony in the future by showing a substantial
change in circumstances if, in fact, she does not
or cannot obtain work providing that level of
income. See Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379, 382
n. 1 (Utah 1983). On the other hand, without
such a specific finding, any income she does
earn from employment will show improved circumstances on her part, supporting a request by
respondent to lower his alimony obligation.
She should not be thus penalized, at least until
her earnings exceed the baseline amount the'
trial court contemplated she could and would
make when the decree was entered. See Can-

Her ability to work is impaired by the
disability of their adult daughter. She will
have difficulty finding and retaining a fulltime job. If employed, her earnings would
undoubtedly be meager for a long period,
given her lack of education, training or
work experience.3
The facts and the trial court disposition
in this case are very similar to those in
Jones, where the alimony award decreased
from $1,000 to $500 over ten years. The
parties were married for thirty years,
raised four children, built a retail pharmacy
business, and enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle. The tangible assets were divided,
but Mr. Jones received the income-producing business. Mrs. Jones had no outside
income and no income-producing assets.
She was awarded a home, but had to pay
the home mortgage, probably necessitating
its sale. She was 52, had no professional
training and limited marketable skills. The
court said it was unrealistic to assume that
she would be able to enter the job market
and support herself in the style they had
enjoyed. The incorporated business generated profits of about $90,000 annually but
the husband drew only $45,000 salary,
thereby providing the husband with additional discretionary income in the business.
As the Utah Supreme Court concluded:
This is simply not the sort of situation in
which a decreasing rehabilitative alimony
award is appropriate. The husband operning v. Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 327 (Utah App.
1987).
It is obvious that many circumstances of the
parties could change materially in eight years or
less. Accordingly, we think decreasing alimony
—based on speculation about a future ability to
earn—is generally inappropriate in view of the
court's continuing jurisdiction to modify an
original decree under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
(1987).
3.

Even if she secured full-time employment at
the federal minimum wage, Mrs. Rasband
would only earn a gross income of $134 per
week, approximately $536 per month. After
taxes are taken out, these earnings plus the
alimony awarded by the trial court do not even
meet her basic monthly needs of $1,250-$ 1,400.
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ates a financially successful business,
built up over the course of the marriage
through the joint efforts of both the husband and the wife. These facts clearly
call for some form of continuing spousal
maintenance.
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1076.

of the decreasing alimony award and remand for adequate findings4 by the trial
court and entry of new judgment and decree provisions awarding permanent alimony.

Although Mr. Rasband does not have the
amount of discretionary income Mr. Jones
did, the award herein leaves Mr. Rasband
with some discretionary income and Mrs.
Rasband with none. The lower court found
$45,000 of disposable income. He needs
$18,000 annually and she needs $16,800, for
a total of $34,800. This leaves him with
$10,000 annual discretionary income, in addition to the advantage he enjoys by being
able to expense some personal living expenses through the business. These facts
appear to warrant permanent alimony in a
monthly amount greater than $800.

[6] The trial court in a divorce action
has considerable discretion in equitably adjusting the financial and property interests
of the parties. Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d
468, 470 (Utah 1984); Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d
1378, 1380 (Utah App.1987). Because the
court's distribution of property is endowed
with a presumption of validity, Pusey v.
Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986), we
will not disturb it on appeal unless it is
clearly unjust or a clear abuse of discretion. Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1078; Smith v.
Smith, 78 Utah Adv.Rep. 39 (CtApp.1988).

[5] Under these circumstances, the
amount of nonpermanent, declining alimony awarded to Carol Rasband creates a
situation comparable to the meager award
in Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah
1983), and the non-award in Canning v.
Canning, 744 P.2d 325 (Utah App.1987).
When this is coupled with the lack of adequate findings regarding her current and
future ability to produce an income thattogether with alimony—will meet her
monthly need of $1,250-$1,400, the trial
court's award is a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion.
Although this court has the power to
modify the amount of alimony awarded in
the decree, the lack of proper findings prevents us from doing so. See Higley, 676
P.2d at 382; Canning, 744 P.2d at 327.
We thus vacate the portion of the judgment
below that sets the amounts and duration
4. See Higley, 676 P.2d at 382
On remand, the trial court must consider
whether the appellant has the ability to earn
enough to supplement the permanent alimony
award to a level consistent with the guidelines
set forth by this Court for determining a reasonable alimony award If the tnal court
finds that the appellant does not have this

PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION

Mrs. Rasband avers that, although the
trial court divided the property equally,
equal is not equitable in this case. She
claims an equitable award would give her,
as a "basic minimum/' the home in toto, as
well as the fixtures, furnishings and appliances.
The underlying premise of her argument
is that Mr. Rasband has acquired during
marriage specific, intangible personal property assets not valued by the court, i.e.,
business acumen, contacts and knowledge.
She asserts his intangible knowledge and
experience have considerably more value
than $10,000. She, on the other hand, has
not acquired any comparable income-producing assets. She claims an award of all
of the parties' tangible assets, instead of
only half, would equitably offset the intangible assets that he has acquired.
The parties, however, had also acquired
$37,866 of tangible business debts, which
ability, then it should modify its award of
permanent alimony accordingly. If the trial
court believes that the appellant does have
this ability, then it should make such a finding of fact Absent a finding regarding the
appellant's ability to work, the appellant
would be precluded in the future from asking
the court to modify her alimony award based
on changed circumstances if she can show in
the future that she is unable to work
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the court ordered Mr. Rasband to pay, after finding that the value of the income
potential of the business was offset by
those debts. Appellant also overlooks the
court's finding that she withdrew $8,500
from family bank accounts in mid-1985,
only some of which was used for family
expenses; she did not account for the rest
In addition, Mr. Rasband contributed an
inheritance (amount unknown) from his
parents that was comingled with family
funds and used to pay family expenses or
to set up savings accounts.
[71 On these facts, we cannot say the
trial court clearly abused its discretion in
distributing the parties' assets and obligations.
ATTORNEY FEES
Counsel for Mrs. Rasband made a proffer at trial concerning her $7,970 bill for
his legal services, identifying himself as a
family law specialist and a fellow of the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. Counsel's documented time was
billed at $125 per hour, his legal assistant's documented time was billed at $40 per
hour.8 He stated that he had attended two
pretrial hearings and that the hours spent
on this case were reasonable in light of two
extraordinary factors: (1) the adult child's
disability and its effect on respondent's
support obligation; and (2) investigation of
the possible hiding of respondent's actual
income by charging off personal expenses
as business expenses.
Counsel for Mr. Rasband objected to the
amount of hours proffered as being unreasonable and unnecessary. The court
agreed, concluding that the case was not
difficult from a legal, factual, or discovery
standpoint and fixing a reasonable fee at
$3,500. Mrs. Rasband had already paid
5. Appellant's counsel advised the trial court that
his assistant was present at trial to help him
with witness and exhibit management. The
court advised counsel that it did not intend to
allow him to receive credit for that work, since
that was precisely the bailiffs job There is
nothing in the record to suggest that the court

$2,500 from monies acquired during the
marriage. Mr. Rasband was ordered to
pay the $1,000 balance. Although the basis for appellant's challenge to this award
has not been clearly articulated, she apparently claims that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that $3,500 represented a reasonable attorney fee in light of
the complexity of this case.
[8] A trial court has the power to
award attorney fees in divorce proceedings,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3
(1984). Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384
(Utah 1980). The decision to make such an
award and the amount thereof rest primarily in the sound discretion of the trial
court Id However, the award must be
based on evidence of both financial need
and reasonableness. Beats v. Beats, 682
P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984).
Reasonable attorneys fees are not
measured by what an attorney actually
bills, nor is the number of hours spent on
the case determinative in computing fees.
In determining the reasonableness of attorneys fees, . . . [a] court may consider,
among other factors, the difficulty of the
litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys
in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the
case, the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar services, the amount
involved in the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience
of the attorneys involved.
Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-25
(Utah 1985). See also Beals, 682 P.2d at
864.
[91 In light of the relevant factors and
the circumstances of this case, we find no
abuse of discretion in the court's determination and award of the attorney fee.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, except for the provisions related to
categorically refused to consider the pre-trial
work performed by the legal assistant in determining the reasonable attorney fee in this case.
Because of this, we need not reach the issue of
whether a trial court must take into account the
time expended by counsel's legal assistant in
determining a reasonable attorney fee.
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the decreasing alimony award. Those portions of the judgment are vacated and the
case remanded for requisite findings of
fact pertaining to appellant's earning capacity, based on the evidence presented at
trial, that adequately support new judgment and decree provisions covering only
the amount of permanent alimony to be
awarded her. Costs to appellant. On remand, the trial court should also determine
appellant's need for respondent's payment
of her attorney fees incurred in this appeal.
If that financial need is adequately shown,
the trial court may take evidence regarding
a reasonable fee and make such an order
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3

(1984). See Heltman v. Heltman, 29 Utah
2d 444, 511 P.2d 720 (1973).
DAVIDSON and GREENWOOD, JJ.,
concur.
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best be promoted by maintaining the prior,
stable and healthy arrangement. That is,
where the evidence was otherwise inconclusive—if anything, favoring Vladimir somewhat—the paramount consideration of stability conclusively tips the scale in Vladimir's favor and warrants awarding custody
to him, as a matter of law. We, therefore,
reverse and award custody to Vladimir, with
Anna to have liberal visitation rights. We
remand for a determination of child support to be paid by Anna and an appropriate
visitation schedule.
The issue of child support raised by Vladimir is moot in light of our order regarding custody.
PROPERTY AWARD
[8] Lastly, Vladimir assails the court's
division of property and debts. In part, he
contends the court improperly found that
the parties had about $780 in their checking account and divided that amount between Anna and Vladimir. Anna testified
that on the day she left Vladimir, she went
to the bank and checked the balance in the
account and the balance was about $780.
A bank statement was admitted into evidence which indicates end of day balances
on April 8 of $781.78, April 9 of $677.09,
and $32.00 on April 10. Anna's testimony
is somewhat unclear as to exactly which
day she left, but nevertheless, we find it
within the court's discretion to determine
that each party was entitled to half of the
amount in the account on the approximate
date of their separation. We also find no
error in the remainder of the court's order
regarding the parties' assets and debts.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The parties shall bear
their own costs of this appeal.
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur.

DcLynne N. SCHINDLER, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
John E. SCHINDLER, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 880355-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 6, 1989.
In divorce action, the Seventh District
Court, Carbon County, Dennis L. Draney,
J., awarded wife alimony and custody of
parties' two children, and husband appealed- The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held
that (1) custody award to wife was not
abuse of discretion, despite wife's emotional instability; (2) psychologist's proffered
testimony as to which party should have
custody of children was inadmissible due to
lack of foundation; (3) husband was not
entitled to new trial on basis of surprise at
trial court's refusal to admit psychologist's
proffered testimony as to better custodial
parent, and psychologist's promise to wife
not to give comparison; and (4) award of
alimony to former wife was not abuse of
discretion, although it did not leave former
husband with much money to live on.
Affirmed.
1. Infants <S=>19.3(2, 3)
Trial court's broad discretion in making child custody awards is limited in that
it must be exercised within confines of
legal standard set by appellate courts, and
facts and reasons for court's decision must
be set forth in appropriate findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
2. Divorce <S=>298(1, 4)
Trial court's primary focus in making
child custody decision must be on best interest of child, rather than conduct of parties during marriage.
3. Infants ^19.3(1), 19.3(2)
There is no required set of conditions
which trial court must consider when mak-
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ing custody determination; applicability
and relative weight of vanous factors in
particular case lies within trial court's discretion.
4. Divorce S=>298(1, 4)
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
when awarding custody to mother by considering only three factors, the identity of
primary caretaker, bonding of children
with prospective custodian, and prospective
custodian's emotional stability, where
factors considered were the most pertinent
to case.
5. Divorce «=>302
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding custody of children to mother
without requiring her to obtain counseling
for her emotional problems, despite court's
finding that mother had exhibited some
emotional instability during marrige.
6. Appeal and Error <s=>757(3), 931(1),
1008.1(5), 1010.1(1)
To mount successful attack on trial
court's factual findings, appellant must
marshal all evidence in support of trial
court's findings and then demonstrate that,
even viewing evidence in light most favorable to findings, evidence is insufficient to
support findings, or that findings are otherwise clearly erroneous.
7. Evidence <&=>571(1, 9)
Trial court's finding that mother's
emotional problems were result of marriage relationship, and its conclusion that
mother was fit and proper person to have
custody of children in spite of her emotional disability, were not abuse of discretion,
despite expert testimony proffered by husband to contrary.
8. Evidence <£=*555.2
Psychologist's proffered testimony as
to which party should have custody of children was inadmissible due to lack of foundation, where psychologist had never counseled with children or with mother together
with children. Rules of Evid, Rule 702.
9. Divorce ^ l S l
Father was not entitled to new trial on
custody determination on basis of father's
surprise at psychologist's promise to moth-

er not to give comparison as to which party
would make better custodial parent, where
trial judge's exclusion of psychologist's testimony was based on lack of foundation,
rather than psychologist's promise to mother, and thus surprise at discovering existence of promise was irrelevant.
10. Divorce <3=>151
Father was not entitled to new trial on
custody determination due to his alleged
surprise at trial court's refusal to admit
psychologist's proffered testimony as to
which party was better custodial parent, on
grounds of lack of foundation because psychologist had never counseled with children
or with mother together with children, as
father should have known basis for psychologist's testimony.
11. Divorce <&=>286(3)
If factors of financial conditions and
needs of receiving spouse, ability of receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for
herself, and ability of responding spouse to
provide support, have been considered,
Court of Appeals will not disturb trial
court's alimony award unless such serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest clear
abuse of discretion.
12. Divorce <&=>240(2)
Trial court's award of alimony to former wife, which did not leave former husband with much money to live on, was not
inherently unfair or abuse of discretion;
record indicated that parties were heavily
in debt and unable to meet their current
financial obligations, trial court found that
former wife was capable of employment
but currently unemployed, and trial court
had examined both parties' budgetary
needs and former husband's income.

Don R. Peterson, Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, for defendant and appellant
B L Dart, John D. Schaeffer, Jr., Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
Before BENCH, GARFF and ORME,
JJ.
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OPINION

GARFF, Judge:
Defendant/appellant, John E. Schindler,
appeals the trial court's judgment awarding plaintiff/respondent, DeLynne N.
Schindler, alimony and custody of the parties' two children. We affirm.
Appellant and respondent married on August 17, 1973, divorced in January 1980,
and subsequently remarried on July 20,
1981. Two male children were born during
the second marriage: John Christian
(Chris) and Cory Lynn. These boys were,
respectively, ages 4 and 3 at the time of
trial.
Appellant's gross monthly income at the
time of trial included a salary of $2,360 for
his work as a deputy county attorney, private law practice income of $500, and contract income of $206. Respondent had
been an elementary school teacher prior to
and during the marriage, until Chris's
birth. She did not work outside the home
afterwards, and was unemployed at the
time of trial. At the time of trial, respondent's monthly income consisted of $400
temporary maintenance paid by appellant
and $500 per month from her parents, in
contrast to her claimed monthly needs of
about $2,500 per month. Appellant claimed
living expenses totaling $3,360 per month,
$1,492 of which was attributable to debts
established in the temporary custody hearing. The parties acquired a home and other real property during the marriage, none
of which had any appreciable equity.
The parties separated on February 14,
1987. A hearing on the issues of temporary custody and support was held on
March 4, 1987, and resulted in an order
awarding temporary custody of the children, exclusive use and occupancy of the
marital residence, and $400 per month temporary maintenance to respondent.
At trial, appellant relied on expert testimony presented by Dr. Lynn Ravsten and
Dr. Ralph Vanderlinden, both licensed psychologists with whom the parties had participated in marriage counseling during
1986 and 1987, to support his position that
he should be awarded custody of the chil-

dren because respondent's behavior was
emotionally damaging to them.
Ravsten testified that Chris had a "very
severe oppositional behavior problem" resulting in resistive and aggressive behavior, was much more aggressive than most
boys his age, had a mood problem of anger
and sadness, and was alienated. He found
that Cory did not have these problems because he was too young. Invoking ethical
restrictions because he had not observed
respondent and the boys together, Ravsten
testified only concerning the theoretical
background of aggressive behavior, rather
than finding respondent's behavior to be
the cause of Chris's problems. He stated
that he did not have any reservations about
appellant as a custodial parent, but cautioned that he did not intend this as a
comparative statement with respect to respondent's capability as a custodial parent.
Appellant sought to elicit testimony from
Vanderlinden as to which parent would be
the best permanent custodial parent. Respondent's counsel objected on the grounds
that Vanderlinden had not evaluated the
children nor seen them interact with respondent. Upon voir dire examination,
Vanderlinden stated that, prior to the initial
hearing, he had promised respondent he
would not testify as to which party was the
better parent. He also admitted that he
had not counseled with the children, tested
them, nor observed them interact with respondent. Therefore, the judge sustained
respondent's objection and did not allow
Vanderlinden to give an opinion as to which
party would be the better permanent custodian. However, he did allow Vanderlinden
to compare the parties' general personality
characteristics.
The trial court awarded custody of the
children to respondent and ordered appellant to pay $400 per month child support.
Further, it ordered appellant to pay the
$875 per month mortgage payment until
the house was sold and, then, permanent
alimony of $500 per month. Appellant was
also to assume debts with payments in
excess of $700 per month, while respondent
was ordered to pay other debts in the
amount of $539 per month. The court en-
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tered its written factual findings and decree of divorce on March 4, 1988.
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial
on March 14, 1988, alleging that the trial
court abused its discretion in excluding
part of Vanderlinden's testimony, that he
was surprised by Vanderlinden's previous
promise to respondent not to testify, and
that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's custody and alimony
awards. Appellant's affidavit accompanying the motion indicated that he had met
with Vanderlinden several times to discuss
the upcoming trial, that Vanderlinden had
given no indication that he had made such a
promise, and that appellant could not have
anticipated Vanderlinden's restricted testimony. Vanderlinden also submitted an affidavit in which he indicated that the children's long term interests would best be
served by awarding their custody to appellant because respondent's psychological
problems detracted from her parenting
ability.
The trial court denied appellant's motion
for a new trial. Appellant brought this
appeal in which he raises the following
issues: (1) Was the trial court's award of
custody to respondent an abuse of discretion in that it was against the weight of the
evidence? (2) Did the trial court err in
excluding Vanderlinden's testimony? (3)
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in
denying appellant's motion for a new trial?
(4) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in
awarding respondent alimony?
CUSTODY
[1] In making child custody awards, the
trial court is given broad discretion, Davis
v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988), and
its decisions will not be overturned absent
an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice.
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159
(Utah Ct.App 1989) This discretion is limited in that: (1) it must be exercised within
the confines of the legal standards set by
the appellate courts, and (2) the facts and
reasons for the court's decision must be set
forth in appropriate findings of fact and
conclusions of law Id.; see also Daws,
749 P.2d at 648

[2] The trial court's primary focus must
be on the best interests of the child, rather
than on the conduct of the parties during
the marriage. Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d
972, 974 n. 4 (Ct.App.1989). To determine
the best interests of the child, the trial
court must consider "function-related"
factors, which include:
the preference of the child; keeping siblings together; the relative strength of
the child's bond with one or both of the
prospective custodians; and, in appropriate cases, the general interest in continuing previously determined custody arrangements where the child is happy and
well adjusted. Other factors relate primarily to the primary custodians' character or status or to their capacity or willingness to function as parents: moral
character and emotional stability; duration and depth of desire for custody;
ability to provide personal rather than
surrogate care; significant impairment
of ability to function as a parent through
drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other
cause; reasons for having relinquished
custody in the past; religious compatibility with the child; kinship, including, in
extraordinary circumstances, stepparent
status; and financial condition.
Id. at 973 (quoting Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982)). This
court has recognized that some of the more
significant factors, although not dispositive, include the identity of the primary
caretaker dunng the marriage, the parent
who has the greatest flexibility to provide
personal care for the child, and the relative
stability of the environment each parent is
capable of providing Id at 56.
[3,4] Appellant argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by considering
only three factors, the identity of the primary caretaker, the bonding of the children
with the prospective custodian, and the prospective custodian's emotional stability,
and then disregarding evidence that
weighed in appellant's favor on the emotional stability factor. The trial court, m
its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
stated that:
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5. During the marriage, the plaintiff
has been the primary caretaker of the
parties' minor children, and has continued in that role since the parties' separation.
6. The parties' children are more closely
bonded to the plaintiff than to the defendant
7. Both parties are fit and proper parents.
8. Plaintiff has exhibited some emotional instability during the marriage which
is principally attributable to marital conflict between the parties and does not
impair plaintiffs functioning as a fit and
proper parent to the children.
9. The oldest child of the parties is exhibiting some emotional problems.
4. It is in the best interest of the parties' two minor children that their care,
custody and control be awarded to plaintiff subject to the condition that plaintiff
arrange for such counseling as may be
necessary for Chris to overcome his emotional difficulties and if qualified counselors determine that such difficulties exist
aside from the emotional trauma caused
by the divorce, plaintiff shall follow
through with such counseling [sic] for
Chris as may be necessary. This conclusion takes into account the emotional instability of the plaintiff which the Court
believes can be addressed by counseling.
Because custody determinations are so
fact-sensitive, there is no required set of
conditions which the court must consider,
but the applicability and relative weight of
the various factors in a particular case lies
within its discretion. Hutchison, 649 P.2d
at 41; see Bake v. Bake, 772 P.2d 461,
462-65 (Ct.App.1989).
Although the
judge's written findings do not take into
account all possible factors, he considered
the factors most pertinent to this case,
which was well within his discretion.
[5] Appellant argues that the judge
abused his discretion in awarding custody
to respondent without requiring her to obtain counseling for her emotional problems.
The judge clearly considered respondent's
emotional state and potential need for

counseling in his findings, and his failure to
require respondent to obtain counseling lies
within his discretion.
Appellant further argues that the trial
court's finding that respondent's emotional
problems were a result of the marriage
relationship and its conclusion that respondent was a fit and proper person to have
custody of the children in spite of her emotional disability were against the clear
weight of the evidence. In so arguing, he
relies heavily on the expert testimonies of
Ravsten and Vanderlinden.
[6,7] To mount a successful attack on
the trial court's factual findings, an appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
findings, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings, Scharf v. BMG Corp.,
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), or that its
findings are otherwise clearly erroneous.
A finding is clearly erroneous when, even
though there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court is "left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d
191, 193 (Utah 1987). This court does not
consider evidence de novo, so the mere fact
that we might reach a different result than
the trial court on the same evidence does
not justify setting aside the trial court's
findings. Id.
Evidence as to respondent's emotional
state, its effect on the children, and her
ability as a parent is extremely controverted. Respondent admitted she "ranted and
raved" at times, but that this was due to
the interpersonal conflict with appellant.
Appellant admitted that respondent was
able to take physical care of the boys and
behaved appropriately in public, but felt
that she disciplined them inappropriately,
was emotionally detached from them, and
had an angry and explosive temperament
which was upsetting to them. Although
appellant's expert witnesses testified, in
substance, that respondent's parenting
skills were substantially impaired by her
emotional state, there was much other evidence presented as to her positive parent-
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ing skills, her involvement with the children, and their bonding to her. Further,
respondent's witnesses had observed her
interact with the children while appellant's
experts had no such opportunity. Thus,
even though much of the expert testimony
supports appellant's position, he has not
taken all of the evidence in respondent's
favor, viewed it in the light most favorable
to the trial court's findings, and demonstrated that it is insufficient to support the
court's findings or otherwise shown that
the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous.
Therefore, we find that the court did not
abuse its discretion in considering three
factors and in not weighing the emotional
stability factor in appellant's favor.
EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
[8] Appellant argues that the trial court
erred in excluding Vanderlinden's proffered testimony as to which party should
have custody of the children, asserting that
Vanderlinden's promise to not make a comparative statement at the initial hearing did
not preclude him from giving more complete testimony at the final hearing. He
states that Vanderlinden's failure to meet
with the children or respondent after the
initial hearing goes only to the weight and
not to the admissibility of the proffered
testimony, and, therefore, the testimony
should have been permitted.
Under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, the trial court has discretion to
determine the qualification of an expert
witness to give an opinion on a particular
matter, Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping
Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985); State v.
Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 14 (Utah Ct.App.1989),
and the admissibility of the expert's testimony. Craig Food Indus, v. Weihing, 746
P.2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct.App.1987). The expert's opinion may be based upon facts or
data he or she perceived or were made
known to him or her at or before the hearing. Wight, 765 P.2d at 15. The critical
factor is whether the expert has knowledge
that can assist the trier of fact in resolving
the issues before it. Utah R.Evid. 702.

At no time did the trial judge indicate
that he had excluded Vanderlinden's testimony on the basis of Vanderlinden's promise to respondent Instead, he explicitly
excluded the testimony for lack of sufficient foundation, stating:
[t]he basis for my sustaining the objection, . . . is no counseling with the children, no tests on the children, no counseling with the plaintiff for that purpose,
and without that basis, I think thaf s all
we're doing—if his only purpose in being
here has to do with custody, then I'm not
sure that he has the basis at this time to
discuss with the Court the attributes that
can only go to that issue.
The trial court is free to accept or reject
an expert's opinion, State v. Shickles, 760
P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1988); Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 830 (Utah CtApp.
1989) cert filed 106 Utah Adv.Rep. 63, and
may accord to the witnesses' opinion whatever weight it deems proper. Shickles, 760
P.2d at 302. Apparently, the judge was
not persuaded by the testimony of the two
experts, so did not rule in appellant's favor,
which is within his discretion and does not
constitute error.
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR
NEW TRIAL
[9,10] Appellant asserts that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for a new trial, alleging that he was
surprised at the court's refusal to admit
Vanderlinden's proffered testimony as to
the better custodial parent and at Vanderlinden's promise to respondent not to give a
comparison, which he could not have reasonably discovered before the trial.
The decision to grant a new trial lies
largely within the trial court's discretion.
State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Ct
App.1989). However, the trial court has no
discretion to grant a new trial unless the
moving party shows at least one of the
circumstances specified in Rule 59(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Moon
Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah
Ct.App 1988). These circumstances include, among others, "[ajccident or sur-
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prise, which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against"; "[n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the party making
the application, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial"; and "insufficiency
of the evidence to justify the verdict or
other decision." Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(3), (4),
and (6). So long as such a showing is not
made, we will not reverse the trial court's
decision on a motion for a new trial absent
a clear abuse of discretion. Brown, 771
P.2d at 1095; Moon Lake Electrical Ass'n,
767 P.2d at 128.
Appellant has shown none of the above
circumstances. Because the trial judge excluded Vanderlinden's testimony on the basis of lack of foundation rather than on
Vanderlinden's promise to respondent, appellant's surprise at discovering the existence of the promise is irrelevant. Appellant states that he met with Vanderlinden
several times prior to trial to prepare for
the trial in addition to his counseling visits,
and was presumably aware of the basis for
Vanderlinden's opinion, including the fact
that Vanderlinden had never counseled
with the children or with appellant together
with the children. That Vanderlinden's testimony was excluded because of lack of
foundation should not have surprised appellant because, he, in all prudence, should
have known the basis for his testimony.
Also, Vanderlinden's affidavit did not provide newly discovered evidence but only
stated testimony already known at the time
of trial but excluded on the basis of lack of
foundation. Because appellant has shown
none of the circumstances required in Rule
59(a), the trial court had no discretion to
grant him a new trial.
ALIMONY
Appellant insists that the trial court
erred in awarding alimony to respondent
because it failed to adequately consider (1)
respondent's ability to earn income because
her employment status might change m the
near future, and (2) his inability to provide
support. He claims his financial obligations nearly equal his income, which
leaves him insufficient funds with which to
support himself.

[11] Trial courts have essentially the
same discretion in awarding alimony and
dividing property as they have in making
child custody awards. Davis, 749 P.2d at
649. In awarding alimony, appellate courts
require the trial court to consider each of
the following three factors: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving
spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving
spouse to produce a sufficient income for
him or herself; and (3) the ability of the
responding spouse to provide support.
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d
121, 124 (Utah Ct.App.1988); Fullmer v.
Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah CtApp.
1988). If these three factors have been
considered, we will not disturb the trial
court's alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion. Fullmer, 761
P.2d at 950; Andersen v. Andersen, 757
P.2d 476, 478 (Utah CtApp.1988). The ultimate test of an alimony award is whether
the party receiving alimony will be able to
support him or herself "as nearly as possible at the standard of living . . . enjoyed
during the marriage." English v. English,
565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977).
[12] The court's written findings indicate that "both parties are able-bodied and
capable of employment Plaintiff is seeking employment but is presently unemployed and caring for the parties' minor
children on a daily basis. She is trained as
a school teacher, and is preparing to return
to teaching in the Fall of 1988." It then
detailed the parties' economic needs and
sources of income. The court concluded,
among other things, that "[t]here are insufficient assets and income to meet the needs
of the parties."
It is reversible error if the trial court
fails to make specific findings on all material issues unless the facts in the record are
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding m favor of the judgement," Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124
(quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,
999 (Utah 1987)), or if the court fails to
consider the three factors. See Maxwell v.
Maxwell, 754 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Utah CtApp.
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1988). It is clear from these findings that
the court did consider the three factors
when it found that respondent was capable
of employment but currently unemployed,
and when it examined both parties' budgetary needs and appellant's income. The
record indicates that the parties are heavily
in debt and unable to meet their current
financial obligations. Therefore, even
though the trial court's award of alimony
did not leave appellant with much money to
live on, it is not inherently unfair or an
abuse of discretion. Once respondent becomes gainfully employed and her income
rises, there is nothing to preclude appellant
from moving for a modification of the alimony award at that time. See Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987).
Although the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in making an award of alimony
here, it is curious that it awarded permanent rather than temporary alimony when
respondent's employment circumstances
were likely to change significantly in the
near future. Because appellant did not
raise the issue of temporary alimony, however, we decline to rule on it.
Affirmed.
BENCH and ORME, JJ., concur.
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DAVIDSON, Judge:
Defendant appeals from the trial court's
revocation of his probation. He claims that
his probation term automatically terminated after eighteen months by operation of
law pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-l(10)(a) (Supp 1986).1 We agree
and reverse
Defendant pleaded guilty, on September
18, 1985, to two third degree felony
charges of uttenng a forged prescription
sion defendant relies upon in this appeal is
currently
found
in
Utah
Code
\nn
§ 77-18-l(7)(a) (Supp 1988)
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Remanded in part, modified in part and
on hn own motion, recused himself due to otherwise affirmed
„
the colorable claim of prejudice
Pursuant to our holding regarding sec
tion 77-2<M, the convictions are reversed 1 Parent and Child *»3 3(1)
Amendments to child custody statuU
and the charges are dismissed with preju
deleting rebuttable presumption favoring
dice
joint legal custody was a substantial and
HOWE A C J , and STEWART,
substantive amendment and thus could not
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ ,
be applied retroactively U C A 1953, 30!
concur
3-10 2

428 Utah

2 Divorce «=»299
Trial court abused its discretion in Imposing order of joint legal custody on par*
en Is and child without statutorily required
parental agreement and in the face of parental opposition U C A 1953, 30-3-10 1 to
30-3-10 4
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ther relevant facts will be set forth below
in our treatment of the respective issues
CHILD CUSTODY AWARD
Ms Thronson challenges the joint legal
custody decree and order on two grounds
(1) She did not agree to the order of joint
legal custody and Utah Code Ann
§ 30-3-10 2 (1989) required the agreement
of both parents at the time of this decree
and order (2) The provision for an automatic award of sole custody to one parent
when the other moves from the state was
error

Mary Thronson appeals provisions of a
divorce decree and separate order award
bg joint legal custody of a child, child
support, alimony, and property
We re
mind for further proceedings regarding
child custody and support We modify the
alimony award and affirm the remainder of
toe decree

CIHI D CUSTODY IN UTAH
Prior to 1988, Utah did not have a statute
expressly authorizing an award of "joint
Mary M TIIRONSON, Plaintiff
legal custody" • of a child Our divorce
statutes have contained various child custoand Appellant,
3 Divorce *=»301
dy provisions since 1903 For many years
v
Findings were inadequate to support
Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5 (1989) has autho
Charles II TIIRONSON, Defendant
child custody award where court utilized
nzed district courts to include in divorce
best interest factors related to joint legal
and Appellee
decrees ' equitable orders relating to the
FACTS
custody, not those related to child custody,
No 890517-CA
The parties were married on September children, property and parties " Further,
findings were in conflict as to whether
Court of Appeals of Utah
tO, 1978 Their marriage was the first for Utah Code Ann § 30-3-10 has contained
court or parents should determine visitaboth
She was a full time pharmacist and various specific provisions regarding
March 25, 1991
tion rights, findings did not support award
be
a
full
time attorney A son was born to factors to be considered in awarding sole
of any physical custody, and custody WM
Rehearing Denied May 21, 1991
custody of a child See Lembach v Cor,
awarded on the basis of court imposed via them on September 11, 1981 She became 639 P2d 197 (Utah 1981), 1 Utah L Rev
tation time allocation U C A 1953, 304-1 the child 8 primary caretaker and a part
363 (1989) (historical development of child
In a divorce action, the Third District 10, 30-3-10 2(3)
' time pharmacist He became a shareholder custody factors and preferences in Utah)
Court, Salt Lake County, David S Young,
fa hu law firm She filed a complaint for
"Joint Legal Custody" was specifically
J , entered a divorce decree and awarded 4 Divorce «=»306
divorce He filed a counterclaim for di
joint legal custody of the parties' child,
In determining appropriate child siai rorce They were divorced by a decree added to the sole custody statute in 1988,
child support, alimony and property divi
port award, parental income had to includ* entered June 23, 1989 A separate order of and designated as § 30 3-10 1 to -10 4
We emphasize that this is a joint "legal"
sion Wife appealed The Court of Ap
consideration of income from nonearnelj JNnt legal custody was also entered Fur
custody statute and not a joint ' physical'
peals Jackson, J , held that (1) amend
sources, as well as current earnings <K
ments to child custody statute deleting re
buttable presumption favoring joint legal
custody was a substantial and substantive
amendment and thus could not be applied
retroactively, (2) court abused discretion in
imposing joint legal custody on parents
without statutorily required parental
agreement (3) findings were inadequate to
support child custody award, (4) child sup
port award had to be reconsidered includ
ing income from noneamed sources and
husband s current earnings in making cal
dilations and (r>) wife was entitled to ah
mony of $800 per month on a permanent
basis, rather than for only one year

L Custody terminology Many legislators judges

husband, rather than average of husbaniflj and wyters have been loose with their joint"
earned income over several years U Cil custody language Early articles identified this
1953, 78-45-7 4, 78-45-7 5, 78-45-7 5(lXi| veiing problem as follows
Both the forms of custody (sole divided split
(5)(b), 78-45-7 5 to 78-45-7 7
I joint) following divorce and the terms which
describe them are vague and overlapping

5 Divorce «=»240(2)
The lack of standard definitions and the
courts tendency to use certain terms inter
Award of $800 alimony to wife OB
changcably have created confusion
permanent basis, rather than for only« Foiberg & Graham Joint Custody of Children
year, was warranted based on consu
hltonng Divorce 12 U C Davis L Rev 523 525
tion of wife's earning capacity as a
Often when referring to one of these custody
time pharmacist and her necessary mon!
arrangements courts use vague language or
living expenses, and husband's cur
Inadequately defioed terms
[•rati
Joint Custody 67 Ky LJ 271 283 (1978gross capacity and his actual and necesi
I7f)
monthly living expenses

One author points out that considerable se
manlic confusion has resulted possibly because
the term joint custody predates the concept"
of joint custody as it is known today He slates
"I have encountered at least fifteen terms used
to refer to various alternalnes to sole custody
joint legal custody joint physical custody divid
ed custody separate custody alternating custo
dy split custody managing conservatorship
possessory conservatorship equal custody
shared custody partial custody custody given
to neither parly to the exclusion of the other
temporary custody shifting custody and con
current custody
Miller Joint Custody 13(3)
r a m L Q 345 360 n 79 (1979)
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(c) both parents appear capable of implecustody statute. In the 1988 Utah legislamenting joint legal custody.
tive session, Senator Hillyard stated: "This Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2 (1989).
is not joint physical custody. The child
The order remains discretionary with the
obviously can't live in two homes. But it's
court, not mandatory, even when all three
joint legal custody which would give the
conditions are satisfied, i.e., (1) parental
noncustodial parent more involvement in
agreement, (2) best interests, and (3) parthe decisions of child raising." Floor Deents capable of implementation. Further
bate, (Feb. 3, 1988) Sen. Recording No. 42,
sections of the statute emphasize its "paside 2. In section 10.1 the legislature prorental agreement" posture. We note that
vided its definition of joint legal custody:
section 10.3—terms of joint legal custody
In this chapter, "joint legal custody"
order—contains two further subsections
(1) means the sharing of the rights,
dealing with parental agreement:
privileges, duties, and powers of a parent
(2) The court shall, where possible, inby both parents, where specified;
clude in the order the terms agreed to
(2) may include an award of exclusive
between the parties; . . .
authority by the court to one parent to
(5) The agreement may contain a dispute
make specific decisions;
resolution procedure the parties agree to
(3) does not affect the physical custouse
dy of the child except as specified in the
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989). Moreorder of joint legal custody;
(4) is not based on awarding equal or over, the termination provisions, section
nearly equal periods of physical custody 10.4, confer upon one parent the right to
of and access to the child to each of the unilateral'y terminate the order of joint
parents, as the best interest of the child legal custody. The order can be terminatoften requires that a primary physical ed simply by filing and serving a motion.
residence for the child be designated; Once the motion is filed, the court is required to replace the order "with an order
and
(5) does not prohibit the court from of sole legal custody under Section 30-3specifying one parent as the primary 10." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (1989).
caretaker and one home as the primary This provision emphasizes the parental
agreement stance of the statute as initially
residence of the child.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.1 (1989). Sub- adopted and in force at the time of this
sections (1) and (2) define joint legal custo- divorce.
We return to section 10.2(3) to point out
dy: both parents share the authority and
responsibility to make basic decisions re- that the legislature created a list of factor!
garding their child's welfare. Subsections the court shall consider in determining thi
(3), (4) and (5) tell us what joint legal custo- best interest of a child in the context of
dy is not—it is not joint physical custody. joint legal custody (not joint physical cusu>
We note that this statute does not contain a dy). Those factors are:
(a) whether the physical, psychological
definition of nor a provision for "joint physand emotional needs and development of
ical custody."
the child will benefit from joint lep)
Subsection 10.2(1) created a "rebuttable
custody;
presumption" that joint legal custody is in
(b) the ability of the parents to give
the best interest of a child. But, that prepriority to the welfare of the child
sumption was made subject to subsection
reach shared decisions in the child's
(2) which provided:
interest;
,
The court may order joint legal custody
(c) whether each parent is capable of
if it determines that:
couraging and accepting a positive
(a) both parents agree to an order of
tionship between the child and the o
joint legal custody;
parent;
(b) joint legal custody is in the best interest of the child; and
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(d) whether both parents participated in
raising the child before the filing of the
suit;
(e) the geographical proximity of the
homes of the parents;
(0 if the child is 12 years of age or older,
any preference of the child for or against
joint legal custody; and
(g) any other factors the court finds relevant.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2(3) (1989). On
the other hand, the legislature did not offer
any guidance to trial courts' to assist in
determining the "capability" of the parents. The term is not defined. Section
10 4 contains provisions for (1) modification
of a joint legal custody order, (2) termination of the order discussed above, and (3)
attorney's fees based on frivolous pleadings and harassment. Utah Code Ann.
f 30-3-10.4 (1989). The modification provisions appear to be a codification of the
Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982)
bifurcated procedure used in sole custody
modifications. Prior to adoption of this
statute in 1988, the only reported Utah
esse dealing directly with an initial award
of "joint custody" was Lembach v. Cox,
tupra. There, the court stated "a custody
arrangement, joint or otherwise, is within
the broad equitable powers of the court."
Further, the court said "[t]he fact that the
father and the mother could not negotiate a
joint custody arrangement demonstrates
Other Uiah reported cases involving j o i n ! custody are: Moody v. Moody. 715 l».2d 507 (Utah
1985) (modification hearing of an initial a w a r d
of joint custody); Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608
(Utah 1984) (on modification hearing, it was
noted that trial court considered joint custody
*•
but did not order it in initial decree).
i S. The child custody reform of the eighties
L
gained impetus from ongoing no fault divorce
P
trfulatlve reform. Utah added "irreconcilable
£
differences" to its list of nine
fault-based
fc'c grounds
in
1987.
Utah
Code
Ann.
f : f J0-i-l(3)(a) (1987).
"Both reforms look
r<
place with no public commitment or private
I * lahiative for the systematic assessment of the
jfc left) changes on patterns of custody or on child
x L welfare As fashions change and new interest
f . group* emerge, family law is at risk of becom& fc*f a series of experiments that never report
& v result! in ways that can help i n f o r m the legislagk' I h * process." Zimring, Foreword to Sugarman

42S (Ul.hApp. 1991)
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the inappropriateness of ordering joint custody." 639 P.2d at 200.*
Prior to 1980, a handful of states including California had adopted various forms of
"joint custody" statutes.
During the
1980's "joint custody" was in vogue and a
second wave of states adopted "joint custody" statutes. Utah became the thirty-second state (and apparently the last) caught
up in this wave. 2 Family Law and Practice, § 32.04 (A. Rutkin ed. 1990 & Supp.)
(hereinafter "Fam. Law").3
California, the acknowledged pioneer of
no-fault divorce and joint custody, retrenched in 1988 regarding joint custody.
California's 1979 statute contained a "presumption . . . that joint custody is in the
best interests of a minor child where the
parents have agreed to an award of joint
custody." Cal.Civ.Code § 4600.5(a) (West
1979). In 1983, California amended its
joint custody statute to include a specific
definition of both "physical" custody and
"legal" custody. The California Legislature recognized the need to he more specific when in 1983 it defined joint legal custody to mean "both parents shall share the
right and responsibility to make decisions
relating to the health, education and welfare of the child," Cal.Civ.Code § 4600.5Jd),
and defined joint physical custodif as
"each of the parents . . . (have) significant
periods of physical custody." Cal.Civ.Code
§ 4000.5(d)(5) (West 1988). A team of
Stanford professionals proposed the need

1

it Kay, Divorce Reform at the Crossroads, at viii
(1990). As no fault made divorce virtually automatic, fathers' groups began to protest a promother bias in child custody decisions. At the
same lime, feminist groups began attacking legal standards which were gender specific as inherently discriminatory. Then, fathers' groups
turned the idea of gender neutrality to their
advantage in the child custody aiena.
These
opposing forces set the stage for "joint custody"
statutes based on the rationale of "equality"
rather than "equity" and children end up taking
a back scat to the drivers, i e., their divorcing
parents. One writer succinctly summed up the
result: 'This modern trend illustrates a move
backward toward the more explicit lieminent of
childien as property—only this lime the properly is lo be divided equally." Fineman, Dominant Discourse. Professional language, and Legal Change In Child Custody
Decisionmaking,
101 H a r v L . R e v . 727. 739-40 (1988).
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the presumption. Due to the paucity of
to consider "joint custody" as having a pre-Statute and absence of post-statute
third form—the actual residential arrange- joint custody reported decisions in Utah,
ment for the child.1 Later, a California plus the fact that Utah's statute is not like
Task Force recommended that existing that of any other state, we are left to
joint custody provisions be clarified to indi- decide an issue of first impression with
cate that no statutory presumption exists little useful precedent. Mr. Thronson arin favor of joint custody. In response, gues that we should apply the 1990 version
subsection (d) was added:
of the joint legal custody statute, i.e., apply
This section establishes neither a prefer- the amendments retroactively. We decline
ence nor a presumption for or against to do so. The 1990 amendments did not
joint legal custody, joint physical custo- make a mere procedural change or simply
dy, or sole custody, but allows the courts clarify how the 1988 statute should have
and the family the widest discretion to been understood originally. The amendchoose a parenting plan which is in the ments were substantial and substantive,
best interests of the child or children. thus retroactive application is not appropribest interests 01 mc ^...._
ate. See In re J.R, 648 P.2d 1364, 1369 n.
Cal.Civ.Code § 4600(d) (West Supp.1989).
HI Coincidentally, while this appeal 4 (Utah 1982).
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find whether the parents agreed or disagreed as to an order of joint legal custody.
At the time the court ruled, the statute
stated:
The court may order joint legal custody
if it determines that:
(a) both parents agree to an order of
joint legal custody . . . Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-10.2(2)(a) (1989).

vision for automatic change of custody
when one parent moves from the state.
ANALYSIS OF CHILD CUSTODY
UNDER § 30-3-10
Our vacating of the order of joint legal
custody is not necessarily dispositive of the
issues of child custody, including legal custody, i.e., decision-making, and physical
custody, i.e., caregiving and visitation
rights. The trial court's findings might
support a "best interests" custody award
under § 30-3-10, although an award of
joint legal custody was improper. However, both the court's memorandum decision and formal findings specify the court's
reliance on the legislature's list of best
interest factors in the joint legal custody
statute § 30-3-10.2(3) enumerated above.
On the other hand, § 30-3-10 provides:
In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child
and the past conduct and demonstrated
moral standards of each of the parties.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (1989) (emphasis
added).

The form of the statute required a
threshold finding of parental "agreement."
The trial court implicitly found "disagreement" but proceeded with the order.
Moreover, the record reveals opposition to
the order, i.e., no agreement Several
states have adopted the "parental agreement" form of joint custody statute, including Colorado, Texas and Kansas.* The Colorado statute, for example, requires -that
was pending, the 1990 Utah Legislature
ANALYSIS OF JOINT LEGAL
any motion for joint custody be filed by
substantially amended its two year-old joint
CUSTODY AWARD UNDER §
both parties, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 14-10-124(5)
legal custody statute deleting the "rebut30-3-10.1 to -10.4
(1973), and that any plan for joint custody
table presumption" favoring joint legal cusAs noted above, the majority of states
must be jointly agreed to by the parties,
tody. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.2
(1989 & Supp.1990). However, the legisla- have adopted statutes expressly authors I Colo.Rev.Stat. § 14-10-124.5(5) (1973). In
ture retained its initial definition of "joint ing some form of "joint custody" award I Colorado, a trial court ordered joint custolegal custody," section 30-3-10 1, and the Those statutes come in four basic formil dy over the objection of the mother. The
list of seven factors courts are required to
appellate court ruled that the award in the
1. joint custody as an option only when
Our Supreme court has developed the
consider in determining the best interests
absence of agreement of the parties was an
the parties petition or agree;
best interest factors to be considered under
of the child in the context of joint legal
abuse
of
discretion.
In
re
Marriage
of
2. joint custody as an option;
custody. Section 30-3-10.2(3)(a-g). Also
Potinoff, 683 P.2d 377, 378 (Colo.Ct.App. this provision.
3. joint custody as a presumption *
We believe that the choice in competretained in the statute is some language
1984). See a/50 Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 672
regarding parental agreement: "The court
ing child custody claims should instead
preference;
S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Ct.App. 1984) (court has no
shall, where possible, include in the order
be based on function-related
factors.
authority to award joint custody without
4. joint custody split into joint legal cut
(joint legal custody order] the terms agreed
Prominent among these, though not extody and joint physical custody.
] agreement); Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Kan.
to between
the parties
\ parents)," Fam.Law, § 32.0612]. Initially, Utah
clusive, is the identity of the primary
App2d 284, 615 P.2d 806 (1980) (without
§ 30-3-10.3(2) (emphasis added), and, "The bined forms 1 and 3. Now, Utah is form
caretaker during the marriage. Other
agreement, joint custody award unauthoagreement may contain a dispute resolu- but only as to joint "legal" custody. Ha
factors should include the identity of the
rised).
tion procedure the parties agree to the trial court faced Utah's initial BUt
parent with greater flexibility to provide
use
" § 30-3-10.3(5) (emphasis added). with a favorable presumption on one h
(2) We hold that the trial court abused
personal care for the child and the identiUtah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (1989). Our and the requirement of parents' agreei
ka discretion by imposing the order of joint
ty of the parent with whom the child has
legislature's change of position on the "re- on the other. Ma. Thronson opposed a w , kftl custody on the parents and child.
spent most of his or her time pending
buttable presumption" in favor of joint le- custody order. The trial court failed ' Th* statute required parental agreement.
custody determination if that period has
gal custody and the necessity of parental meet the parental agreement requirem > Here, there was parental opposition. See
been lengthy. Another important factor
agreement creates confusion concerning head-on. Instead, th£ court found "< } Unbach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200 (Utah
should be the stability of the environthe public policy basis for the joint legal exists substantial difficulty between K lttl) (inappropriate to order joint custody
ment provided by each parent.
custody statute. Utah and California ap- parties" and "it is in the best interesUi |jiktre parents not in agreement). Thus, Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah
pear to be the first and only states to the child for the parties to be awsH * wt vacate the order of joint legal custody. 1986) (emphasis added). See also Hutchiretrench from a presumption in favor of joint legal custody." The court failed' )D«e to our ruling and remand, we need not son v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah
joint (legal) custody after having adopted
rately to understand the implications of I |Mtch M* Thronson's challenge to the pro1982); Rule 4-903(3) Utah Code of Jud Ad4. -There .re , « u , . . r * £ £ £ £
t ^ X *
, « . , : .he leg.. " • " ^ f i ^ S *
res.denU.1
cu 5 .ody agreementi .nd •"
^ . ^ ^
,„

for the functioning of the post-divorce fin
Albiston, Maccoby, & Mnookin, Does Jointl
Custody Matter\ Stan.L. & Poly Rev. I67.J

(1990).

Illinois. Massachusetts, Ohio, and Wisconsin
t alto adopted simitar statutes. Fam.Law

§ 32 06(21 at n. 45.

434

Utah

810 PACIFIC REPORTER. 2d SERIES

THRONSON v THRONSON
CtfcasSIO rid

Our task Is to act in the best Interest* el
mm (1980) (requiring custody evaluators to
the child We must vacate and remand the
consider and respond to a list of factors)
131 Our comparison of the two lists of custody and visitation award We do Ml
factors re\eals that they are not identical, remand simply for revision of the finding
or with directions to modify the decrt«
although some similarities appear More
over, the context of the respective factors regarding these matters During the inter*
point the thrust of the trial court s inquiry im, the facts regarding the parents aad
in tv»o different directions As a result, their child and their relationships mijcbt
have been dramatically changed Further,
the findings herein will not support an ulti
mate finding under § JO-3-10 that child the joint legal custody statute has bet*
custody should be placed with one parent substantially amended The current ftttaor the other Further, the findings contain al and legal circumstances should be examinternal disagreement The memorandum ined before this matter is finalized That,
we remand for further fact finding and t
decision states ' the court desires the par
new legal determination, utilizing whaler*
ties to arrange between themselves for rea
sonable and liberal visitation which they procedures and hearings the trial court
determine
To the same effect is formal deems necessary—consistent with tfcji
finding number 61 ' [i]t is in the best opinion
interests of the parties and their minor
child to attempt to arrange between them
CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
selves reasonable and liberal visitation
(41
Child
support will have to be recg*>
If the parties are unable to do so, the court
will set a specific schedule" But, the sidered in connection with the above f*
mand Utah Code Ann § 78-45-7 4 (Su?fv
court in formal finding number 65 took
W 0 ) reveals that the support obligate* k
that promised privilege away from the par
ties stating— (i)n light of an appropriate intended to be a shared obligation of boU
reasonable and liberal visitation schedule, it parents This obligation must be allocalW
is reasonable that the parties' minor child in proportion to the parties' adjusted great
will spend 577 of his time with plaintiff, income pursuant to Utah Code An*.
who has primary physical custody, and 41% § 78-45-7 5 to -7 7 Subsection 7 5 ua*
of his time with the defendant" The the items of income to be included in gnat
* 57^ visitation award to the mother pro income It also lists two items to be s*Ja»
vides the basis for the "primary physical traded from gross income to calculate *4>
custody statement
This was the only justed gross income alimony previous^
ordered and paid and child support prtvl
time the trial court mentioned physical cus
tody This specification of visitation time ously ordered Neither of those item* k
surreptitiously imposed an award of joint applicable here Ihus, gross income m U»
physical custody upon the parties without same as adjusted gross income in thu cat*
proper consideration of the best interest But, the trial court failed to include in c o t
from nonearned sources as required If
factors under § 30-3-10 We hold the find
ings to be inadequate to support any award § 78-45-7 5(1 )(a) Moreover, the trial eoelt
averaged Mr Thronson s earned income fir
of child custody because
(1) The trial court utilized best interest several years rather than using "currt*
factors related to joint legal custody earnings ' Section 78-45-7 5(5Hb) fesV
§ 30-3-10 2(3) and not the factors related cates that current earnings are to be u**l
On remand child support calculation*
to child custody § 3 0 - M 0
(2) The findings are in conflict as to the should properly account for these fttai
determination of visitation rights, i e , by pursuant to the statutory requirement*.
the court or the parents,
(3) The findings do not support any
award of physical custody, and
(4) Custody was awarded on the basis of
a court imposed visitation time allocation

ALIMONY AWARD
The trial court awarded Ms Throats!
alimony of $800 per month for one j«a\

42* ( U u S A p p

iVte factor* must be considered by the
tm) court in making an alimony award
I the financial condition and needs of
the party seeking alimony,
t that party's ability to produce suffi
arnt income for him or herself, and
t the ability of the other party to pro
tide support
.Wmiyo v Naranjo, 751 P2d 1144, 1147
(luh CtApp 1988) (citing Engltsh v Eng
M . 5*5 P2d 409 410 (Utah 1977))
"Failure to analyze the parties' circum
•fences in light of these three factors con
•ttute* an abuse of discretion " Id (citing
fkfftt v Paffel 732 P 2d 96, 100 (Utah
IJ&SD As long as the trial court exercises
fei discretion within the bounds and under
&W standards we have set and has sup
farted it* decision with adequate findings
**4 conclusions, we will not disturb its
ttftAfs Dams v Darns, 749 P 2d 647, 649
(Vuh 1988)

Utah
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1991)

it* discretion In making the alimony non
permanent, 1 e , for one year
The trial court found that "an annual
income of $35,000 should be imputed" to
Ms Thronson 1 e , she could earn that
amount, assuming she was employed on a
full time basis But, the court found her
needs to be $3,700 per month, 1 e , $44,400
annually Accordingly, she is not capable
of meeting her needs, she requires $9 400
annually to meet her needs, even when
employed on a full time basis Thus, she
will require the $800 per month ($9 600
annually) alimony for the forseeable fu
ture Otherwise, she will face a substan
tial income shortfall compared to her
needs Further, the trial court found Mr
Thronson s actual and necessary monthly
living expenses to be $4,300 per month, 1 e ,
$51,600 annually
This leaves him with
some discretionary income These findings
warrant an award of permanent alimony
The trial court abused its discretion in lim
iting the alimony award to one year Ras
band v Hatband 752 P 2d 1.U1 1JJ5
(Utah Ct App 1988) We remand for modi
fication of the alimony award to be penna
nent alimony of $800 per month

(l| Here the trial court considered each
W the alimony factors and entered find
•4-v Ms Thronson R actual and necessary
•oftthly living expenses were found to be
11*00 She presented a higher figure, but
•Vc court heard evidence challenging cer
tut items and found them to be overstated
X*. Thronson's current earning capacity,
a* a full lime pharmacist, was found to be
OTHER FINANCIAL AND
C&000 a year gross This finding was
PROPKRrY AWARDS
tftitd on competent evidence and repre
Matt the midpoint of an annual gross sala
There is no fixed formula upon which to
rj noge of $31 000 to ${9,000 The final determine a division of property in a di
fetor, Mr Thronson's ability to provide vorce action The trial court has considera
atfport, i e, his earning capacity, was con
ble latitude in adjusting financial and propttsfcrtd by the trial court He submitted a erty interests, and its actions are entitled
tt*rt<<n-year summary of his income The to a presumption of validity See Naranjo,
toal court used an average of the last eight 751 P 2d at 1146 Ms Thronson claims the
jttn, after excluding some contingent fee trial court erred by failing to restore to her
fee*** in three of those years Thus, the inheritance monies expended by her while
•Mft found Mr Thronson's average gross Hie parties were separated prior to divorce,
acta* to be $71 376 annually This calcu
by failing to replace certain furniture re
ItfM and finding was in error Mr Thron
moved by Mr Thronson, and by failing to
SMS schedule showed his current gross restore certain funds spent by Mr Thron
•rung capacity to be $94 47G annually
son after they separated We have exam
Xeiertheless, we cannot say that an award
med these items and find no abuse of trial
•11800 per month in alimony is an abuse of
court discretion This court will not dis
sWmjon given the above factors and oth
turb a determination of financial and prop
•rfinancialcircumstances of the parties
erty interests unless it is clearly unjust or a
Wt, we do hold that the trial court abused
clear abuse of discretion Rasband, 752
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P2d at 1335. Thus. » e affirm the rulings
on these matters.
BENCH and GARFF. JJ.. concur

applied retroactively.
7tlKa).

U.C.A.1953. 2G-1S-

2. Social Security and Public We Ifart
*»24l
State *as entitled to recover from rt*
cipients medical assistance payments advanced in his hehalf, as recipient settled tut
claim with insurer without state's consent
U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a).

Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 26-19-1 to -18 (1989).' The trial
court granted Utah Department of Social
Services' ("the State") motion to recover
state medical assistance payments provided
for Aundrae Higley ("Higley"), minor son
•f the conservator.2 The recovery consisted of proceeds obtained by Higley's coiiHertatwr through a settlement with an autoMobde insurance carrier. We affirm.

3. Soclul Security and Public Welfsrt
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF
Aundrae I1I(>LEY, a minor.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES. Appellee,
v.
Dennis J. IUC.LEY,
conservator. Appellant.
No. 900236-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
April 10, 1991.
After recipient of state medical assistance payments settled his claim against the
insurer of the owner of the automobile
which caused his accident, State brought
action against recipient under the Medical
Benefits Recover) Act to recover medical
assistance paxmenis provided for recipient.
The Third District Court, Salt I^ke County.
David S. Young, J., entered summary judgment for State, and recipient appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held
that- (1) 1989 amendments to the Act applied retroactively, and (2) because recipient settled the claim without state's consent, state was entitled to recover the medical assistance payments.
Affirmed.
I. Social Security and Public Welfare
«=»24T
1989 amendment to Medical Benefits
Recovery Act, which previously prohibited
filing of claim without State consent and,
as amended, included settlement, compromise, release, or waiver of claim as well,
was not substantive, and thus, could be

Utah 437

ClleuSIO PJd 4M (UtahApp. 1991)

Because recipient of state medical it*
sistance payments settled claim with imuf
er without state's consent, state was entitled to recover those medical assistant*
payments, even though insurer's writta*
offer to settle for policy limits predaUd
hoth recipient's application for State aaiial*
ance and state's acceptance; recipient's
claim was not fully and legally settled until
several months after state became obligatr
ed. U.C.A.1953, 26-19-7(l)(a).
4. Social Security and Public Wclfaft
^241
Where recipient of state medical auisV
ance payments had claim for recovery
against insurer of owners and driver of
automobile which caused recipient's injuries, and recipient pursued that claim without state's consent, state's claim again**
recipient under Medical Benefits Recovery
Act included "any proceeds" payable by
third party to extent of State medical assistance provided to him. U.C.A.1953, 2S19-5, 2<M9-7(l)(a).

Victor Lawrence (argued), Salt Laki
City, for appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen., and
Douglas W. Springmeyer, Asst. Atty. Cea.
(argued), Salt Lake City, for appellee.
Before BENCH, JACKSON and
RUSSON, JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Appellant ("the conservator") appeak
from a summary judgment based on the

ISSUES
Appellant raises four issues concerning
ifpUcation of the provisions of the Medical
Benefit* Recovery Act: (1) the 1989 amendment! to § 26-19-7 should not be applied;
CO he did not file any claim or commence
any action which would trigger the State's
nfht to recover; (3) he agreed to settle the
Ihirdparty claim before the State paid or
fctcaroe obligated to pay any medical assist•act, thus the State's right to recover was
ft* triggered; and (4) the State is not
tattled to recover insurance proceeds
wkkh were paid to him other than "medical
casta."
FACTS
Both parties filed motions for summary
Judgment. The material facts are undisaated. On April 30, 1985, Higley sustained
•cnoui personal injuries. He was sitting
M a car. The driver suddenly drove the
car away causing Higley to fall and strike
an head on the pavement. Farmers Insurance Exchange ("Farmers") had issued a
aobcy of motor vehicle insurance covering
tfct car's owners and driver. The policy
coverage limits were $5,000 first-party nofauh medical benefits and $20,000 for liaL For discussion relating lo whether the 1984 or
1*#9 version of ihe statute applies, see infra at
pp. 437-438.
t The Medical Benefits Recovery Act operates in
tudem wnh the Medical Assistance Act
I 26-1M to - I I (1989). Section 26-18-10,
tub Medical Assistance Program, provides in
a**
(I) The division shall develop a medical asustance program, which shall be known as
ihe Ulah Medical Assistance Program, for low
Income persons who are not eligible under

bility to third parties for persona) injuries.
Higley'B medical bills amounted to more
than $55,000. I Farmers verbally offered to
pay the $5,000 medical benefits, and $20,000 personal injury liability policy limits
immediately after the accident. Farmers'
offer was confirmed by a letter addressed
to Higley's parents dated May 31, 1985.
Thereafter, Farmers paid $5,000 to Higley's medical care providers. No one filed
an action against the car's owners or the
driver, and no formal claim was filed with
Farmers.
Higley and his parents applied to the
State for medical assistance, i.e., payment
of his medical expenses. The application
form is entitled "application and affidavit
for financial, medical assistance arid food
stamps." The application portion of the
form is a basic income and asset financial
statement of the family. The affidavit portion of the form contains a sworn oath
stating that the information supplied is
truthful, an assignment to the State of "all
rights to benefits otherwise payable to me
for medical services" and the following acknowledgment:
If 1 have a right of recovery under an
insurance policy or against a person who
may be liable for the medical expenses, I
have an obligation to the State of Utah
for medical expenses paid on my or my
dependents behalf by the Utah Department of Health.
The Higleys in their application did not
mention Farmers' written offer to pay both
the $5,000 medical payments and the $20,000 personal injury coverage. The application was filed on June 10, 1985 and the
State certified them as eligible for benefits
on June 20, 1985. On October 30, 1985,
the ptalr plan for Medicaid under Title XIX of
the Social Scciuify Act or Medicate under
Title XVIII of that act ..
(3) The department shall develop standards
and administer policies relating to eligibility
requnements for participation in the program, and for payment of medical claims for
eligible persons
(4) The progiam shall be a payor of last resort Before assistance is rendered the division shall investigate the availability of the
resources of the spouse, father, mother, and
adult children of the person making application.
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78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing
fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial
Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of
the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per
annum or fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sentence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-

ficeof a judge of the Court of Appeals is 6 years
and until a successor is appointed and approved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the
present third and fourth sentences and made
minor stylistic changes,

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
14
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(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment by ch 73, effective April 25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) and (b) in
Subsection (1), inserted "resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings" in Subsection (2)(a),
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a), substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a), deleted
"notwithstanding any other provision of law"
at the end of Subsection (2)(a), inserted Subsection (b), redesignated former Subsections (2Kb)
to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i), added
"except those from the small claims department of a circuit court" at the end of Subsection (2)(d), and made minor stylistic changes
The 1988 amendment by ch 210, effective
April 25, 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsection (2)(i)
The 1988 amendment by ch 248, effective
Apnl 25, 1988, m Subsection (2)(a), rewrote
the phrase before "except" which had read "the

final orders and decrees of state and local agencies or appeals from the district court review of
them", deleted "notwithstanding any other
provision of law" at the end of Subsection
(2)(a); inserted present Subsection (2)(b), designated former Subsections (2)(b) to (2)(h) as
Subsections (2)(c) to (2)0), and substituted
"first degree or capital felony" for "first or capital degree felony" m present Subsection (2)(f)
The 1990 amendment by ch 80, effective
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g),
which read "appeals from orders on petitions
for extraordinary writs involving a criminal
conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony" and made punctuation
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3)
The 1990 amendment by ch 224, effective
Apnl 23, 1990, inserted the subdivision designation d) in Subsection (2Kb) and added Subsection (2)(b)(n), and made related styLstic
changes
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1,
1992, substituted "a court of record" for "district court" in Subsection (2)(f)
Cross-References. — Composition and jurisdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15,
39-6-16
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78-45-7.5

78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used.
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of
the child support award. Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the
child may be used to determine the award under these guidelines.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.4, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 6.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 214 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25.

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, S.S.L, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earnings, including year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current earnings with copies of
tax returns from at least the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income from nonearned sources
according to the source. Verification of income from records maintained
by the Office of Employment Security may be substituted for employer
statements and income tax returns.
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(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whethefi
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
3
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
, &
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
**+\£
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, t h e income shall be based upon
employment potential a n d probable earnings a s derived from work his-'
tory, occupation qualifications, a n d prevailing earnings for persons a f
similar backgrounds in t h e community.
Hg
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed afr
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
*;
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:,
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children,
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent c®$
earn;
'%
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he1
cannot earn minimum wage;
i%
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to estate
lish basic job skills; or
^
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the.
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right, such as Supplemental Security Income.
^«
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered
as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the last
sentence in Subsection (5)(b), in Subsection
(7)(b) substituted "If income is imputed to a

parent, the income shall be based" for "Income,
shall be imputed to a parent based," and made
a stylistic change in Subsection (7)(c)
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 214
became effective on Apnl 24,1989, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Modification of award
Cited
Modification of award.
When the parties had agreed to the amount
of child support before the effective date of the
child support guidelines, the trial court erred
in modifying child support when no petition to
modify had been filed and in modifying the

support amount without finding that a material change of circumstances had occurred
since the previous order had been entered.
Bailey v Adams, 798 P 2d 1142 (Utah Ct App.
1990) (applying § 78-45-7 2(1 Kb) prior to 1990
amendment regarding impact of guidelines on
existing support orders)
Cited in Thronson v Thronson, 810 P 2d 428
(Utah Ct App 1991)
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